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ABSTRACT
In religions in which a supreme being is worshipped, he is often said 
to be transcendent. The reason for this is that a transcendent being 
surpasses one not transcendent - and only an unsurpassable being is worthy 
of worship. Transcendence involves being beyond knowledge, understanding 
and language of which created rational beings are capable. In particular, 
unsurpassable goodness would transcend in various ways the understanding 
capacities of created rational beings.
Anti-realist theories of meaning might be thought to challenge the 
coherence of epistemological transcendence. However, these theories have 
serious weaknesses and their challenge ultimately should not worry the 
Theist. Epistemological transcendence might also be thought to present a 
problem to anyone wishing to speak about God, and have beliefs about him.
But by invoking causal theories of reference we can see that this problem 
can be overcome. In order that members of communities of Theistgcan see 
each other as talking of, believing in and worshipping the same transcendent 
God it may well be that these members will need the capacity to believe things 
they cannot fully understand, and to believe things which are inexpressible in 
language mastery of which they are in principle capable. On the face of it, 
such requirements are fraught with philosophical difficulties. But if we 
look carefully at what it is to believe something, and at the various kinds of 
understanding failure that there may be, we see again that the philosophical 
difficulties may be overcome.
Finally, an ontologically transcendent God still has to be spoken of in 
language developed firstly in connection with created items. Aquinas’ 
theory of analogy is touched on in this regard, and a positive theory of how 
the language of created rational beings may be applicable to God is 




Must God be transcendent? If he must, are there in consequence 
insolu ble philosophical problems for the Theist? I am going to argue 
for a qualified affirmative answer to the first question. In the course 
of my argument, I examine some of the meanin^that may be attached to the 
expression 'transcendent1, the various degrees of transcendence that are 
possible, and the reasons for requiring that God be transcendent.
My answer to the second question is in the negative. In order to 
reach this conclusion I study what seem to be strong objections to 
transcendence, based in a number of areas of philosophy. Chapter 4 
discusses the potential threat to transcendence posed by anti-realist 
theories of meaning. In Chapter 5, I scrutinise the problem of reference 
to a transcendent God, drawing mainly on the work of philosophical 
logicians. The question then arises in Chapter 6 as to whether it is 
possible to have beliefs concerning a transcendent God. I conclude that 
none of the objections that I investigate in these chapters do in fact 
present insuperable difficulties for the Theist. Finally, in Chapter 
7, I offer a positive account of language about transcendence in the 
context of theories of language and metaphor.
By the end of this work, I hope to have achieved two broad objectives 
First, to have given the Theist grounds for optimism with respect to the 
philosophical legitimacy of transcendence, and second, to have increased 
philosophical understanding both of the religious motive for transcendence 
and of transcendence itself.
2. TRANSCENDENCE
At this introductory stage, I offer a three-fold distinction between 
types of transcendence, which will be refined and qualified as discussion 
proceeds.
Ontological transcendence
A well-worn phrase refers to God as the ’wholly other'. This is an
2extreme expression of what I refer to in this work as ontological 
transcendence. The implication of the phrase is that God is somehow 
distinct from, separate from, and different from everything else that 
exists. But we cannot interpret expressions such as ’distinct from’, 
or 'separate from' in a crude spatial fashion. Consider the point that 
many theists hold that God is present at every point in the universe, and 
that he is also 'other' than the universe, or 'distinct' from it.
I am going tooffer a quasi-technical specification ofontological 
transcendence, whose motivation and value may not be immediately apparent, 
but should become clearer as we proceed. I suggest, then, that an 
ontologically transcendent being is one who (a) possesses essentially at 
least one property which any other existent would essentially lack, and 
(b) the property in question must also be such that any other existent 
would essentially fail to possess it to a lesser degree.
(i understand 'a has property P essentially' in the following 
Aristotelian fashion, as developed by Brody.^ 'a has P, a has always had 
P-there is no possible past in which a exists without P, and there is no 
moment of time at which a has P and at which there is a possible future in 
which a exists without P'. This account of essential properties cannot be 
applied to God tinless he is understood to exist in time; that is an 
assumption which I make throughout, but for which I offer no argument).
The word 'essentially' plays a crucial role in specifying the 'otherness' 
of God. If it were omitted from the specification of ontological 
transcendence given above, we would merely be saying that, as a matter of 
fact, God is unlike in at least one respect any other existent. And if we 
left matters there, we would scarcely have captured the difference between 
God and everything else - the gulf between him and all other existents.
After all, if the universe is full of variety, a number of items within it 
might be such that each of them differed, as a matter of contingent fact, 
from all other existents in at least one respect; a number of items, then,
3could in principle meet the requirements of a specification of ontological 
transcendence weakened by the absence of the expression 'essentially*. 
Whatever account we provide of the 'gulf' between God and other existents, 
it must surely exclude the possibility that a similar 'gulf could in 
principle exist between an individual distinct from God and all other 
existents.
It is worth pausing briefly to note the importance of (b) in the 
specification of ontological transcendence. Traditionally, God is 
ascribed extraordinary properties, such as omnipotence and omniscience, 
which certainly set himapart from all other existents. But this 
'setting apart' is, at best, a matter of degree. Many of these tradi­
tional properties, though not omnipotence, could in principle be possessed 
by beings distinct from God, and there is certainly no problem in principle 
for the suggestion that other beings could possess the traditional properties 
to lesser degrees - for instance, be very knowledgeable indeed, or very 
powerful indeed. So the inclusion of (b) in the specification of 
ontological transcendence attempts to ensure that the 'setting apart' in 
question is not merely a matter of degree.
There is one respect in which the specification of ontological 
transcendence might mislead; it might seem to imply that God might have 
just one or two ontologically alien properties - that there might be a 
certain aspect of the divine nature around which we could place a neat 
boundary; inside the boundary would be strangeness, or othemdss, whilst 
outside the boundary would be properties which could at least in principle 
be possessed by existents distinct from God, or could in principle be 
possessed to a lesser degree by existents distinct from God.
I now argue that there can be no such neat division between divine 
properties which meet the specification for ontological transcendence, and 
divine properties that do not. Divine properties are bound together by 
links of various kinds. Some of thewe links may be straight forwardly
4logical entailments; for example, it may be claimed that omnipotence 
entails omniscience, or that divine rationality entails moral perfection, 
etc. I do not pronounce here on the merits of such contentions. In most 
cases the links are more complex, and difficult to specify. But we can 
illustrate the fact that the links are present - they show up in connections 
between our understandings of the various properties* Suppose someone 
attempted to explain the nature of divine goodness. It would be quite 
impossible for him to do so comprehensively without also explaining, at 
least in part, the nature of what it is for God to be a person. And if, 
for instance, the view was taken that divine personhood does not include 
the undergoing of emotions and the possession of desires, this would imply 
a very different tinderstanding of the nature of divine goodness from that 
understanding of divine goodness which would go with a view of divine 
personhood which admitted emotions and desires to the divine psyche. One 
could not take a particular view of divine goodness without also coming to 
at least a partial conclusion as to the nature of divine personhood, and 
vice versa. Or again,if someone attempted to explain the nature of divine 
freedom •, he would also have to bring in his understanding of what it is for 
God to be a person - whether, for instance, God has emotions and desires, the 
nature of a divine intention, etc. Divine properties, then, are bound 
together in a mutually supporting structure.
There is one divine property which is ’isolated' from the others, but I 
contend that it is the only one. It is eternity. This reflects the fact 
that, speaking of existents in general, the length of time for which they 
exist is a matter which is logically or conceptually independent from their 
other properties. It must be admitted, however, that it might be argued that 
this generalisation is not without its exceptions - that, for instance, one 
cannot fully understand what it is like to be a person without an appreciation 
of the life expectancy of a person - that a being who anticipated an eternal 
future would (necessarily) be a different sort of person from one who did not.
etc.
5I do not want to get bogged down in these complex issues - I note them in 
passing, observing that, at most, eternity is the one exception to the 'rule* 
that divine properties are linked together in a variety of ways, some clearly 
logical, others more loosely characterisable as 'conceptual'*
Hence, if God is ontologically transcendent, this will not merely 
involve one isolated 'strange' property; if he possesses at least one 
property essentially, such that any other existent would essentially lack 
it, then his other properties, with the exception of his eternity, will be 
'tainted' with ontological transcendence.
Epistemological Transcendence
God is sometimes referred to by Theists as 'mysterious'. I' propose 
to use this expression interchangeably with 'epistemologically transcendent'. 
Broadly speaking, a mysterious God is one about whom there are truths which 
cannot be known by a created rational being (CRB), and/or concerning whom 
there are truths which cannot be understood by a CRB. There can be more 
or less extreme versions of mystery - and this fact becomescrucial when we 
later consider possible objections to mystery. For instance, a believer of 
an extreme persuasion might hold that no truths concerning God can in 
principle be known by any CRB. Or he might think, more reasonably, that 
some truths can be known concerning God by CRB's, whereas others cannot in 
principle be known by CRB's. Or someone might hold that, though there are 
truths concerning God which cannot be known by CRB's, this is not a matter 
of them being unknowable in principle by CRB's. He might take the view 
that no aspects of the divinity can be known by CRB's now, but that in an 
aft^r life they could be known. Or he might claim that no aspects of the 
divinity can be known by CRB's employing their own natural powers, but that 
the divine nature can be known by CRB's if God. helps them.
Ineffabilitv
It is sometimes thought that God is indescribable- beyond the power of 
language to specify his nature. God has an ineffable nature if he has a
6nature which eludes linguistic description. Like mystery, ineffability can 
come in more or less extreme guises. For instance, it might be held that 
to some extent God could not be described, or, on the other hand, that he 
was entirely beyond description. It might be held that no language which 
a CEB could develop by means of his own natural powers could describe God, 
but that God could somehow enable CRB's to describe him, etc.
Some of the relationships between the different kinds of transcendence 
will emerge only as the discussion proceeds. But I want to mention one 
relationship here, which proves to be of importance later - that between 
ontological transcendence and mystery. If there are truths concerning God 
which a CEB cannot know, or cannot understand, how could this be explained? 
If the 'cannot' in question were merely contingent, we might imagine a 
number of possible explanations, and some of these have actually been 
suggested by proponents of Theism. For instance, it might be contended, 
in a Kierkegaardian fashion, that CEB's cannot as a matter of fact know much 
about God, since God must hide himself from CEB's; that he must do this in 
order that he may teach them about himself in an appropriate way. Another 
explanation having some affinity withthis one would be that God chooses to 
present himself to CRB's in a veiled manner, in order that he should not 
'compel' faith from his creatures. I am not claiming here that any one of 
these explanations would prove on examination to be philosophically satis­
factory, but merely that, at least at first sight, a number of explanations 
seem possible.
But if the 'cannot' is stronger - if it is said that there are truths 
concerning God which cannot in principle be known or understood by CRB's, 
possible explanations are harder to imagine. Indeed, the only obvious 
explanation that I can see is in terms of ontological transcendence. God's 
'otherness' explains CRB's epistemological limitations with respect to him. 
It must be admitted that the mere fact that a divine property is such that 
God essentially possesses it, and any other existent essentially lacks it,
7even to a lesser degree, does not seem to entail in any straightforward 
manner that CEB's cannot know or understand that God has such a property. 
Nevertheless we can see, perhaps, that ontological transcendence may well 
ultimately be responsible in some complex fashion for mystery; if so, it 
would be likely that CEB's would be unable to fathom just how it was 
responsible.
Suppose a fairly extreme version of mystery is required by a given 
Theism. We then have in that Theism a situation similar to that arising 
for ontological transcendence. If ontological transcendence is responsible 
for mystery, then no one divine property can be mysterious in total isolation 
from other divine properties, any more than ontological transcendence could 
consist in a single divine property in isolation from other divine properties. 
If there is one divine property which is, say, in principle unknowable or 
incomprehensible to CEB's, then there are others infected with mystery, at 
least to some extent.
3. TRANSCENDENCE IN WORLD EELIGIONS
The man with a religious view of the world regards something as 'highest' 
something as more worthy than anything else of his 'ultimate concern', to use 
Tillich's phrase. There is, of course, more to viewing the world religiously 
than this, otherwise it would be an undisputed fact that Marxism, Humanism, 
and the like, were world religions. For the Marxist takes as that which is 
worthy of his ultimate concern a certain social arrangement; the humanist 
regards as worthy of his ultimate concern the well-being of the entire human 
race. There is, of course, an unfortunate vagueness and generality attach­
ing to the phrase 'ultimate concern' - the provision of paraphrases, such as 
'the most important', 'that which is most worthy of being desired', 'that 
which is most worthy of being pursued as an end in itself', 'that which is 
worthy of worship', do not help much without careful discussion. This will 
be attempted in Chapter 2. Some would regard 'religion' as a word like 
'game' - claiming that there are no features common to all religions; some
8religionsinvolve belief in supernatural beings, whilst others do not; 
some involve ’a general picture of the world as a whole and the place 
of the individual in it' , whilst others donot, etc. In my view, perhaps 
in virtue of its sheer generality, Tillich's 'ultimate concern' marks an 
element which is a necessary condition for a view to be a religious view, 
but not a sufficient condition.
Many religions which are monotheistic in character have thought of their 
Gf- od as transcendent in some way, especially where a central aim of the 
religion is worship of the God. Shortly I will provide some illustrations 
of this. But not all monotheistic religion has concerned itself solely, 
or even at all, with worship; some monotheistic forms of hinduism, for 
instance, are striving for some kind of union with God - and even where 
this striving is also accompanied by worship of a kind, the very idea of 
'union' seems to preclude extreme versions of ontological or epistemological 
transcendence. Both worship, and the desire for union, mediated perhaps by 
contemplation and meditation, may be seen as alternate expressions of an 
'ultimate concern'. In the next chapter, I try to develop the connection 
between that which is 'highest' or most worthy of ultimate concern, and 
transcendence, in monotheistic religions whose practice centrally involves 
worship.
It is within the Judaeo-Christian and the Islamic traditions that we 
have the clearest claims that God is transcendent; it is also these tradi­
tions that have almost entirely concerned themselves with worship of the 
supreme being, rather than, as in some of the Hindu traditions, with practices 
designed to lead to contemplative union or identity with the supreme being. 
Most of the examples I cite from the former traditions are very extreme and 
not representative of the religious thought of the belief system in question. 
But in view of their extremity, the issues involved, and perhaps the motives 
for ascribing transcendence, are that much clearer.
In Jewish thought, a clear connection is made between ontological
9transcendence and being the "highest”; 'All the nations of the earth shrink, 
in his presence, to nothing... will you find a likeness for God - set up a 
form to resemble him?... There is One who sits so high above its (the earth's) 
orb, those who live on it seem tiny as locusts...What likeness then, can 
you find to match me with? asks the Holy One' . In the writings of Philo, 
a Jewish philosopher influenced by Greek thought, especially platonism, we 
find a very extreme version of transcendence. Something akin to ontological 
transcendence is affirmed in passages such as... 'For he proceeds onwards 
before the created universe, and outside of it, and not cont ained or born 
onward in any of the things whose existence began after him'^. Philo 
thinks that God is ineffable, and also mysterious, ’...the Father...directed 
a perception of himself, as far at least as a created and mortal nature could 
attain to such a thing, not indeed such a perception as should show him what 
God is, but merely such as should prove to him that he exists; for even 
this, which is better than good, and more ancient than the unit, and more simple 
than one,cannot possibly be contemplated by any other being; because, in fact 
it is not possible for God to be comprehended by any being but himself^.
God is too great, too perfect, to be capable of being adequately described 
by affirmative propositions. So Philo develops a negative theology**.
The Koran throughout emphasizes God's sovereignty and power; in the 
following Sura amohg others, language is used which may well involve 
ontological transcendence.
'In the name of the merciful and compassionate God,
Say 'He is God alone,
God the Eternal
He begets not and is not begotten*
Nor is there like unto him anyone'.
Within Christianity there have always been strands of thinking which 
greatly emphasized transcendence; other Christian traditions have not done 
so, and some of these, of course, have been especially prominent in modem 
times.
Almost every variety of transcendence is ascribed to God by, for
10
instance Pseudo-Dionysius (c.500 A.D.) - mystery, otherness, and ineffability.
'...nor do existent beings know it (God) as it actually is... nor can reason
attain to it to name it or to know it... nor can any affirmation or negation
apply to it; for while applying affirmations or negations to those orders of
beings that come next to it, we apply not unto it either affirmation or
negation, inasmuch as it transcends all affirmations by being the perfect
and unique Cause of all things, and transcends all negation by the
pre-eminence of its simple and absolute nature-free from every limitation
8and beyond them all' . Whilst the writer has some more localised philo­
sophical motives for making God transcendent, his general drift is that God 
is transcendent in all these ways because he is so great.
John Scotus Eriugena translated the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius and 
wrote commentaries on them in the ninth century. Like Pseudo-Dionysius, 
he asserts of God all three types of transcendence, and asserts them in 
perhaps the most extreme fashion of all thinkers. According to him, there 
is a sense of 'comprehend' in which God does not even comprehend himself; 
even Philo does not go this far - he just says that one would have to be 
God to comprehend God. Eriugena says; '... God is comprehensible in that 
one deduces from creation that he is, and is incomprehensible because what
he is can be comprehended by no understanding human or angelic, not even by
9himself because he is not a what but is superessential...' • Yet again,
Eriugena makes the connection between the fact of transcendence, and the
superiority of God to all others..•' The divine likeness in the human
mind, therefore, is recognised most clearly in that it is known only to be;
but what it is is not known; and to put it thus, in it we deny that it is
anything and affirm only that it is. Nor is this void of reason. For if
it were known to be some certain thing, it would be circumscribed certainly
in something, and, by that fact, it would not express in itself wholly the
image of its Creator who is entirely uncircumscribed, and is understood in




We find that Aquinas takes on hoard some of this, hut not all of it 
in its most extreme forms. Some thinkers put forward a level of 
epistemological transcendence which applies only to this life - in a life 
after death, God will he 'known'; others say that God will only he 'known' 
or 'understood' hy a CEB if he provides them with special help to do so.
I will have to look more carefully at the precise role of the expressions 
'known' and 'understood' in later chapters.
First, many passages in Aquinas suggest ontological transcendence - 
'God is more distant from any creature than any two creatures are from 
each other' He does not, however think that God is strictly ineffable;
he devotes a certain amount of space to explaining just how we can speak of 
God - hy means of the via negativq, and hy the use of analogical language.
In discussing epistemological transcendence, Aquinas distinguishes 
between the questions of how far CEB's can know what God is like, from the 
questions of how far CEB's can understand what God is like. He seems to 
think that in principle CEB's cannot fully understand God, whereasthey can 
in principle know what God is like, even if they cannot in this life, or 
even if they cannot fully do so in virtue of their own efforts. The blessed 
can attain to a vision of God, in which they do see him as he really is, hut 
they cannot fully understand what they see. '...our way of knowing does 
not measure up to...(God). Whoever sees God in his essence sees something 
that exists infinitely and sees it to he infinitely intelligible, hut he does 
not understand it infinitely. It is as though a man might he of the opinion 
that a certain proposition could he proved without himself being able to 
prove it' .
The version of epistemological transcendence put forward hy 
Kierkegaard in his'Philosophical Fragments' looks weaker than that asserted 
by most of the other writers mentioned here. According to Keirkegaard, God 
chooses to hide himself from CEB's. He loves his creatures, hut it is hard 
for him to make himself understood in such a way as not to 'annihilate the
12
unlikeness that exists between him and the creature' • God could show 
himself directly to his creatures, and receive worship from them, but this 
would overwhelm and crush the creature. It is perhaps not clear, at least 
in 'Philosophical Fragments', whether it would be possible for God in 
Kierkegaard's view to reveal himself fully to a creature if God ceased to 
worry about the effect that this would have on the creature.
In the present century, Karl Barth has, apparently, emphasized God's 
ontological transcendence; though according to him God is only 
epistemologically transcendent in the sense that CEB's cannot by themselves 
come to know about God's nature-God has to enable them to do so. The
Barthian view that God can in principle enable them to do so seems to 
imply a much weaker form of mystery than that which would be asserted, for 
example, by Pseudo-Dionysius.
In passages such as the following, Barth urges ontological transcendence
'Ee who is called God is not to be regarded as a continuation and enrichment
of the concepts and ideas which usually constitute religious thought in
general about God... God is not to be found in theories of gods...God... is
and exists in a completely different way from that which is elsewhere called 
14divine' . Or again, 'God-is not in the series of these worldly powers, 
perhaps as the highest of them; but He is superior to all other powers, 
neither limited by nor conditioned by them, but He is the Lord of all lords, 
the King of all kings'^.
A weak version of ineffability is also advanced - 'weak' in the sense
that, in Barth's view, God himself can enable CEB's to speak of him, even
though they cannot do so by means of their own powers'. ...God is not only
improvable and unsearchable, but is also inconceivable. No attempt is made
16
in the Bible to define God - that is, to grasp God in our concepts...' • 
'...whatever we say of God in ...human concepts can never be more than an 
indication of him; no such concept can really conceive the nature of God. 
God is inconceivable. Vhat is called God's goodness and God's holiness
13
13
cannot be determined by any view that we men have of goodness and holiness,
17but is determined by what God is'
Given the vast territory of the development of religious thought, the 
samples presented in this introductory chapter have an inevitably sketchy 
and disjointed character. But we have seen enough to understand the 
importance of transcendence for many thinkers within the Judaeo-Christian 
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CHAPTER TWO
WORSHIP; AND THE UNSURPASSABLE
We have seen that in world religions which concern themselves with 
the worship of supreme being, there is a link of some kind between - 
(a ) that being having a nature which is 'highest* - worthy of worship, 
and (B) that being possessing transcendence. I now turn to philosophical 
explanation, articulation and defence of this link. I know of no 
philosophical argument which could prove conclusively that a supreme being 
who is worthy of worship 'must' be transcendent. What I attempt is to 
provide considerations 'capable of determining the intellect' in favour of 
the conclusion that a supreme being must possess a degree of transcendence. 
This task provides the matter of the present and following chapter.
1. WORSHIP
If someone worships a being, he is paying that being the highest 
possible compliment. He holds that being in the highest possible regard.
He holds that the object of his worship is unsurpassable. (Though I take 
this point to be obvious, it has been questioned, andl defend it in section 
4). There are degrees of reverence which may be accorded Lord Mayors, 
winners of the Nobel Prize, kings, Popes, etc. Worship, if placed on a 
scale with these other gradations of tribute, would go on the scale beyond 
all the rest. In fact, worship involves a degree of reverence or honour 
that cannot (logically) be exceeded.
In worshipping a being A, the worshipper regards A as having at least 
quasi-personal characteristics. I cannot worship a volcano, and yet think 
of it as just an inanimate physical extrusion from the earth's surface; I 
need to believe that it is some kind of 'personal god', with a capacity to 
be aware of me - to be aware, in particular, that I am worshipping it.
In this respect, worship differs crucially from meditation or contemplation. 
In so far as these activities are directed to an 'object', the object can 
as easily be the impersonal substrate of all existing things, the One, or 
Brahman, or a state of oneself, as a personal being. Another reason why 
the object of worship must be personal is this. Most believers who
16
worship do so, to fulfil what they regard as an obligation; they think 
worshipping is something which created rational beings have a duty to do, 
and that the supreme being has a right to this worship. It is a logical 
point that an impersonal item cannot have this type of right.
Worship may be described as an 'intentional' activity ( m  Brentano's 
sense) like hunting. The worshipper's activities are 'directed' towards 
a particular object or being, which may or may not really exist, though, 
of course, the worshipper will suppose that it does exist; similarly I 
can hunt a particular lion, Leo, which I suppose to exist - my hunting 
activities are 'directed' towards Leo as an 'intentional' object, and this 
is possible whether or not Léo really exists. Of course, I could hunt, 
not Leo, but just a lion or lions; this is not paralleled in the case of 
worship - a point which will emerge in later discussion.
The intentional object towards which worship is directed must 
(logically) be thought of as endowed with certain characteristics and not 
others. I cannot admire X without believing that X has certain properties 
in virtue of which it is admirable; I cannot pity Y without believing that 
Y has certain properties in virtue of which it is pitiable. Similarly, as 
I shall be maintaining, I cannot worship Z without believing that Z has 
certain properties in virtue of which Z is unsurpassable. (There is no 
general rule here - I could love P without necessarily believing that P has 
properties in virtue of which P is lovable - I could fear Q without 
necessarily believing that Q has properties in virtue of which it is 
dangerous, etc.)
'X is unsurpassable' might be described as an 'evaluative judgement'; 
perhaps philosophers will never satisfactorily explain the meaning of 
'evaluative' here, or justify a contrast with e.g. 'descriptive'. But we 
can certainly suggest other judgements which are prima facie of the same 
sort. For instance, 'The bull is dangerous', 'The man is courageous',
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'The music is beautiful', and the like.
Sometimes my 'evaluative judgements’ may be ill-founded. I might 
think, for instance that a household spider was dangerous. My reasons 
for making this judgement might be that I think it is poisonous, that it 
bites humans whenever it can, and so on. These beliefs of mine are false, 
and so my judgement is ill-founded. My judgement may or may not also be 
described as 'irrational*; it might be said to be irrational in the sense 
that it is made on the basis of false beliefs; but it need not be 
irrational of me to make such a judgement, since, in imaginable, if 
exceptional circumstances, I might be justified in having the false belief 
that the spider had certain properties in virtue of which it would be 
dangerous.
These judgements can be ill-founded or irrational in another way; they 
may be exaggerated, or, on the other hand, too weak. Suppose I judge my 
neighbour's Alsation to be dangerous. My reason is my belief that the 
animal once bit an intruder - five years ago. My judgement that the animal 
is dangerous, then, is too strong, given that this is my only reason - it 
might have been more appropriate to think of the animal as 'mildly 
threatening', or something of this sort.
Other judgements which are prima facie of the same sort as those 
already mentioned are not open to accusations of ill-foundedness or 
irrationality in quite the same way. But there is controversy over which 
these are. To cite one example over which there should be little dispute; 
if I am disgusted with the dinner, I judge, say, that the food is 
nauseating. But my friend, partaking of the same flood may come to the 
'opposite' conclusion; neither of us could, it may be argued, fairly accuse 
the other of having inappropriate beliefs about the food, nor of having made 
too weak or too strong an 'evaluative' judgement on the basis of the beliefs 
we do have about the food. On the other hand, if my friend was a 
gastronomic aesthete, and thought that there could be something about the
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nature of the food In virtue of which such and such an evaluative judge­
ment was appropriate to it 'objectively1, then there would be a very 
different story to tell here. And there are more obvious examples of 
'evaluative judgements' over which there is dispute as to whether they 
can be 'ill-founded' - for instance, moral and aesthetic judgements.
Accusations of 'ill-foundedness' or 'irrationality' are only made 
against evaluative judgements if the following obtains. The 'evaluative 
predicate' ascribed to an object or situation in such a judgement, must 
attribute a property, e.g., dangerousness, courage, beauty, to the object 
or situation, a property which has an 'objective base*. A property of 
the kind in question has an objective base if the object (etc) which 
possesses it does so in virtue of its possession of other properties, at 
least some of which must be non-relational. These latter properties must 
have the following realist feature; for any one of them, p, if an object
0 is p, then '0 is p' is true in virtue of 0 being p, and also, in virtue 
of 0 being p, '0 is not p' is false. Some philosophers would take the 
further step of claiming that, say, the possession of courage is entailed 
by the possession of certain other properties of the person, etc. I do 
not want to commit myself on this.
I will shortly be defending the view that the property of unsurpassa- 
bility would be 'objectively based'; it would be possessed by a being in 
virtue of that being's possession of other properties, some of which would 
be non-relational, and have the realist feature outlined about. The 'other 
properties' would not all be what traditionally would be called 'descriptive' 
e.g. a being's unsurpassability would be had partly in virtue of that being's 
moral perfection, or so I would contend. (Possibly moral perfection itself 
is had in virtue of yet other properties which would come under the 
traditional classification 'descriptive', but, as I have already indicated,
1 do not attach any ultimate significance to these labels, being unable to 
supply anything better than extensional definitions of 'descriptive
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properties’ and 'evaluative properties0
Some philosophers would deny that any of the so-called 'evaluative 
properties' exist at all, let alone have an 'objective base'. They would 
deny, for example, that 0 can possess courage as a property, and they would 
deny that it could possess such a property in virtue of its possession of 
other properties with the realist feature sketched above, J, L. Mackie 
would take this line on at least the so-called moral properties such as 
moral goodness. On his view, *0 is morally good* is not true in virtue of
0 possessing the property of moral goodness, the latter being had in virtue 
of other properties with the realist feature. He agrees that our ordinary 
ways of talking and thinking often suggest that there are such properties, 
but contends that this is an 'error'?
My defence of thé claim that unsurpassability would be an objectively 
based evaluative property will proceed as follows. I argue that the Theist 
who believes that there exists a supreme being who is worthy of worship must, 
among other things, regard his God as supremely desirable. I show that the 
notion of the supremely desirable involves objectively based evaluative 
properties, and contend that if the Theist is committed to some such divine 
evaluative properties, then he should take the further step of claiming 
unsurpassability itself as an objectively based evaluative property. Of 
course, some philosophers might want to argue that no form of evaluative 
realism is cohereht; I do not engage to defend evaluative realism in any 
comprehensive fashion, but rather to show that it is required by Theism} 
if evaluative realism could be shown to be untenable, this would, in my 
view a fortiori show that a view in which a supreme being is regarded as 
worthy of worship is untenable.
2. WANTS
To explain the nature of the supremely desirable, it will be necessary 
to spend some time in discussing the nature of wants and desires; not all 
of the results obtained here will be used immediately to develop the argument
1 have just sketched; some of them will be important later when we discuss
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the nature of divine goodness, and in our discussion of belief.
It is often thought that 'desirable' is ambiguous as between 'is 
desired' and 'is worthy to be desired'. Whether or not there is 
ambiguity of this kind in common speech, I shall intend 'desirable' to mean 
'worthy to be desired'. If something is such that it is fitting or worthy 
to be desired, it may be morally fitting, or fitting in some other sense. 
When I speak of the ultimately or supremely desirable character of God, I 
mean that he is such that it is morally fitting to desire him more than 
it is possible to desire anything else. These introductory remarks 
cannot be taken any further until we have gone more deeply into the 
question of wants and desires, and accordingly I turn now to this matter.
I make what I hope is the uncontroversial assumption that wanting or 
desiring is'propositional' - thus 'I want p' may be suitably paraphrased in 
all cases by a sentence of the form 'I want that q'. Thus 'Jones wants 
cornflake^ could mean 'Jones wants (that he eats cornflakes); equally, it 
could mean 'Jones wants (that he buys cornflakes)' etc. Context should 
make clear what is meant. The typical want or desire statement is not 
explicit. For example, the wanting or desiring of another person can mean 
many things, and a characteristic statement of such a want or desire will 
mean more than one of these things at the same time. 'Jane wants Peter' 
could mean for instance, 'Jane wants (that she marries Peter', 'Jane wants 
(that she is with Peter', 'Jane wants (that Peter come to her office at 
once)' etc. If Jones is said to want God, this also could mean a number 
of things - but most significantly, and most probably, the following sorts
of things would be meant» 'Jones wants (that he is with God).... (that he
is 'closer' to God than he is now)...(that he continues to enjoy being in 
the presence of God)....(that he has a better relationship with God than he 
has at present),' and so on.
Matters, are complicated by the fact that want/desire has a number of 
'senses' - often employed together, and we frequently slide from one sense
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to another. I write 'sense1 in scare quotes, since my contention is not 
that 'want' has a number of distinct meanings; I wish rather to distinguish 
four strands or elements within the rather wide and sometimes vague notions 
of wanting and desiring that we employ. Within the category of what I 
dub 'B-wants', which I treat first, I will have also to distinguish a 
number of sub-categories.
B-wants-general
Pew wants or desires fail to contain an element of B-wanting. The 
general form of a B-want, where I want (that p) is a belief. It is the 
belief that I will be pleased (that p). 'Being pleased is'vague - 
ultimately it proves too vague, and we will distinguish various kinds of 
B-wants according to more precise specifications of wajsin which we can be 
pleased. A few instances before we go into matters more carefully - 1  
want a holiday' becomes - 'I want (that I am having a holiday)', and the 
B-want component in this becomes - *1 believe that I will be pleased (that 
I am having a holiday)'. 'I want Jane'becomes, e.g. 'I want (that I am 
with Jane)', and the B-want element may be expressed as 'I believe that I 
will be pleased (that I am with Jane)'. I can be 'pleased' at all sorts 
of things - at experiences of my own that I anticipate undergoing - at 
states of affairs which do not involve my own experiences at all, and so 
on. Before we go into this, the general form of the belief that I have 
claimed is identical to a B-want requires a qualification.
Evidently I can desire that certain states of affairs obtain, even 
though they would obtain after my death, or even if, were they to obtain,
I would not personally be in a position to have areaction to them, let 
alone be pleased. For instance, I can want to sacrifice my life for a 
friend; I can want to be famous a hundred years from now; I can want 
there to be no hungry people on the earth in 2080. The distinction here 
is between wants which involve experiences I will undergo personally, and 
all other wants. Thus, if I want to eat a piece of cake, I anticipate a
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pleasurable experience in the course of eating the cake - I believe that 
I will enjoy eating the piece of cake - or, to return to the vague phraseology 
of the beginning of this section, I believe that I will be pleased to eat 
the piece of cake. But, on the other hand, I could want the next door 
neighbour to recover from his illness even though I believe that I personally 
will not have any experiences in connection with the recovery - perhaps I 
believe that he is going to move away from the district as soon as he comes 
out of hospital. What I want here bears no relation to what I anticipate 
in the way of my own future experiences. It is not that I expect to be 
pleased once the wanted state of affairs obtains and makes an impact on my 
own experience, for I look to no such impact; it is rather that I expect 
to be pleased at the obtaining of the said state of affairs per se.
Now I can, in principle, be pleased about that, whether it obtains 
currently, has already obtained, or will obtain in the future; indeed, all 
that seems necessary is that I believe that it currently obtains, or that it 
has already obtained, or that it will obtain, for me to be pleased about it. 
Thus, if I want the next door neighbour to recover from his illness, my 
belief that I will be pleased on his recovery could be shown to be 'correct' 
as soon as I become convinced that he will recover - perhaps his wife tells 
me that the doctors have every confidence, etc; my being pleased does not 
have to wait upon the fact of the recovery itself. Or again, if I want to 
be famous after my death, it is true in a way that were I to be around as a 
kind of ghostly spectator, I would be pleased to contemplate the evidence of 
my growing fame. But, needless to say, my desire for posthumous fame would 
not normally take this form. It in fact amounts to a belief that I would 
be pleased that the following state of affairs obtains - I am famous after 
my death. I do not'have to wait until after my death to start being 
pleased; my belief that I will be pleased about it could be shown to be 
correct if, as soon as I become convinced that I will be famous after my 
death, I am pleased.
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Suppose I want my son not to have been killed in an aircrash. Let 
us build into the example that I do not anticipate seeing, or hearing 
from my son again, if, by good fortune he is. still alive. Perhaps he is 
working in a foreign country, and I am due to die from cancer very shortly. 
My want here does not simply amount to the belief that I would have been 
pleased an hour ago, when the crash took place, if my son had not been 
killed; the time factor is irrelevant, since the obtaining of the desired 
state of affairs does not affect my personal experience directly. The 
desire in question amounts rather to the belief that I will be pleased 
once I am convinced that the state of affairs in question did obtsin.
One final example at this point: If I want to sacrifice my life for a 
friend I believe that I will be pleased at the obtaining of the state of 
affairs - me sacrificing my life for a friend. Evidently, I cannot wait 
until I have performed the sacrifice to be pleased; my being pleased will 
be restricted to that period of time before my death in which I am convinced 
that the appropriate state of affairs is going to obtain.
In her book 'Happiness', E. Telfer suggests that enjoyment is of activities 
and experiences that I perform or undergo myself - thus I enjoy the cake, 
the holiday, the film. But I scarcely enjoy-being famous after my death 
(although I could enjoy dwelling on the prospect of it) - my neighbour 
recovering from an illness when I am never going to see him again - the 
labour party winning the election in a country I am never going to visit, 
etc. Being pleased, she suggests, is a wider notion, not restricted to 
my personal activities and experiences - lean be pleased at the result of
2
the General Election, the government's stand on pornography, and so forth •
I would have thought that I could also be pleased at those things I enjoy 
or from which I gain pleasurable sensations - thus I can be pleased at 
eating the cake, at watching the film, etc. Anyhow, in the spirit of her 
observations, and in the light of the foregoing discussion, I distinguish 
between two broad categories of B-wants.
24
Experiential B-wants
For these, I reserve the expressions 'enjoying', 'getting pleasure 
from', and the like. Often it would be quite natural to talk of 'being 
pleased' in such contexts, but in the interests of clarity I will avoid so 
doing from now on. When I have a B-want of this kind that p, I believe 
that I will enjoy p obtaining, or get pleasure from p obtaining. Some­
times the situation is more aptly portrayed in negative terms - I want 
that p can amount to the belief that when P obtains, my present state of 
discomfort, pain, etc. will disappear.
If I believe that I will enjoy p obtaining, or have enjoyable 
experiences when p obtains, then, in so far as these are expressions of 
experiential B-wants, I believe that p's obtaining will be a causal factor 
in my enjoying myself at the time that p obtains. Suppose I want a piece 
of cake. This almost certainly involves an experiential B-want. In 
'propositional' form, it becomes - I want (that I am eating cake), and this, 
according to the account offered here, is equivalent to the belief - that I 
will enjoy the obtaining of the state of affairs - me eating a piece of cake. 
Implicit in the belief is the thought that my enjoyment will, at least in 
part, be caused by the obtaining of the desired state of affairs. A second 
instance - I want to get out of the cold water, in 'propositional' form is 
expressed as 'I want (that I am out of the cold water)' which is equivalent 
to the belief - 'the obtaining of the state of affairs - me being out of the 
cold water, will, at least in part, be causally responsible for me at that 
time not to be in the state of discomfort I am in at present'. 
Non-experiential B-wants
For this category of B-wants, I reserve the expression 'being pleased'. 
These are B-wants for the obtaining of states of affairs whose obtaining at 
time t does not causally affect my experiencees at time t or later. They 
are equivalent to beliefs as follows. 'I non-experientiqlly B-want that p' 
becomes - 'I believe that I will be pleased if p obtains, whether or not I
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also believe that the obtaining of p will causally affect my own 
experiences. Put in this way, my belief includes the belief that once 
I am convinced that p will obtain, then I will be pleased; if I am con­
vinced that p is now obtaining, then, even if my experience is entirely 
unaffected by the obtaining of p itself, my belief that it is obtaining 
will be associated with my being pleased about it, etc.
For example, 'I want the liberals to be in power in the 22nd 
century' basically amounts to the belief that I will be pleased at the obtain­
ing of the state of affairs - the liberals being in power in the 22nd century 
- but since I will not be around to witness this state of affairs, my belief 
is, more specifically, that if I become convinced that the said state of 
affairs will obtain, then I will be pleased about it, and will continue to 
be pleased about it as long as my conviction remains. Or again, suppose I 
want my next door neighbour to recover from his illness, though I believe 
that I will never see him again. This becomes: 'I believe that I will be 
pleased at the obtaining of the state of affairs - my next door neighbour 
recovering'. But since, ex hypothesi I worft actually get any experiences 
associated with his recovery itself - I won't enjoy seeing him well again - 
or even enjoy his wife's happiness at his recovery, etc., my belief, more 
carefully expressed, is that I will be pleased as soon as I have grounds for 
thinking that he is well again, or even for thinking that he will be well 
again. Accordingly I need not believe that the actual obtaining of the 
state of affairs - my next door neighbour recovering - will be a causal 
factor in my being pleased; I will not necessarily believe that his 
recovery will causally affect my experiences at all; if there is a pure 
non-experiential B-want here, what I want is purely that he recover, without 
regard to whether it makes any difference at all to my experiences.
(Of course, in a natural case there would be a combination of both 
experiential and non-experiential B-wants here - I separate the two rather 
artificially for purposes of philosophical analysis).
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As with the experiential B-want, we can have a negative version of the 
non-experiential B-want. 'I want the war (which is taking place in another 
country which I shall never visit etc.) to end', could mean: 'I am currently 
not pleased, because I am convinced that thiswar is taking place, and I 
believe that were I to come to believe that it had ceased. I would no longer 
be distressed as I am at present. 'In this example, it is important once 
more to emphasize the point that I need not believe that my anticipated 
relief from current distress will be causally determined in any way by the 
cessation of the war. I might come to have the false belief that the war 
had stopped, and I would still believe that I would be pleased - so long as 
I was unaware of the falsity of my belief.
C-wants
These are simply those beliefs involved in B-wants which are true. In 
the category of experiential B-wants, the matter is easily expressed; I 
B-want. cake; if I actually eat it and enjoy doing so, then, at the time that 
I B-wanted the cake, I also C-wanted it. There is a sense in which there can 
be C-wants which are not gratified, as illustrated by the following; someone 
might B-want cake, but fall down dead before he is able to eat it; it may 
well be that he C-wanted it too - i.e. it may well be true that he would have 
enjoyed it had he eaten it - this counterfactual being true perhaps in virtue 
of certain physiological states of the person before death. As regards 
non-experiential B-wants which turn out to be C-wants too, the matter is 
slightly more complex. Suppose I B-want the liberals to be in power in the 
22nd century, and also C-want this; I believe that I would be pleased were 
the liberals to be in power in the 22nd century. I will not be around to 
see, so this belief amounts here to the belief that were I to become con­
vinced that the liberals were quite definitely going to be in power in the 
22nd century, I would be pleased from then on. If I then do become con­
vinced, for whatever reason, that they will be in power, and I actually am 
pleased about it, then I C-wanted the liberals to be in power in the 22nd 
century. Or again, if my non-experiential B-want for the recovery of my
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next door neighbour is also a C-want, then, were I to become convinced that 
he would recover, was recovering, or had recovered, then I would indeed be 
pleased. Generally, C-wants are judged to be present 'after the event', 
although with non-experiential wants this is evidently not always possible. 
A-wants
Characteristic examples of such wants are so called appetitive desires 
for food, sex, and so on. (Though appetitive desires are seldom purely 
A-wants - in speaking of A-wants I talk of an element in desiring which 
rarely occurs on its own in pure form, though it does occasionally, as I 
argue shortly). Sometimes we may speak of cravings or yearnings here 
rather than wants. The most important feature of such wants is that there 
is no link between the having of such a want and the kinds of beliefs 
involved either in experiential or non-experiential B-wants.
To give one or two examples; it is possible, though admittedly very 
unusual, for.me purely to A-want food; I may not believe that I will 
experience pleasure when I eat the food, or enjoy eating it, or even be 
pleased in any sense that I am eating it. Perhaps I have an obsessional 
wish to slim - perhaps I have a severe stomach condition, and I believe 
that I will experience severe discomfort when I eat food; the condition 
might be so bad that I would not believe that I would be pleased in any 
sense that I had eaten it; I might feel quite suicidal, and even the bare 
thought of eating food to prolong life would not move me.
The most plausible examples of pure A-wants occur with drug addiction. 
Evidently, particularly at the beginning of the drug taking, the person 
concerned may have certain beliefs as to how he will feel after taking the 
drug - beliefs of a favourable character. He may believe that he will feel 
good in such and such ways. But eventually he may reach the stage where he 
no longer has any such beliefs - the drug, he thinks, is doing nothing for 
him - he wishes he were not addicted to it - he believes it is causing his 
health to deteriorate, giving rise to physiological states which themselves
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are inducing within him pain and nausea* Yet he still A-wants the drug.
He craves for the next dose - he has ungovernable yearnings for it.
Further examples of a similar kind may, arguably, be found among desires 
of a type with which a psychiatrist would attempt to deal. For instance 
I may A-want to steal from shops - I am a genuine kleptomaniac* I need 
not believe that I will enjoy the stealing or the having of the objects 
concerned - I need not believe that I will in any sense be pleased at the 
thieving, or with the possession of the objects afterwards.
It is characteristic of A-wants that the A-wanter is in a state of 
mild discomfort analogous to pain; the discomfort is generally slight.
But it cannot be objected against my outline of A-wants that there is an 
inevitable link with B-want type beliefs. The objection which fails would 
run as follows; I want my next dose of heroin, and believe I will be pleased 
when I have had it, because, whatever else will still be wrong, I think that 
the present discomfort of having the want at all will be removed. The flaw 
in the objection is this. Whilst I may believe that the discomfort of the 
having of the want may be removed - equally I may not have this belief. I 
may have reached a state in which I believe that no matter how much I try to 
satisfy my want, the 'discomfort1 of its presence - the feeling of 
desperate craving, will not disappear. Yet I may still want the next dose 
- and if so, this would be, in my view, a pure A-want.
An additional feature of A-wants, though perhaps not peculiar to them, 
is that they come and go independently of my voluntary control. I cannot, 
by some kind of act of will, A-want food or sex; neither can I in this way 
extinguish such wants. I can try to distract myself from them, and I can, 
if I think it is necessary, endeavour not to give into them. But once I 
cease my efforts, the want may still remain. (My will can perhaps have a 
longer term influence over such wants, for I can choose, or avoid choosing 
certain things which might lead to various habits, etc. But when I speak 




There is a sense of 'want' which means roughly the same as 'intend' 
or 'choose' or 'decide'. For example, Jones says to the shopkeeper: 'I 
want some cigarettes, please'. He need not, although he may, have any 
kind of yearhing or craving for cigarettes, so there need be no element 
of A-wanting here. He need not think that he will be pleased in any sense 
to have the cigarettes - he may have been forced by his mother to buy some 
for her, and he may be trying very hard to get her to stop smoking. So 
he need not B-want or C-want the cigarettes. However, without, A,B or 
C-wants, Jones can still mean that he intends to have some cigarettes, and 
that he intends that the shopkeeper should give him some.
3. THE JUSTIFICATION OF WANTS
I cannot be 'justified' in having a pure A-want; when I crave for the 
next dose of heroin, this is just a brute fact about me. There may be 
reasons for it, in the sense that there may be an explanation, say in 
physiological terms, of my craving, but I can have no kind of justification 
for the craving. By the very nature of A-wants they are not had because the 
A-wanter believes that the object of his want has one set of features rather 
than another. Anything can be the object of an A-want in theory, and indeed, 
psychopathology indicates that some vexy peculiar things are sometimes the 
objects of A-wants. But pure A-wants are rare - there is usually a B-want 
of some kind involved too.
It is perfectly possible for someone to have, either an experiential, 
or a non-experiential B-want, where the question of whether the want is 
justified has not arisen for him. Some psychologists argue that we begin 
life with a set of 'native desires' - and few of the candidates that they 
suggest look as though they could be pure A-wants. For instance if, in 
some sense curiosity is innate, a baby might be said to believe that it 
would enjoy exploring its environment - i.e. involved in its curiosity could
«
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be an experiential B-want to explore the environment. The baby will 
almost certainly have failed to consider whether it has any justification 
for having -this want. Let us consider another example which involves a 
non-experiential B-want. Some people are bora, let us suppose, with 
innately benevolent dispositions. Hence they have non-experiential 
B-wants for others to be happy. At a given time, the question of 
whether they are justified in believing that they would be pleased if 
others are happy need not have arisen for them.
Those beliefs, then, which constitute B-wants may on occasion be held 
by people who do not consider whether they are justified in believing thus. 
But normal reasonable people do not retain beliefs for which.they do not 
think they have justification; if B-wants are had by someone who does not 
consider himself justified in having them, then he will probably give them 
up over a period of time. It is possible, however, that B-wants, rightly 
thought by their possessors not to be justified, might not diminish, if, 
for instance, the waht is in some sense pathalogical - a result, say of 
treatment in early childhood.
A belief b which I am justified in holding, is either in itself such 
that I am justified in holding it, or such that I am justified in holding 
it if I am also justified in having certain other beliefs which provide 
justification for holding b. Prima facie, the beliefs which constitute 
B-wants are no exception to this; if so, there may be some which are such 
that we are justified in having them without reference to further beliefs, 
and others which we are only justified in having given the support of 
further beliefs. When further beliefs are appealed to, these may be 
described as our reasons for our B-wants.
Many such reasons will simply be beliefs which link a state of 
affairs which we are justified in believing we will enjoy, or be pleased 
about, with other states of affairs which are connected, e.g. causally, 
with states of affairs of the former kind. Thus, suppose my belief that
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I will enjoy eating cake is one ■which I am justified in holding* Suppose 
I want to go into the dining room - viz., that I believe that I will enjoy 
myself when I go into the dining room. This belief is not, we will suppose, 
a self-justifying one; my reason for holding it is that I believe that 
there is cake in the dining room; that if I go in I will be able to have 
some, and that I will enjoy having some. In different terminology, I want 
to go into the dining room, not for itself, but only as a means to the end 
of getting the cake which is there. I only mention these means-ends 
reasons to put them on one side since I want to concentrate on the kind of 
justification we may have for believing that we will enjoy p obtaining, or 
be pleased that p, where p is already the 'end* in question.
The justification of experiential B-wants seems only to take one or 
two simple forms. If I B-want a piece of cake, my justification could 
consist in my belief that I have had cake before, and that I enjoyed it on 
the previous occasion. Or more eccentrically but arguably with equal 
validity, my justification might consist in beliefs about my own 
physiological/and or psychological make up - beliefs which lead me to think 
that I would enjoy the cake. My justification for an experiential B-want 
does not require me to attend to the intrinsic character of the state of 
affairs that is wanted; the kind of justification I had for my want for 
cake could, in principle at least, apply to anything. For instance, I 
could, in theory, experientially B-want to bite the tree on the grounds 
that I believe that I have done it before and enjoyed it - or on the grounds 
that I believe I am the kind of person who enjoys this kind of thing.
The situation as regards the justification of non-experiential B-wants 
is quite different. Remember that we are excluding the cases of 'being 
pleased' which result from enjoyment, and that we are reserving the 
expression 'being pleased' for cases where our own experiences and activities 
are not involved. Then I cannot believe that I will be pleased that p, on 
the grounds that 'I believe that I was pleased last time’. It is not a
32
question of whether I was pleased last time - as though I try to remember 
how I felt last time that p obtained, and conclude, given the appropriate 
memory, that I will feel good about it this time too. That would be an 
attempt to obtain a justification of a kind appropriate to experiential 
B-wants. If my belief that I would be pleased that p is a justified 
belief, its justification springs from the correctness of my beliefs as to 
the very nature of p itself; justification cannot lie in beliefs I might 
have concerning the experience I would have as a result of p, since 
ex hypothesi p need not affect my experience at all, and I may well 
believe that p’s obtaining will not reflect on my experience.
Now what could it be about p itself which could 'justify* my belief 
that I would be pleased that p? In my view, the only way in which p 
could justify my belief that I would be pleased that p, is if p involves 
the manifestation of 'evaluative properties' such as moral goodness, courage, 
prudence, beauty, and so on. If in the philosophical long run, it turns 
out that the 'evaluative realist' is mistaken, and there are no such things 
as evaluative properties, then, as far as I can see, I cannot have a 
•justified' belief that I would be pleased that p; I can only have a belief 
that I would be pleased that p which amounts to a prediction of a purely 
'subjective' response to p, if it obtains. Some will of course wish to 
dispute this claim. But if they thought there was justification to be 
had in this area at all, I cannot see what alternative they can offer to 
something like 'evaluative properties'.
There is of course still room for dispute within the confines of 
evaluative realism over the questions - what evaluative properties are 
there? - and in virtue of what properties are evaluative properties 
possessed as ’resultants'. For instance, even a utilitarian of the
crude hedonic variety might accommodate himself within the realist 
perspective, if he said, e.g. - the moral property of goodness is 
possessed solely in virtue of the quantity of pleasure produced.
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Often I will have both an experiential and a non-experiential B-want 
that p. Suppose I want my next door neighbour to recover from his illness, 
and this time expect to enjoy his company when he is out of hospital, I 
may well believe both that I will enjoy myself if he recovers, and that I 
will be pleased if he recovers. If I take the view that my belief that I 
will be pleased at his recovery is a justified one, this will involve me in 
thinking that the state of affairs - my neighbour recovering from his 
illness, involves the manifestation of a realist evaluative property - say 
moral goodness of some kind. My belief that I will enjoy his recovery may 
also be a justified one - not justified by any evaluative property manifested 
thereby, but on the grounds, for instance, that I have enjoyed his company 
before, and I believe that his recovery means that I can enjoy his company
ome more„ Or again, suppose I wish to go to the concert. I have an
experiential B-want to go - whose justification is that I believe I have 
enjoyed concerts before, I may also believe that I will be pleased to go -
the justification for this could be my belief that the music manifests a
realist evaluative property - viz. 'beauty'.
Sometimes experiential and non-experiential B-wants will conflict, I 
will not anticipate being really pleased overall, or happy, that p, where p's 
obtaining will play some causal role in determining my future experience, 
unless there is not merely an absence of such conflict, but also the presence 
of an appropriate non-experiential B-want. An example of conflict:- I might 
believe that I would enjoy sleeping with my neighbour's wife; nonetheless,
I might also believe that I ought not to do this. In the light of these 
beliefs, it might be true to say of me that I have an experiential B-want to 
sleep with her, and a non-experiential B-want to refrain from so doing. In 
such a situation I will not anticipate being pleased overall to sleep with 
her, or being happy to sleep with her.
Consider another example, where there might be no conflict, but where 
the lack of an appropriate non-experiential B-want indicates that true
34
happiness will not be anticipated: I might believe that I would enjoy 
having an electrode implanted in the pleasure centre of my brain, and in 
so far as I did so, I would have a sort of experiential B-want for the 
electrode to he implanted. But even if I had no view that such implanta­
tion would be morally wrong (possibly, I ought to have such a view, but 
let us put that to one side), I am unlikely to anticipate real happiness;
I would not believe that I would be pleased overall to have the electrode 
implanted. I would not have a non-experiential B-want for the electrode;
I would be unable to see any possibility that such a want could be justified. 
There would be nothing about the state of affairs of an electrode implanta­
tion, I might well think, in virtue of which any realist evaluative property 
would be manifested which could provide justification for non-experiential 
B-want for the implantation.
We are now ready to apply the results of these reflections to the 
matter of desiring God. Suppose Jones worships God. This entails that 
Jones believes that God is unsurpassable (a claim that will be defended in 
the next section). Part of being unsurpassable is, surely, being supremely 
and ultimately desirable. Jones, believing in an unsurpassable being will 
want that being more than he could possibly want anything else; his 
>  possession of such desires will be a criterion of his belief that he
recognises the supremely desirable character of God. But what exactly does 
it mean to say that Jones wants God more than he wants anything else? We 
have already suggested some of the propositional forms such wants might 
take; we are now in a position to take this further. Suppose that Jones 
wants (that he is with God) more than anything else. It might seem that 
this could be treated purely as an experiential B-want, according to which 
Jones has the belief that he would enjoy being with God more than he could 
possibly enjoy anything else.
But I want to argue that such an experiential B-want is not enough; if 
God is ultimately desirable, he must be such that Jones would be more pleased,
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overall, as he thinks, or such that Jones anticipates that he would be more 
tru ly happy, to be with God, than he could possibly be with anything else.
I have urged that if S is to anticipate being pleased overall that p, or 
if S is to anticipate being tru 'ly happy that p, then there must (l) be no 
conflict between S's experiential and non-experiential B-wants, and (2) S 
must have appropriate and compatible experiential and non-experiential Bvwants 
that p. We have seen that the justification of non-experiential B-wants that 
p could onlyconsist in true beliefs concerning the manifestation in p of 
realist evaluative properties. Jones requires both an experiential and a 
non-experiential B-want for God; it must be possible for Jones to regard 
his non-experiential B-want for God as a justified one - (indeed, if Jones 
is a 'normal reasonable person' without any pathalogical religious desires, 
he requires in actual fact to think that his non-experiential B-want for God 
is justified - otherwise he will not retain this want).
Hence Jones will need to believe that God is such that he possesses 
certain realist evaluative properties. In sum, for Jones to believe that 
God is unsurpassable, he needs to believe that God is such that he possesses 
certain realist evaluative properties. We have now reached the conclusion 
for which I have been arguing, and which was the reason for my long excursion 
into the subject of wants.
At this point, it is a natural step for the Theist to take - viz. to 
say that Godpossesses the realist evaluative property of unsurpassability - 
that it is this property that ensures his ultimate desirability, and that 
he is worthy of worship. The question of course arises as to what God must 
be like to be unsurpassable. The next chapter considers this question to
the extent that it inquires how far God must be transcendent to be 
unsurpassable. Associated with the general question of what God must be 
like to be unsurpassable is another. How are we to judge what properties 
he requires to be unsurpassable. Such a question does not differ in kind,
though perhaps it does differ in difficulty, from the question which faces
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all moral realists - or even all evaluative realists* How do we judge 
when an evaluative property is manifested? The evaluative realist has 
to assume that we can on occasion be correct in our claim to recognize 
instances of such properties; such an assumption is of course compatible 
with the possibility of wholesale error, the possibility of perpetual lack 
of agreement about, for example, what is desirable, courageous, admirable, 
beautiful, and the like. It would be nice for the evaluative realist if 
he could provide a watertight and rigorous specification of the sort of 
person who would be an 'ideal observer' - who would be bound to detect 
evaluative properties in the appropriate circumstances. This person would 
be 'rational' - not afflicted by any kind of 'blindness', moral or otherwise, 
able to take an impartial view, who, after cool consideration of the situation 
would react in a 'fitting' matter* But any attempt to specify such a person 
would almost certainly result in circularity or vacuity*
I have argued that a religion in which an unsurpassable being is 
worshipped entails some form of evaluative realism, and suggested that the 
Theist treat unsurpassability itself as a realist evaluative property. In 
the discussion that follows, I am just going to have to assume the possi­
bility that, if such a form of Theism were true, we would be able to detect 
or judge that about a supreme being in virtue of which he would be 
unsurpassable - that in virtue of which the being would be worthy of worship.
We can perhaps render this apparently daunting judgemental task easier 
than it first appears. We can, for instance, reflect that the features of 
the being in virtue of which he is unsurpassable - worthy of worship, are at 
the same time the reasons why we ought to do those things involved in 
worship. In other words we can to some extent 'unpack' worship into some 
of the characteristic activities and responses it involves. For example, 
whatever it is about the being that makes him worthy of worship, is the 
reason why we ought to 'bow the knee' to that being in acts of ultimate 
humility. It is also the reason why a CRB ought to render the highest
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praise and honour to him; again, it is the reason why a CRB should strive 
to serve him to the very best of his ability - and why a CRB would be 
justified in thinking he would be happier with him than he would be doing 
anything else. Prom a slightly different perspective, we can say that that 
about the supreme being in virtue of which he is worthy of worship will be 
that in virtue of which he is worthy of certain emotional responses to him 
that, arguably, a CRB ought to cultivate - a supreme degree of love, 
admiration, awe, fascination, and so on.
If, then, we are sometimes at a loss when we are wondering whether a 
being with such and such a nature is unsurpassable - worthy of worship, we 
can look at matters in detail, and take points in turn; for instance, we 
can ask whether a being of the kind in question would be such that we ought 
to bow the knee to him, or, again, whether he would be such that we should 
render him the highest praise and honour, etc. Ultimately the questions 
that arise here will not be settlable by argument, but by judgement. We 
can do no better than this.
4. MUST A BEING BB UNSURPASSABLE TO BE WORTHY OF WORSHIP?
The claim that only an unsurpassable being is worthy of worship is
■5
attacked by Peter Appleby in his article 'On Religious Attitudes' . Since 
this is a claim whose truth I have already assumed, and will go on assuming 
throughout this work, I will say a little in the present section in defence 
of it.
There is a group of closely connected statements which may relevantly 
be considered in this connection, viz: *
(1) Necessarily, if any being is God, he is unsurpassable.
(2) Necessarily, if there is an unsurpassable being, there is only
one such being.
(3) Necessarily, if any being is God, he is worthy of worship.
(4) Necessarily, if any being is worthy of worship, then he
alone is worthy of worship.
(5) Necessarily, if any being is God, he alone is worthy of
worship
(6) Necessarily, if any being is unsurpassable, then he alone
is worthy of worship.
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We could consider (1)—(4) as premisses of an argument, whose con­
clusion is ultimately (6). (5) follows from (3) and (4). Then, putting
(5) with (1 ) and (2) we obtain (6). Concerning all this, the following 
observations may be made.
(l) appears to be a de dicto necessary truth. It seems to be based 
on the fact that we would not award any being the title 'Cod' unless he 
were unsurpassable. It's ancestry is of course respectable, going back 
to Anselm or beyond-God is "that than which a greater cannot be conceived".
Concerning (2): if this premiss is true, as I indeed- think it is, 
its truth arises from what it means to be unsurpassable. Unsurpassability 
implies both (a) that the being in question could not be bettered, and (b) 
that the being in question could not be equalled. An argument for (b) 
which I only sketch here is this: an unsurpassable being would be eternal 
and omnipotent; on standard versions of what it is to be omnipotent, it is 
logically impossible for there to exist more than one eternal omnipotent 
being. Hence, if there is an unsurpassable being, then, necessarily, 
there is only one such being.
(3) is an assumption, with which I think Appleby would not quarrel. 
Appleby entirely disagrees with the conclusion (6), and probably, therefore 
with (1 ) and (4), which indeed seem to be the only premisses open to dispute 
in any real sense. Appleby brings counter-examples against (6). In his 
view, it would imply that in polytheistic religions, Gods were not worshipped, 
since, he presumes, if one was paying tribute to one god among others,one 
could not have been thinking of that god as unsurpassable. I have some 
inclination to accept that such beings were not worshipped, but Appleby 
evidently finds such an implication implausible. An alteniative response 
to Appleby would be to say that primitive man did, in a sense, worship all 
his gods. But he was inconsistent, and thought of whatever god he was 
honouring at a particular moment as uniquely unsurpassable, failing to 
realise or care that this attitude conflicted with the attitude he had taken,
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say to another god on the previous day.
Writing about the Vedic religion, and commenting on a hymn to Indra, 
Ninian Smart says; 'Here is exhibited the tendency to exalt one god as 
surpreme over all. To be sure, the hymn recognises other gods; there is 
no strict monotheism here. However, here, and elsewhere in the Vedic 
hymns, it is noticeable that the god addressed tends to be treated as the 
sole object of worship, and the attributes of other deities are often heaped 
upon him.
•This attitude has been called kathenotheism (literally 'one-god-at-a- 
time-ism'). Although the composers of the hymns may on various occasions 
address themselves to various gods, within the context of a given hymn the 
god addressed is supreme...there is an attitude not far removed from 
monotheism, even though outside the frame other gods are recognised and
A
exalted. The chief gods are reckoned supreme severally, one at a time' .
Appleby argues that the ancient Hebrews did not think of Jahweh as all- 
powerful and all-knowing, but just as very powerful, and as knowing a great 
deal. Yet, he claims, they worshipped Jahweh. And it was fitting for them 
to do so. Also, in his view the contention that only an unsurpassable being 
is worthy of worship implies that most 'ordinary believers' are idolaters.
In their rituals (etc) in church, mosque or temple, they do not think of God 
as being unsurpassable.
If we refuse to say that an activity carried out by a CBB is worship 
unless the being towards whom the activity is 'intentionally' directed is 
thought of by that CBB as unsurpassable, one response to Appleby is this.
It is to accept that neither the ancient Hebrews nor the 'ordinary believer' 
has the capacity for full worship; perhaps worshipping is something which 
is an ideal; something CBB's can strive to achieve, but never accomplish 
in full. Thus idolatry does not arise, since there is not actual full- 
blooded worship taking place. Though this view has some attractions, it 
must be admitted that a view which results in the conclusion that 'worship'
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is misapplied in the vast majority of cases at present could scarcely be 
maintained without qualms.
Better perhaps is to say that the ancient Hebrews and the modern ordinary 
believer do think that the object of their worship is unsurpassable, and 
that Appleby is wrong to deny this. I suspect that Appleby assumes that 
they don't take their object of worship to be unsurpassable, because he also 
assumes that they would not think of themselves as believing, and would not 
say, that the object of their worship possesses those features traditionally 
thought of as those in virtue of which God is unsurpassable - viz., 
omnipotence, omniscience, and so forth.
But we need to make careful inquiry as to how we would go about test­
ing whether, say an ancient Hebrew believed in a God who was unsurpassable.
On my view, some kind of dispositional theory of belief is correct, and I 
defend this at some length in Chapter 6. When I believe that p, I am 
normally disposed, among other things, to say that p in certain circumstances, 
and to think of myself as believing that p - i.e. in certain situations when 
I consult my state of mind introspectively, it seems to me that I believe 
that p. But - andthis is a point I develop much more fully in Chapter 6, 
sometimes when it seems to me that I believe that' p, I do not in fact believe 
that p; also, though typically, when I believe that p, I am disposed to 
'assent inwardly' to p, or to say that p, this need not be so; sometimes 
I can believe that p when I am neither disposed to think I have this belief, 
nor disposed to say it; unconscious beliefs are one kind, of example of this.
I am not for one moment suggesting that the ancient Hewbrews had 
unconscious beliefs in an unsurpassable God. But I am claiming that when 
we at« assessing what it is that someone believes about God, we should not 
attend only to what the believer may say, or think to himself that he 
believes. We must look (of course) at the whole range of his behaviour; 
we must also try to imagine what he would have said and thought had he been 
confronted with situations of a kind with which he was never in actual fact
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confronted. The ancient Hebrew, for example, might, at most, have had a 
disposition to 'assent inwardly' to the proposition that Jehovah is very 
powerful, rather than to the proposition that Jehovah is omnipotent. But 
suppose he, anachronistically, had been confronted with St. Anselm, who 
put the question to him. 'Do you think either that there is, or that 
there might have been a being more powerful than Jehovah? It is not at 
all obvious that the Hebrew would happily have answered in the affirmative 
to either question. Once he had considered this thought, perhaps a thought 
that had never entered his head before, I suggest he might well deny that any 
being could possibly be more powerful than Jehovah. Of course, on a 
dispositional theory of belief, there is no infallibility v about the 
mental or verbal responses- that a He- brew would make when stimulated by 
St. Anselm either. But such a theory makes us much more cautious than 
Appleby about assuming that we can tell what, say, the Hebrews believed just 
from what they would probably say or think in everyday religious circumstances. 
The behaviour of the Hebrews in general could quite plausibly be interpreted 
as manifesting belief in an unsurpassable being.
Similar points could be made about the modern 'ordinary believer'. He
might not be disposed to say, or to think that he believed, for instance, in
an omnipotent being, as opposed to a very powerful being, within the standard
range of circumstances in which he would be likely to be placed. It is
at least arguable that his behaviour as a whole,and possibly the extremes
%
of emotions that at least some normal believers exhibit, could be interpreted 
as belief in an omnipotent being, and more generally, belief in an 
unsurpassable being. It might also be contended, that were we able to put 
the 'normal' believer on the spot, and ask him in a way he found intelligible 
whether he supposed that the object of his devotion could be surpassed, he 
then might insist that the object of his devotion could not be surpassed.
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1. Unsurpassability entails transcendence: general
We are now ready to explore the links between the unsurpassability of 
a. supreme being, and the transcendence of that being. Without argument,
I will assume that God must at least have the traditional properties in 
order that he be unsurpassable - viz. that he must be omnipotent, omniscient, 
omnipresent, eternal, the creator ex nihilo of all other existing things.
I will have a little more to say about the implication that he must be the 
creator when we come to the question of ontological transcendence. A 
further major implication, that he must be perfectly good, and the type of 
transcendence which flows from this, will form the subject of the bulk of 
the present chapter.
Otto writes: 'The 'truly mysterious* object is beyond our 
apprehension and comprehension not only because our knowledge has certain 
irremovable limits but because in it we come upon something inherently 
'wholly other' whose kind and character are incommeasurable with our own, 
and before which we therefore recoil in a wonder that strikes us chilland 
numb'^ .
In my terms, Otto thinks that God must be ontologically transcendent 
in order that emotions such as awe, fear, wonder, and so on, should be 
, fitting, and that he is epistemologically transcendent in virtue of his 
ontological transcendence. The reference to the 'irremovable limits' of 
our knowledge also suggest that Otto believes that an unsurpassable being is 
•bound’ to be mysterious to 'finite' CRB's. I am in broad agreement with 
this approach, but I will spend a few paragraphs in spelling matters out in 
my own way.
We will see later that there are important differences between 
epistemological transcendence in the sense of transcending understanding, 
and epistemological transcendence in the sense of transcending knowledge, 
but for present purposes these two types may be treated together. When a
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Theist says that God is mysterious, this may well be an expression of his 
conviction that God is such that before him it is fitting to feel the 
utmost humility, and such that it is fitting to perform acts directed to 
him which express extreme self-abnegation. God, the Theist feels, is so 
great that he is bound to be beyond the powers of CRB's to understand him 
fully, and bound to be beyond the powers of CRB's to know all there is to 
know about him. It would, of course, be fitting to feel awe of a being 
who is creator and lord of the universe, all powerful, all knowing, etc.
There is a strong impulse to say, however, that it is fitting to feel an 
even greater degree of awe (etc) with respect to a being who is all that 
the former being .is, but is also 'mysterious' in the sense of Otto - viz. 
unknowable because other, different. In this kind of context Otto also 
speaks of ’fascination*; being unsurpassable involves being supremely 
desirable, as we discussed in the last chapter; a being who is unknowable, 
and/or incomprehensible, at least to some degree, seems to have that in 
virtue of which he is more desirable, because of an extra element of 
'fascination', than a being who is seemingly all that the first being is, 
but lacks the mystery.
It is, of course, at points like this that the elements of 'judgement' 
comes in - the point I touched on at the end of the last chapter. If some­
one disputes here that unsurpassability does involve mystery; if they 
claim that they can see nothing 'fascinating' about mystery,there is little 
more than I can say to show that I am 'right' and that they are 'wrong'.
It is a familiar, but important point, touched on indeed by Appleby , 
that there comesa point when the degree of mystery invested in the object 
of worship begins to interfere with the very possibility of some of the other 
emotions which it is fitting to have with respect to the object or being in 
question. In so far, for example, as love may be thought of as an emotion, 
it is clearly not possible to feel any degree of love, let alone the 
greatest possible degree of love, for a being who is wholly mysterious and
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and incomprehensible. The constraints on the degree of mystery that a 
supreme being may possess are not only of the philosophical kind which we 
will spend some time in dismissing, then, but are also religious; worship 
of a totally mysterious and incomprehensible being is an unintelligible 
activity. Nevertheless, there is no doubt in my mind, at least, that a 
being who was indeed unsurpassable would not be totally within the 
epistemological grasp of a CRB; it will be in Chapter 4 that we will 
discuss various precise philosophical versions of this claim, and examine 
whether there are tenable versions.
Concerning ontological transcendence, very similar points can be made 
as were put forward in favour of a degree of mystery. It seems wholly 
appropriate to respond with extreme emotional responses, for example, in 
the way of wonder, fascination, dread, awe, astonishment, and so on, to 
that being who is worthy of worship. And a being who was at least to 
some degree 'other' or 'alien' would seem to be more fitting as an object 
of these emotions than a being who was not ontologically transcendent in 
this way. And a being who was not only wonderful, but also 'different' 
would perhaps be more desirable (Otto's fascination) than a being who ' 
lacked ontological transcendence.
A profound difference between religions of India - Hinduism and 
Buddhism, even where they contain important monotheistic elements, and the 
monotheism of the Judaeo-Christian and Islamic traditions, is that in the 
latter the supreme being is seen as the creator ex nihilo of the universe, 
whereas in the former he is not. Worship is the characteristic mode of 
religious approach to the God of Judaeo-Christianity and Islam, whilst 
meditation and contemplation is the characteristic mode of the Indian 
religions. Even the adherents of Bhakti-loving devotion to a God, never 
invested him with the powers of a creator exnihilo. And it is, of course 
the Judaeo-Christian and Islamic traditions that have developed the notion 
of the 'otherness' of God.
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I will sketch a 'route' to ontological transcendence which goes by- 
means of the notion of creation ex nihiloi to be unsurpassable, a being 
must be the creator ex nihilo of everything else that exists; being the 
creator ex nihilo is a property which conforms to the specification of 
ontological transcendence which I gave in Chapter 1;an ontologically 
transcendent being (a) possesses essentially at least one property which 
any other existent would essentially not possess, and (b) the property in 
question must also be such that any other existent would essentially fail 
to possess it to a lesser degree.
It might be thought that the property of being the creator ex nihilo 
fails to meet requirement (b). For, it might be said, God could impart 
to other beings the ability to create ex nihilo; it might appear to 
follow from this that they possessed to a lesser degree that property which 
God is alleged to possess essentially. However, I do not in fact think 
that it would be a matter of a property being possessed to a 'lesser degree'. 
God would have to maintain in existence such lesser creators as he chose to 
permit, otherwise they and their creations would 'disappear'. There is 
surely a difference in kind between the property of being the original 
creator and sustainer of all existing things, and the property of possess­
ing delegated creative and sustaining powers. Hence the property of being 
the creator ex nihilo does after all meet the (b) requirement for ontological 
transcendence.
As with mystery, ontological transcendence must not be such as to 
preclude the very possibility of worship. If, for instance, ontological 
transcendence denies personhood, then an ontologically transcendent being 
would not surpass a being not endowed with such a 'characteristic'. Now 
being the creator ex nihilo surely involves agency of a kind which only a 
person possesses; the expression 'impersonal creator' does not seem to 
denote a possible entity. Hence, insofar as being the creator involves God 
in being 'other', this 'otherness' cannot preclude his being a person. The
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emphasis on the unsurpassable being possessing personhood will prove 
crucial in ensuing discussion.
If we now consider briefly the third type of transcendence - viz. 
ineffability: there seems to be a close association between the views 
that God is beyond the understanding of CRB's and that he is in some 
sense beyond the language of CRB's. We cannot speak of something of 
which we have no comprehension. If another understands something that 
we do not, we can repeat what he says, taking his authority for the fact 
that the string of words in question can express an intelligible proposition. 
But, it may be thought, any view that God is beyond the understanding of 
CRB's which is extreme enough to be interesting, willimply that no CRB 
could in principle be in a position to understand. So there would not 
even be the possibility of using someone else's authority to support 
statements about God which we want to make but cannot understand ourselves.
However, in my later discussion of belief, I argue that we cannot in 
fact believe anything about God which we cannot understand in the sense of 
'understand', apparently employed in the above paragraph. I also take up 
a conclusion I reach shortly concerning the moral nature of a supreme being - 
that there is an entirely different sense of 'understand' in which we fail to 
understand God which has no obvious link with the question as to whether he 
is ineffable. I argue that this distinct sense of 'understand' is such 
that absence of understanding need not preclude belief.
The motives for attributing ineffability to God seem much the same as 
those which lie behind the other types of transcendence. A being who is 
too great to be subject to be subject description mastery of which a CRB is 
in principle capable, is a being before whom it is, for instance, more 
fitting to bow the knee in acts of ultimate humility than a being who is 
not transcendent in this way. (in the present work I do not attempt to 
discuss the philosophical problems which may be thought to arise from 
ineffability, other than those involved in belief).
48
2. The Moral Nature of an Unsurpassable being
I now proceed to argue for the same general conclusions vis a vis 
ontological and epistemological transcendence outlined in section 1, via 
the consideration of the goodness of an unsurpassable being. . I show that 
unsurpassable goodness is such that (a) CRB's cannot fully understand it 
or know about it, and (b) that it involves aspects of God's nature which 
are ontologically alien to what may be found within creation.
Moral Rightness, and Moral Goodness
In the spirit of Ross , but not to the letter, I want to distinguish 
between moral rightness and moral goodness. Moral rightness, a s l  under­
stand it, can be a property of an action; it is closely linked to whether 
that action is such that an agent ought to do it - I will be a little more 
explicit about this in a moment. Persons as such cannot have the property 
of moral rightness. Moral goodness, on the other hand, can be (a) a
4property of persons, and of their emotions, desires , and intentions, and 
(b) a property of actions. If a person is morally good, he is such that 
if he were praised, tjiis would be fitting or appropriate. He deserves 
praise, or to be estimated highly. These remarks scarcely constitute a 
'definition' of moral goodness, and they are not intended to be such.
They should, however, serve to distinguish the moral goodness of a person 
from other 'evaluative properties’that he might have. For instance, if 
we attribute high intelligence to someone, we might be described as 
attributing an 'evaluative property' to him. But whilst praise of 
intelligence may in some sense be justified, it is scarcely deserved.
. An action is morally good if it is such that the performance of it by 
an agent A is a reason for A being praiseworthy - morally good. As will 
be shortly made clear in examples, such a reason can be overridden by other 
reasons in such a way that A is not praiseworthy overall. Furthermore, 
whatever it is about an action in virtue of which it is morally good 
provides an agent with a reason for doing A; I will have more to say about
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reasons for action later. When an action is morally good, its goodness 
is not linked in the same way as is moral rightness with the question 
whether an agent ought to perform the action, as we will see shortly.
As characterised in Chapter 2, I take a moral realist view, both of 
moral rightness and of moral goodness. So, on this view, both persons 
and actions possess the property of moral goodness in virtue of their 
possession of other properties, at least some of which are non-relational 
and have an 'objective base'. Also, actions possess the property of moral 
rightness in virtue of their possession of other properties, at least some 
of which ar^ non-relational and have an 'objective base'.
Let us make some distinctions among actions, in respect of moral 
rightness. (l) An act can be right, all things considered. If so, it is 
an act which an agent ought to do, all things considered; I shall some­
times speak of acts which ought to be done. The judgement that an act is 
right is sometimes reached by an agent after considering various options, 
for each of which he may think there are reasons. Though he need not 
deliberate at all - and there may be no other possibilities even 
apparently open to him. So, in the type of example beloved by moral 
philosophers, Jones has promised his aunt to go and see her. But, at the 
moment he is about to set out, his neighbour suffers a heart attack. Jones 
being a doctor, can administer medical aid to the man which might even save 
his life until he can be got to hospital and given full treatment. Both 
keeping the promise, and helping the man, would be morally right actions 
for Jones. He decides that on balance the rightness of the second action 
overrides the rightness of the first, and judges, accordingly, that he 
ought to do the second action - that it is right, all things considered.
An essential feature of the all-things-considered-right action, the action 
which the agent ought to do is this. If the agent recognises that he 
ought to do the action, and fails to do it, then he is morally bad in not 
doing it.
(2) An action can be right, even though it is not, in a particular
circumstance, that action which an agent ought to perform. Ross would
have said that the action was prima facie right. I would eschew his
explanation of prima facie rightness in terms of rightness that seems to
be present, or tends to be present. I would say that an action which is
prima facie light really is right, whether or not it is also that which I
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ought to do-right-all-things-considered . That in virtue of which the 
action is right can provide the agent with a reason for thinking he ought 
to do the action, but this reason need not be compelling; it is the kind 
of reason which can be put aside should the agent decide that he ought, all 
things considered, to do not that action but another.
Reverting to the original example, Jones considers the act of going 
to see his aunt. This action would be right, since it would be keeping his 
promise (or it would 'generate' the act of keeping his promise - it depends 
on your theory of action). The fact that it would keep a promise is a 
reason for thinking that one ought to do it. Giving medical assistance to 
the neighbour would also be right; there are reasons for Jones thinking 
that he ought to do this - the reasons being, for example, that the neighbour 
will be helped - that his life may possibly be saved, and so on. Jones 
decides that the reason for going to the aid of his neighbour 'overrides' 
the reason for going to see his aunt, and accordingly judges that helping his 
neighbour is what he ought to do. In . this context, 'overrides' does 
not mean 'silences' (to use McDowell’s phrase)^. The reason which 'loses' 
is not 'extinguished'; the rightness of keeping the promise is not merely 
apparent; it is real enough.
An act which is prima facie right, but which is not that act which 
the agent ought to do, all things considered, is not such that the agent is 
morally bad in refraining from doing it. It is not morally bad of Jones to 
refrain from going to see his aunt in the circumstances of the example. An 
agent may deserve censure for allowing himself to get into a situation in
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which the act, A, which he ought to do all things considered, is incompat­
ible with his performance of an alternative act, B, which is prima facie 
right; had.1 the agent acted otherwise at an earlier stage, he might have 
been able to do both A and B. But the moral badness of the agent is had 
by him in virtue of his earlier folly; he is not morally bad at time t in 
virtue of failing to do B at t, where doing A at t is what he ought to do, 
all things considered, and he cannot do both A and B at t.
I want to avoid, as far as possible, commitment to a particular! theory 
of action individuation, for which I have no space to argue* It is worth 
noticing, however, that on a so called 'austere1 view of act individuation, 
sometimes attributed to Davidson,.the act, say of killing Jones may be the 
same act as the action of saving my wife from being attacked by a lunatic. 
Thus, one and the same action can, given my remarks above, be both prima 
facie right and prima facie wrong. There is nothing objectionable about 
this. Colloquially we say: there are reasons why I ought to do that, but 
there are also reasons why I ought not to do that. On a so-called
7
'prolific* theory of action individuation such as that advanced by Goldman 
or Kim, the action of killing Jones would not be the same action as the 
action of saving my wife from being attacked by a dangerous lunatic. So 
it might seem that on such a view, an action could not be both prima facie 
right and prima facie wrong. However, we can still say that killing Jones 
has a 'consequence*, my wife's being saved from attack; it is prima facie 
wrong qua exemplification of the act type - killing a human being, but it 
is also prima facie light since it has a 'consequence' my wife being saved 
from attack.
(3) An action may be neither prima facie right nor prima facie wrong; an 
agent may have no reasons for thinking he ought to do it, and no reasons 
for thinking that he ought not to do it; presumably the vast majority of 
our everyday actions are like this. But, as we will see shortly, such an 
action could still be a morally good action; and it could still be an
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action which an agent would he morally good to perform. Not allgood 
actions are actions which agents ought to do.
(4) An action may he prima facie wrong; in virtue of its nature, there 
may he a reason why an agent ought not to do the action. So, arguably, an 
action which is a killing of a human being is prima facie wrong; the fact 
that a certain action would he a killing is a reason why it ought not to
he done.
(5) An action may he wrong, all things considered; it will then he an 
action which, all things considered, ou^it not to he done; I shall sometimes 
speak simply of actions which ou^it not to be done. An essential feature
of such actions is this. If an agent recognises the action as one that 
ought not to be done, and yet he still does it, then he is morally had to 
do it. He deserves censure. As a person, he is worthy of blame.
We can make a different set of distinctions among actions, which 
reflect whether we as persons are morally good, morally indifferent, or 
morally had to do these actions, as opposed to reflecting whether the actions 
themselves are morally right, morally indifferent, or morally wrong. This 
set of distinctions cuts across the set of distinctions (l) - (5) that we 
have just outlined.
(A) Actions which it is morally good of us as persons to do - for which we 
deserve moral approval. I will illustrate by means of examples that 
examples belonging to this category include both (p) actions which we ought 
to do, all things considered, and (q) actions of which this requirement does 
not hold. It may also he thought that in certain circumstances I mi^it he 
morally good as a person to perform an action which I ought not to do, all 
things considered; in a moment I make one or two brief observations on 
this - (r).
Concerning (p): perhaps, in view of John’s promise to Jane when they were 
married, he ought, all things considered, to look after Jane for seven years 
while she slowly dies of M.S. let he is still morally good to do this.
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He deserves our approval for so doing. Yet obviously we do not always 
deserve approval for doing what we ought. Sometimes doing what we ought 
is merely escaping a position in which we would be blameworthy - morally 
bad as persons, were we to refrain from the action in question. For 
instance,, as a father I ought to give my child enough to eat if I can, 
Normally, however, I would not deserve any credit for so doing. If I 
did not give my child enough to eat, on the other hand, that would be 
morally bad of me. I would deserve disapproval.
Concerning (q). Falling on the bomb to protect his comrades from 
the explosion is not something that Jones ought to do, all things con­
sidered. I doubt whether it is something that is even prima facie right. 
But it would certainly be an action for which Jones would deserve approval.
Concerning (r), we need an example in which a person thinks at least 
that an action would not be morally wrong - thinks perhaps that it would be 
prima facie right, or even right, all things considered, and/or that it is 
an action in the performance of which he would be morally good as a person. 
Yet this action would not be, in our opinion, as the agent thinks it to be. 
We would take it to be, say, wrong all things considered. I am tentatively 
inclined to the view that there are no plausible examples, and that the best 
we could say of such a person is that, given his possession of what we would 
regard as mistaken moral beliefs about the moral character of the action, he 
might be neither morally good nor morally bad as a person in the performance 
of the action. I do not think that an agent ever deserves praise for the 
performance of an action which is, as we think, wrong all things considered. 
However, I am not so confident of my view here as to insist absolutely on 
this point. It is not crucial to the general argument.
(b ) Actions for which we deserve neither blamenor censure - in the perform­
ance of which as persons we are neither morally good nor morally bad. This 
category includes some actions which we ought to do, all things considered,
some actions which are prima facie right, some which are neither prima facie
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right nor prima facie wrong, some which are prima facie wrong and even, 
as discussion of (r) above suggests, some which are wrong all things con­
sidered. However, whilst mistaken beliefs as to the moral character of 
actions may allow an agent to avoid deserving moral censure, mistaken 
factual beliefs as to the character of the action in question are not to 
the point. It might be thought, for instance, that if I had, through no 
fault of my own, false factual beliefs about a certain action, then I might 
not realise that it was one which I ought not to do, all things considered. 
Hence it might be concluded that as a person it would be neither morally 
good nor morally bad of me to do it. My response is that in the circum­
stances as described, I would not intentionally be performing the action 
under that description which was applicable to it though I believed otherwise, 
and so the question of whether I was morally good, morally bad, or morally 
indifferent to do the action under that description would not arise at all.
(c) Actions which it is morally bad of us as persons to do. Many of these 
will be acts which I ou^it not to do, all things considered. But acts which, 
though prima facie wrong, are not acts which I ought not to do, all things 
considered, can easily be actions which it is morally bad of me to do - e.g. 
if done with bad intentions. The same point seems to hold good for acts 
which are neither prima facie right nor prima facie wrong, acts which are 
prima facie right, and even actions, perhaps, that are right all things 
considered. Lest the latter seem an extreme claim, consider the following. 
Jones might believe that an action which we would take to be one he ought to 
do, all things considered, was in fact an action which he ought not to do, 
all things considered. Yet he still might do it. It might well be argued 
that in such circumstances Jones would deserve moral censure.
8Plantinga points out in his discussion of * great making properties' 
that some properties which are traditionally ascribed to God have an 
•intrinsic maximum’. The maximum amount of power that any being in 
principle could have is omnipotence, and so an unsurpassable being will be
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omnipotent. The greatest degree of knowledge that a being could possess 
is omniscience - so an unsurpassable being will be omniscient. Generally, 
many properties may be possessed to a given degree; objects possessing them 
may be allocated positions along a scale, which ranges from zero to tiiat 
property's intrinsic maximum. Plantinga goes on to express some doubt as 
to whether all the properties that an unsurpassable being must undoubtedly 
possess have intrinsic maxima. For 'moral perfection' to be possessed at
x
a maximum, he suggests that a being could always do what is morally right,
q'so it would not be possible for it to be exceeded along those lines' .
But he is fairly tentative about this.
My argument for the transcendence of the moral nature of the 
unsurpassable being falls into two main parts. The first part deals with 
the notion of moral perfection. The second discusses that aspect of 
divine goodness which goes beyond moral perfection, namely supererogatory 
goodness.
Outline of the First Part of the Argument
Following Plantinga's hint, I say that a necessary condition for moral
perfection is that the agent always does what he ought to do, and never does
what he ought not to do. There is no difficulty in understanding this
the
element of moral perfection. It does appear to beAintrinsic maximum of a 
property, degrees of which can be understood in fairly crude arithmetical 
terms. But my concern will be with the moral status of the agent as he 
always does what he ought, and never does what he ought not, and I will be 
arguing that we cannot see such moral status in anything like simple 
arithmetical terms - that we have no clear notion of what kind of moral 
status would come at the top of a unitary scale of moral goodness as applied 
to persons. It will be my contention that the agent himself can be good in 
more than one way as he does what he ought, and refrains from doing what he 
ought not; that these differing types of goodness cannot sensibly be com­
pared; that a being with only one of these types of goodness would not be
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unsurpassable, and yet that it is not possible for a being to have more 
than one of these types of goodness at one and the same time, I develop 
these points by means of an example, and by applying to the example the 
results of extended discussion of B-wants and of the notions of explanation 
and understanding of actions.
The First part of the Argument
While driving home, Jones sees Smith lying in the road; it is pouring 
with rain outside, and Jones has a bad cold; also Jones is in a hurry to 
get home so that he can see his favourite T.V. programme. Jones realises 
that Smith may well be very ill and needs help; there is no one else in the 
vicinity; Jones judges that, all things considered, he ought to help Smith - 
helping Smith would be the right action, all things considered. He accord­
ingly goes ahead and helps Smith. At no time does he believe that he will 
enjoy helping Smith, or believe that he will get any kind of pleasure from 
helping Smith - in brief, he does not have an experiential B-want to help 
Smith.
In contrast to the first Jones, we can imagine a second Jones. The 
latter sees Smith lying in the road while he is driving home, as before.
The second Jones also notices that it is pouring with rain outside - he also 
has a bad cold, and his favourite T.V. programme will soon be on at home. 
However, the second Jones is very upset on seeing Smith in the road, and he 
wants to help Smith. (Shortly, we will have to investigate what sense of 
'want* is in question here, and whether, in any sense, the first Jones 'wants’ 
to do what he ought to do). The second Jones, when deciding to help Smith, 
does not consciously judge that he ought to help Smith - though we may 
suppose that the situation of the second Jones is sufficiently similar to 
that of the first Jones for helping Smith to be that which is the right 
thing for him to do, all things considered. The second Jones in fact forms 
the intention of doing that action which he wants to do, where his want has 
in some sense arisen from his emotional response to the situation.
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A considerable part of the first part of my argument will consist 
in a discussion of how we would appraise morally the first Jones vis a vis 
the second Jones. But in order to do so, I need to make some general 
points about (a) wants, and (b) explaining and understanding actions.' I 
begin with the latter.
The Nature of the explanation and understanding of actions
I want to distinguish, between two levels at which we understand actions, 
linked with two levels at which we explain actions. Whilst the distinction 
is, I contend, a genuine one it is admittedly artificial in the sense that 
in common speech we frequently combine the levels together in varying 
mixtures.
The first level. At this level, explanation and understanding of actions 
involves beliefs and intentions only. Imagine that we wanted to explain 
and understand Jones' shooting of Smith, which took place yesterday at 
12 o'clock. We can cite Jones' reasons; at the colloquial level these 
reasons may be framed in terms of 'wants'. For example, we may say that 
Jones shot Smith because he wanted to kill Smith. This could form part of 
a first level explanation if we understand 'wanted' in its pure D-want sense. 
The full first-level explanation runs: Jones shot Smith because he intended 
to kill Smith, and he believed that shooting him would very likely result 
in his death.
Explanations at the first level should ultimately cite the widest 
intention, or, as I shall sometimes say, the motive. In explaining Jones 
shooting of. Smith, in the manner specified above, we are implying that an 
intention to kill Smith was the widest intention he had. By 'widest 
intention' I mean that intention which has the greatest 'distance' from 
any intention, if there were such, to perform the basic action concerned. 
'Basic action' is to be understood in roughly Danto's sense^® - it is an 
action which is not done through the agent performing a distinct action.
If moving my finger is a basic action, then I might press the trigger by
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moving my finger, shoot the revolver by pressing the trigger, and kill 
Smith by shooting the revolver. If I had an intention to press the 
trigger, this would be 'nearest* to my 'basic intention', if I had one, to 
move my finger, whilst the intention to kill Smith is the intention at the 
'greatest distance' from my basic intention to move my finger. We can 
supply first level explanations in terms of intentions and beliefs of all^ 
the actions just mentioned, except one. I moved my finger because I 
believed that this would press the trigger, which would fire the revolver, 
which would kill Smith, and I intended to kill Smith; I pressed the trigger 
because I believed that this would fire the revolver, which would kill Smith, 
and I intended to kill Smith; I fired the revolver because I believed that 
this would kill Smith and I intended to kill Smith. But once we reach the 
action ofkLlling Smith, which probably involves the widest intention - viz. 
the intention to kill Smith, there is no more explanation to be had at the 
first level. Though there might be if we changed the example slightly - 
perhaps I have the wider intention of killing everyone I meet whose name is 
Smith or the wider intention of getting myself imprisoned, etc. Then we 
could go on with first level explanation and understanding for one more stage 
we could say that I killed Smith because I believed that his name was 
Smith, and I intended to kill everyone named Smith; or - I killed Smith 
because I believed that such an act would get me arrested and imprisoned, 
and I intended to get myself arrested and imprisoned. Ultimately, however, 
first level explanations come to an end with the widest intention cited. 
Nevertheless, it seems to me that once we have the agent's motive, or 
widest intention, there is often room for explanation and understanding 
of a different kind - of just why the agent should have such an intention.
If we feel, having been supplied with an explanation, a full explanation 
at the first level, that we still do not understand the agent,then we 
are notmerely expressing dissatisfaction with the fact that the chain 
of explanations at the first level has come to an end. Ve want the 
intention of the agent to be made intelligible to us - we require, in fact -
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Explanation and understanding at the second level. Here, we start with 
a statement of the agent's widest intention or motive. In many cases we 
then supply the agent's reasons for forming the intention in question. 
Broadly speaking, a belief cited in explanation at the second level which 
is referred to as the agent's reason (forforming his intention) may be 
characterised as follows; it is such that it 'accounts for', or 'explains'
v
or 'makes intelligible' the formation of an intention without either (l) 
there being any strict logical relation between the reason, the intention, 
and the action, or (2) there being any need for further desires of the 
agent to be mentioned. Second level explanation does not seem to me to 
have any one form - or even to fall into just a few well-defined categories. 
This should become clear shortly as I discuss examples.
Whilst second-level-explanation 'reasons' can, at least in principle 
render intelligible the formation of an agent's intention without the 
introduction of a desire, there will be cases where it just is true that 
A-wants, B-wants, and emotional states of the agent are involved. Unless 
these are brought in, full second level explanations of such cases will not 
be had. In other cases again, we do not mention the agent's reason for 
forming the intention, for he has no reason; but we simply mention the 
A and B-wants that he has (for which he has no reasons) and this, on 
occasion, can be enough to make the forming of the intention in question 
intelligible. There are also cases where no explanation of an action at 
the second level is forthcoming at all, and I will mention some of these 
shortly.
A case where we do need to cite the agent's reason is Jones action in 
shooting Smith. Jones’ reasons for forming the intention to kill Smith 
are - e.g. that he believes Smith to have seduced his wife and ruined his 
career. It may also be true that Jones has a non-experiential, and even 
an experiential B-want to kill Smith. But I doubt that mentioning such 
wants, in this example at least,improves our understanding of why Jones
60
foimed the intention in question; the reasons why he would B-want to 
kill Smith would be the same reasons why he forms the intention to kill 
Smith at all»
Of course, Jones may have shot Smith, or formed the intention to 
shoot Smith, 'because he was angry'. He could have formed the intention 
to shoot Smith for the reasons mentioned above, without being angry, but in 
a very natural case, the intention is accounted for at the second level in 
a more circuitous fashion by means of an emotion and a B-want - viz. Jones 
was angry because he believed Smith to have seduced his wife and ruined his 
career; he had a strong B-want to kill Smith because he was angry - and all 
this accounts for the fact that he formed the intention to kill Smith. The 
emotion and B-want component of an explanation at the second level becomes 
very important when we shortly examine the case where Jones helps Smith 
•from compassion'.
Examples of second-level explanation where agent's reasons of the kind 
quoted above are not forthcoming may involve, among other things, 'appetites'
- e.g. hunger, or 'natural curiosity'. For instance, 'He formed the intention 
to eat the cake because he was hungry'. I think this second level explana­
tion should be rendered as follows: 'He foimed the intention to eat the cake 
because he both A-wanted and B-wanted to eat it'. (True, he might have a 
reason for the B-want - he might believe that he would enjoy eating the cake 
because he had had cake before and enjoyed it - for instance. But a second 
level explanation which just cites hunger, where there are no such reasons 
as these, could be perfectly satisfactory as it stood). Or again -'The 
child foimed the intention to go and see the next room out of curiosity' 
means 'The child formed the intention to go and see the next room because 
he B-wanted to do so*. No reason for the B-want need be given, and such 
a second level account could be perfectly satisfactory as it stands.
(Colloquially we sometimes use the word 'reason' in these sorts of 
cases too - for instance, we might say: 'The reason he ate the cake was
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that he was hungry': 'The reason the child entered the next room was 
curiosity’, etc* But as I have been using 'reason'and will continue to 
use it in the context of second-level explanations, a 'reason' is a specific 
belief of the agent, whereas'hunger', 'curiosity' and the like, cannot 
intelligiby be identified with beliefs).
Candidates for kinds of actions where no second-level explanation is 
forthcoming are the following, although I will not discuss them beyond 
making a few brief remarks. They are: actions involving weakness of will, 
impulsive actions, and habitual actions. If Jones judges that he B-wants 
more than anything else to do X, does not think there is any reason why he 
ought not do do X, and yet fails to do X, we have an example of akrasia. 
There is a sense in which his action is 'inexplicable' - that is, I would 
contend, no explanation at the second level is to be had for it. If an 
old man just in front of me lurches out into the road in the path of an 
oncoming lorry and, quick as a flash, I whip out my arm and thrust him back, 
we cannot explain my forming an intention to save the man - it all happened 
too quickly and impulsively for a second level explanation to be available. 
Or again, if I tread on the left side of the fifth stair because the right 
side squeaks - I may do this for the thousandth time without thinking - out 
of habit - and we would not expect there to be an account forthcoming of 
'why I formed the intention to tread on the left side of the fifth stair'. 
More about B-wants
It will be recalled from Chapter 2 thatfour 'kinds' of wants were 
distinguished. Within the class of B-wants, I discussed two types: 
experiential B-wants and non-experiential B-wants. I now want to 
talk about what I suggest is a subcategory of non-experiential B-want, 
which I will refer to as a moral B-want. Suppose that I think that I 
ought to do A. I may in the light of this want to do A. If this 
want is indeed a species of non-experiential B-want, then its general 
form may be expressed as: I believe that I will be pleased if I do A.
In Chapter 2 however, it became clear that we must provide for expressions of 
non-experiential B-wants which take care of cases where I cannot anticipate
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being around to have a reaction at or after the time that the wanted state 
of affairs obtains - for instance - the want to sacrifice my life, the 
want that the liberals be in power in the 22nd century, and the like.
And indeed, there is no difficulty in providing such expression sincej 
ex hypothesi, non-experiential B-wants do not relate to any experience I 
may anticipate having as any kind of causal consequence of the wanted state 
of affairs. To take care of cases such as when I think I ought to sacrifice 
my life, and non-experientially B-want to do this in the moral sense, we can 
put matters thus for the moral B-want that p; either - I. believe that I 
will be pleased that p and/or I believe that I will be pleased once I am 
certain that p will obtain - once I am certain, for instance, that I am 
going to do A.
If I am justified in thinking that I will be pleased to do A, my 
justification will consist in certain correct beliefs I have about A; 
where this is a case of a moral B-want these beliefs will also be my 
reason or reasons for thinking that I ought to do A.
Consider what should be an untroublesome instance: suppose 1 think 
I ought to go and see my aunt. My reason for thinking this is, we will 
stipulate, that it will keep my promise. And we will say that I have a 
moral B-want (a type of non-experiential B-want) to see her. In a natural 
case, I would have other kinds of B-wants here too - I might believe that I 
would enjoy going to see her, for instance. But let us stipulate that 
none of these are present. My moral B-want to go and see my aunt will 
simply be the belief that I will be pleased to go and see my aunt. Perhaps,' 
however, the want might take a more negative form. In so far as I believe 
that I ought to go and see my aunt, I might anticipate that I will be 
displeased if I do not go and see her. So my moral B-want to go and see 
her might be this: I believe that I will avoid being displeased-at-omitting^- 
the-action-going-to-see-my-aunt, just so long as I do go and see her.
Suppose, to make the example more troublesome now, that I think that
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going to see my aunt will involve such terrible traumas that I will undergo 
personality changes; I anticipate that these will be so drastio that I can- 
-not believe now anything about what attitude I will take to anything after 
the change. We then have to express matters somewhat tortuously,viz. (l) 
the positive forms I believe that I will be pleased once I am sure I am 
going to see her, and this attitude, so I believe, will persist for as 
long as I am sure,and up to the time when my drastic personality change 
will ooour. (2) the negative form- I believe that I will avoid that attit­
u d e  of being displeased that I would have,were I to become sure that I 
was not going to see my aunt,this attitude persisting until my change.
Jiy reason for my moral B-want to go and see my aunt,if I have such a 
want,will be the same a3 my reason for thinking that 1 ought to go and 
see my aunt. If I do in faot go to see her, we might provide a second 
level explanation of this in terms of my realisation, that it will keep my 
promise. Even if I do have a moral B*-want to go and see her, the addition 
of this faot to the second-level explanation of my going to see her does 
not improve that explanation. I might have gone to see her,thinking that I 
ought, my reason being that I think it will keep my promise. But the latter 
is also the reason why I have a B-want in this case, if I have one at all.
Thomas Nagel has drawn our attention to wants of this kind whioh are12•consequentially ascribed* . To avoid misunderstanding, it must be 
emphasised that my moral B-want - viz. my belief that I will be pleased to 
go and see my aunt, or my belief that I will avoid being displeased at not 
going,is not itself the second-level explanation reason why I go; it would 
be redundant to cite a moral B-want in a second level explanation of my 
going. The reason why I go (in the oase as described, at any rate) is that 
it will keep my promise, and that is also the reason for my moral B-want, 
if I have such a B-want at all.
*****
We are now ready to tackle the examples of the two Jones who help
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Smith, mentioned earlier. The first Jones has as his widest intention 
to pick his neighbour out of the road, and perhaps take him to hospital.
We explain this intention at the second level as followsi He forms the 
intention because he believes Smith to be ill, and that if he acts quickly 
and helps Smith, Smith may avoid pain, and will soon receive the medical 
help he needs. And these beliefs are, of course, the reasons why Jones 
thinks that he ought, all things considered, to help Smith. We can, if we 
like, ascribe to Jones a moral B-want in this case; but consideration of 
this want does not improve the second level explanation of the formation 
of Jones intention and of Jones action.
If we now turn to the second Jones, we must, however, tell a very 
different story at the second level - a story in which emotion and a certain 
kind of B-want figure essentially in the explanation - factors which do not 
appear at all in the explanation of the first Jones* action. When the 
second Jones sees Smith lying in the road, he forms the intention, as 
before, to help Smith. Why is this? Because he feels sympathy or com­
passion. As a result of his emotional response to the situation (or, if 
you like, as part of that emotional response) he forms B-wants to help 
Smith - B-wants which may be of a very positive character, and may include 
both experiential and non-experiential B-wants, where the latter would be 
wants other than moral B-wants. He believes that he will be pleased, 
happy, even that he will enjoy helping Smith. His reasons for his 
emotional response and for his B-wants are the same reasons that the first 
Jones had for forming the intention, but when we give a proper second level 
account of the second Jones’ intention, we get to the intention by means 
of the emotional response and the B-wants.
It is clear, I think, that the first Jones may be morally good to help 
Smith. True, he ought to help, ex hypothesi, and he recognises that he
ought. Nonetheless, he does do what he ought to do, despite the fact that
he has beliefs which could become strong reasons for him to form intentions
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which would conflict with any intention to help - viz. his belief that 
it is pouring with rain outside, that he has a bad cold, that his favourite 
T.V. programme will soon be on at home, and so on. If the first Jones had 
no such reasons in favour of forming intentions which would conflict with 
his intention to help Smith, we would be disinclined to award him much in 
the way of moral credit; as I remarked at the beginning of the section, we 
only sometimes think that someone is good to do what they ought to do.
Quite often it is not particularly good of them to do what they ought to 
do. It is rather that it would be distinctly had of them if they failed 
to do what they ought to do. If the first Jones has many beliefs which 
could, potentially, figure as powerful reasons in favour of his forming 
intentions which would conflict with his intention to help Smith and yet, 
even so he focusses on those reasons why he ought to help Smith, forms the 
intention to help, and does indeed help, his moral goodness will be greater 
than if he did not have such potentially troublesome beliefs, or so it would 
seem.
The second Jones, according to the description, has not had to make any 
'effort* to help Smith; he has not had to struggle to keep before his mind 
those reasons why he ought to help Smith, as opposed to those beliefs which 
might become reasons for his forming intentions which conflict with his 
intention to help. It seems, then, that in virtue of this 'effort* the 
first Jones has something morally good about him that the second Jones lacks. 
Yet, on the other hand, the second Jones is apparently in the commendable 
state of mind in which no 'effort* is required. He is such a 'nice person* 
that a natural and spontaneous wave of feeling accounts for his forming the 
intention to help Smith. It is surely morally good that the second Jones 
feels compassion for Smith, and, accordingly, has various non-moral B-wants 
to help him. There is a moral value in the second Jones, in virtue of his 
emotional response, which is lacking in the first Jones.
In view of all this, would it really make sense to assert that the 
first Jones was morally superior to the second, or the second superior to
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the first? Would it even make sense to say that though their respective
moral goodnesses were different, they were in some sense, of 'equal' value?
I would want to ask - better in what respect? Equal in what respect?
For the goodnesses concerned seem to be 'incommensurable'« Furthermore,
it seems to me that we would require an unsurpassable being to have both
kinds of goodness. The possession of either one on its own seems quite
inadequate for an unsurpassably good being. Yet, with respect at least
to any one action, it is impossible, as we understand it, for an agent to
have both kinds of goodness. If he acts on a wave of compassion, he has
not had to make the praiseworthy struggle to keep clear his vision of what
13he ought to do and to put aside or 'silence* beliefs which could become 
reasons for forming intentions to do otherwise. On the other hand, if he 
has to struggle to keep clear his vision of what he ought to do, then he 
is not experiencing a praiseworthy wave of compassion or sympathy.
It might be objected at this point that an unsurpassable beijig.must be 
like the first Jones, and not like the second; since being like the second 
Jones is not open to an unsurpassable being for, as traditional thinking 
about God has it, God would be limited in various non-moral ways if he 
underwent emotions or had desires. I suggest that the claim that he would 
be limited by having desires amounts to the fear that his freedom of action 
would be limited if he had A-wants; the envisaged analogy might be with the 
drug addict reaching for his next dose, which he A-wants, despite strenuous 
efforts of will not to reach for it. As a matter of fact, I doubt that an 
omnipotent being could in principle be limited in freedom by such an A-want. 
No matter how great was its intensity, he could conquer it. And, even 
supposing that he could be limited in freedom if he were to have A-wants, 
there seems to be no reason why we should not simply deny that an 
unsurpassable being would have A-wants of any kind; we can just assert that 
he would only have B-wants (and D-wants, which are intentions). He would, 
as an unsurpassable being, have the best of reasons for his B-wants, and so
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I cannot see why his having B-wants should be thought to limit his freedom, 
in any sense of that elusive expression. I conclude that an unsurpassable 
being could be like the second Jones without being limited at least in any 
non-moral ways. The having of emotions would only limit such a being if 
the desires which the emotions inspired would themselves limit such a being; 
we have seen no reason for thinking that desires would limit in this way.
I now introduce a new complication into the discussion which at first 
sight might persuade us that, after all, an unsurpassable being should 
clearly be like the second Jones and not the first. I will conclude, 
however, that appearances are deceptive here.
Philosophers have pointed out that we do have some long-term 
responsibility for the desires(=B-wants) and emotions to which we are 
'subjected'• If I at this moment undergo an emotion, I cannot by means 
of an act of will dismiss this emotion from my mind, But by a certain 
kind of attention to the object of the emotion, I can over a period of time 
reduce my response, or my disposition to have such a response when I think 
of the object or encounter it. If I am angry with Jane, for example, I 
can dwell on what might be the: mitigating circumstances of that behaviour 
which is prompting my anger, and over time come to feel less angry. The 
same point can be made about a reverse process — from an unemotional state
of mind to one of strong emotion; for instance, by dwelling on Susan's
good points, I can gradually go from a state in which I do not care about 
her in the least, to a state in which I feel admiration for her. We have 
a similar long terms control over our B-wants. If I do not, say, believe 
that I will be pleased to help Smith, I could choose to think about the 
matter more carefully - I could dwell on the possibility of relieving 
Smith of discomfort of pain, etc. Then in time I may come to believe that 
I would be pleased to help Smith after all. (And since there is a tendency 
for some types of B-wants to be self-fulfilling, i.e. if I believe I will be
pleased if p is q, this in part, brings it about that I am pleased that p is
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q - I can bring it about that I actually will be pleased to help Smith, 
by dint of long term effort).
So, returning to the second Jones who acts from compassion; if we 
add that this Jones has over a period of time been trying to work on-his 
emotions and desires, so that he 'naturally' responds favourably to - e.g* 
people in distress, we might be inclined to say that this second Jones is 
morally superior to the first Jones as originally described.
In so far as this is a clear result - a'victory' for one sort of 
moral goodness over another - it unfortunately does not transfer to the 
case of an unsurpassable being. For suppose that such a being did indeed 
have emotions and desires, especially of these kinds which we would wish to 
say were morally good. There would be no question of his 'working on them' 
in the manner envisaged for the second Jones. An unsurpassable being would 
be, among otherthings, omniscient and omnipotent. Hence, he would be 
capable of the maximum amount of reflection upon those features of a 
situation which make such and such an emotion 'appropriate' to it, and all 
this in an instant of time. If it were indeed clearly 'better' for a 
being to act on feelings of compassion, as opposed to acting because of 
his perception of these features of the situation and of the action which 
were the reasons why he ought to do the action, then we may imagine that 
an unsurpassable being would feel, say, compassion, as soon as the situation 
demanding it arose. There would be no question of his acting initially 
because of his perceptions of the reasons why he ought so to act, and later, 
after working on his emotions and desires, acting from a B-want which arose 
from his emotional response to the situation.
I would have thought that in so far as we were sure that the second 
Jones was better morally than the first, it was because he had made an 
effort to acquire the better emotions and dispositions. It is true that 
we value the emotions and desires in themselves. It is also true that the 
first Jones lacks them. But it is not clear that the second Jones is 
better than the first just on that count. The latter has, after all,
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something else* He makes the effort, at the time of his decision, to 
disregard beliefs which could (1) become reasons for his forming conflict­
ing intentions, and (2) could become reasons for 'baser' desires and 
emotions. So it is the work put into altering emotional dispositions 
and desires over a period of time that inclines us to say that the second 
Jones is the superior, morally speaking. However, in the case of an 
unsurpassable being, this 'effort factor' is ruled out. An unsurpassable 
being resembling the second Jones would be a matter of brute fact. The 
being would not have grown morally over a period of time, with this state 
as the fulfilment of his labours.
What beliefs would an unsurpassable being have to put aside or 
'silence' as potential reasons for his forming intentions which would 
conflict with his intentions to do as he ought? I suggest that the belief 
of an unsurpassable being that an actionA would bring about his own suffering 
could figure as a reason for that being to form an intention which would 
conflict with his intention to do A.
There is a tradition in Christian Theism, at least, that God cannot 
14suffer. Penelhum, in his brief discussion of a related point, comments 
that it is not certain whether a being who suffers distress because he knows 
that his creatures are in pain is a greater being or a lesser being than one 
who is unmoved. My response here is that we must keep a firm grip on the 
point that an unsurpassable being is a person. We can grant freely that 
he will be a very different sort of person from any CRB. But if we deny 
that he can suffer, we are, I suggest, pushing the concept of diving person- 
hood beyond intelligible bounds. And if we denied the capacity for suffering 
we would also have to deny that an unsurpassable being had positive B-wants. 
Generally, if I B-want that p is q, then if it turns out that p is not q, I 
may be aware that I am missing being pleased (or whatever) that p is q.
And the more I had anticipated being pleased (etc.) that p is q, the greater 
I would be displeased if it is not. If it were suggested that I could
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believe that I would be pleased in some sense or other that p is q, and 
then, in the clear knowledge that p does not turn out to be q, feel 
nothing - no regret, disappointment, etc. I suggest we no longer under­
stand what was meant in the first place by my belief that I would be- pleased 
if p is q. If it were denied that an unsurpassable being could suffer in 
any way, then, this seems to rule out his capacity to have positive B-wants. 
I find it difficult to imagine how such a being could be regarded as'a 
person at all.
Further, if it were thought that an unsurpassable being must love any 
rational being he creates - that a being who did not love the persons he 
created would be surpassed by a being who did - we could also argue as 
follows. If he loves his creatures, this entails that they have the 
capacity, at least in principle, to make him suffer. If they do not have
this capacity, we may doubt the reality of the love. It is true that,
without this capacity, the unsurpassable being could still wish his 
creatures well - do his best for them, and make them as happy as possible. 
But if they could not, in principle, make him suffer,he would be at an 
emotional distance from them. Their unhappiness, their wicked deeds, their 
responses to him - all would be incapable to making him suffer in any way. 
There could not be a full relationship of love between him and them, or so 
I would contend. God's capacity to suffer need not be regarded as a 
weakness - as somehow making his creatures more 'powerful' than he is. 
Indeed, his capacity to suffer and to bear it would be a strength, which a 
being who could not suffer could not in principle possess.
To sum up the first part of the argument in this section; an 
unsurpassable being must not only do what is right and never do what is 
wrong. He must also be in the 'best' state of mind, morally speaking, 
all the while. I have urged that 'best' suggests a unitary scale which 
is inapplicable here; that if we could have 'scales' at all, there would 
be at least two; that an unsurpassable being would apparently have to be
71
at the top of both, yet it is impossible to be at the top of both, I 
conclude that CBB's cannot understand the nature of unsurpassable goodness; 
in the later chapters I go on to follow up some of the implications of this. 
The second part of the Argument
This deals with the performance by an unsurpassable being of those 
good actions of which it is not true to say that he ought to do them, all 
things considered. First, let us be clear that an unsurpassable being 
would indeed perform such actions - i«e. he would not merely possess moral 
perfection, as earlier defined. To see this, imagine a man who always did 
what he ought to do, all things considered,no matter what the cost was to 
himself, and never did what he ought not. He would of course excite 
admiration. But compare him with someone else, who not only did what he 
ought (and never did what he ought not) but who was constantly seeking out 
opportunities for performing acts 6f extraordinary kindness, generosity, 
and braveness - acts which he was in no way obliged to do, and yet which 
never interfered with his performance of those actions which were such that 
he ought to do them. Surely it is evident that the moral goodness of the 
second man exceeds the moral goodness of the first man. I believe that 
we can transfer this result to the case of an-unsurpassable being - the 
latter will not only do all that he ought, and refrain from doing what he 
ought not - he will also act beyond the call of duty - he will perform acts 
of supererogation. In addition to moral perfection, an unsurpassable 
being must possess an extra dimension of supererogatory goodness.
It is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for an act to be one
of supererogation that it be a morally good action, and it not be an action
15which I ought to do. For as Bichard Price points out, whilst action A 
may not be such that I ought to do it, perhaps I ought to do a reasonable 
number of actions from a certain set of actions which includes A. For 
example, suppose I ought to help people in the third world to a modest 
degree. It is not the case that I ought to give to this particular charity;
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though if I did, I would be doing part of what I ought to do - viz. helping 
the third world to a modest degree. Yet, perhaps, giving to this particular 
charity would be a good action. So, giving to this charity could be both 
good and not something which I ought to do, and yet it may not be an act of 
supererogation to give to it.
Giving to the third world might be described as an 'imperfect duty'. 
David Heyd describes the difference between imperfect duties and 
supererogation like this '...an imperfect duty to perform an act - type A 
implies that it is a perfect duty to do either (act token) ai or &2 0r an, 
(but) a supererogatory act - type B does not mean that it is our duty to 
perform any act token of B* . (in Heyd's terminology, if I have a 
perfect duty to perform act token ai, then I ought, all things considered, 
to do ai).
Hence we could specify an act to be supererogatory if (l) it is a 
morally good action, (2) it is not an action which I ought to do, (3) it 
is an act which it is morally good of the agent to perform, and (4) if it 
is part of a disjunction of acts one or more of which we ought to do, all 
things considered, where it does not matter which, then we must already 
satisfy this requirement by performing an act or acts from the disjunction 
other than A.
When our first Jones reflected that Smith was ill, lying in the roadf 
and clearly needed help, he was dwelling consciously on those reasons why 
he ought to help Smith. So long as he kept the beliefs which were those 
reasons firmly and consciously in mind, other beliefs of his, such as his 
belief that it was pouring with rain, that he had a bad cold, that his 
favourite T.V. programme would be coming on soon at home - these would 
have no chance of becoming reasons for him to form the intention not to 
help Smith. The reasons he has for thinking that he ought to help Smith 
are very cogent; after all, they enable him to realise that if he does 
not help Smith it will be morally bad of him. Such reasons have the
power to 'silence' beliefs of other kinds which might have become reasons
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for his forming intentions which would conflict with his intention to help 
Smith.
Consider now that soldier who falls on the bomb to protect his com­
rades from the explosion. We explain his intention to protect his comrades 
from the explosion at the second level, I suggest, in terms of a B-want, 
generated perhaps by a wave of emotion. The role of the B-want and/or 
the emotion seems to be crucial. For the soldier's reasons for acting 
(the reasons which would be cited in a second level account of his action) 
which consist of his beliefs about the situation - that his comrades will 
be saved, and perhaps be enabled to live out many more years, that they 
will be able to return to their wives and families, etc. are not in 
themselves of a character to 'silence' other beliefs. The latter would 
be such as could become reasons for the soldier to form an intention which 
would conflict with his intention to protect his comrades from the explosion 
such as the belief that if he falls on the bomb he will experience an 
agonising, if very quick death, his belief, if he rejects life after death, 
that the explosion will involve his annihilation - that he will never see 
his wife again, and so on. After all, the soldier's reasons for falling 
on the bomb do not justify him in thinking that he will be morally bad if 
he refrains from falling on the bomb. Nonetheless they are 'powerful' 
reasons - certainly sufficient to 'override' reasons he might have for 
forming conflicting intentions. Because the agent's reasons for perform­
ing an act of supererogation A, 'override' rather than 'silence' reasons 
for forming intentions which would conflict with the agent's intention to 
perform A, the presence of the 'extra element* - an emotional response, is 
crucial in enabling a satisfactory second level explanation of the perform­
ance of A to be given. We cannot rule out the possibility of a situation 
in which there is a satisfactory second level explanation of some 
supererogatory act where this is performed in 'cold blood' - i.e. not on a 
wave of emotion at all. But the reasons for action in such a case would
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have to be very compelling indeed, whilst lacking the power to 'silence'*
When we turn to explaining those acts of supererogation of which an 
unsurpassable being must in principle be capable, I would contend that we 
cannot in principle supply a satisfactory second level explanation of all 
of these. We must imagine that, to be unsurpassable, a being must in 
principle be prepared to perform an act of supererogation even if he 
anticipated that it would involve him in infinite suffering. A being who 
'counted the cost' - who said to himself; 'thus far, and no further' - 
who would not act if the act in his estimation was for him too heavy a 
burden would not be unsurpassable. He would be surpassed in goodness by 
a being who refused to count the cost; who would, at least in principle, 
act no matter how great was the cost he anticipated to himself.
An incamational theology might involve a claim that something like 
this has actually occurred; that God became man - a man who was crucified 
and rose from the dead. On this line of thought, the suffering that this 
involved is unlikely to be restricted to the physical suffering involved in 
crucifixion, which though very great was still finite. It would rather 
include the 'spiritual abasement' required to become an embodied person and 
live, though an unsurpassably good being, in a community of sinful creatures. 
The idea might well be here that in a sense in this act God involved himself 
in 'infinite' suffering; that no limit can sensibly be set to the cost to 
himself in this act. We do not, of course in the present work wish to 
commit ourselves to a particular theology; this is merely an illustration.
More generally, however, we might well think that an unsurpassable 
being would wish to encourage his creatures to be loving and good. Some 
crucial modes of encouragement which yet allowed the creatures to retain 
their freedom could well involve God in being seen to suffer; God makes 
himself the ultimate good example, showing his creatures that he is prepared 
to risk the worst in the way of suffering in the pursuit of goodness.
This might be the only way available to God of influencing creatures in
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certain states towards the pursuit of goodness. It might have to be that 
God was prepared to risk any amount of suffering; any restriction on the 
'quantity' he was prepared to undergo would, if discerned, undermine his 
efforts to persuade his creatures towards the pursuit of virtue.
Much of this, philosophically speaking, is by way of speculation.
The general point is that an unsurpassable being must be prepared to undergo 
infinite suffering in his performance of acts of supreme supererogation 
Now it will be recalled that in the case of the brave soldier, his reasons 
at the second level for acting would not 'silence' reasons for not acting, 
but they would prove 'stronger'. But how could it be, in the case of an 
unsurpassable being, that his reasons for forming an intention to perform some 
act of supreme supererogation could prove 'stronger' than the reasons he 
would have for refraining from that act in the most extreme case - namely 
his belief that it would involve him in infinite suffering? Now it may be 
that some of the speculations in the above paragraph make some kind of sense 
to us at the second level. But at best we scarcely possess a full second 
level comprehension of the matter. We do not understand, for instance 
what it could be about the action of persuading a creature to pursue virtue, 
which could provide an unsurpassable being with reasons for performing the 
act of persuading the creature - reasons which would prove stronger than 
those reasons which there might be for refraining from the act - viz. the 
anticipation of infinite suffering.
Even if we add to the account that the unsurpassable being would react 
emotionally to the situation, and that this would involve him inhaving 
strong B-wants to perform the act of supererogation, this still does not 
make it intelligible to us that he can overcome in his mind the thought of 
infinite suffering. The crucial difficulty here is that the reasons for 
acting have to prove stronger than the reasons for not acting. Silencing 
reasons involves, as I said before, the thought that if the agent turns 
aside from the action he will be morally bad. But in the present case, the
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unsurpassable being would not be morally bad to refrain from the act of 
supererogation; this permits the reasons for not acting to get a real 
hold on him, and necessitates them being overcome as opposed to being 
silenced.
It is my contention, then, that CRB's are barred from a full under­
standing at the second level of that type of action of which an 
unsurpassable being must surely be capable in principle. It does not 
follow from this, however, that no such extreme acts of supererogation 
could exist at all.
To sum up the main burden of the argument in this section; an 
unsurpassable being must, in addition to possessing moral perfection, 
possess moral goodness to a supreme degree* But CRB's cannot fully 
understand the nature of this supreme moral goodness, either as it is 
found in the unsurpassable being as a person in the course of his acting 
as he ought, or as it is expressed in acts of supererogation. It is 
evident that the understanding failure of the former differs somewhat 
from the understanding failure of the latter. Resembling both the first 
and the second Jones looks to a CRB, at least, to be logically impossible.
It is in this sense that the CRB cannot understand how God could be good in 
the way that both the first and the second Jones are good. On the other 
hand, performing the most extreme act of supererogation in no way looks 
logically impossible. It is rather than the CRB cannot conceive of a 
satisfactory second level explanation of such an act. I will have more 
to say about different modes of understanding and understanding failure in 
the chapter on belief.
A traditional qualifier to many of the divine properties has been 
'infinite' - 'infinitely good', 'infinitely loving', 'infinitely wise', 
and so on. It might be thought that a neat phrase could capture the 
point that God must have a degree of moral goodness (say) which cannot be 
surpassed. But my criticism of this qualifier, in the light of the present 
discussion, is that it suggests 'more of the same' goodness, love, and so on.
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Yet it may "be plausibly argued that the explanation of the fact that CRB's 
cannot understand the nature of moral goodness as found in an unsurpassable 
being is this; that the goodness in question is not simply 'more of the 
same' but contains an element which is different from any of the kinds of 
goodness that a CRB can understand.
If moral goodness is 'objectively based' (See Chapter 2 for definition) 
then so will be unsurpassable moral goodness, which, from now on I refer to 
as transcendent goodness. Transcendent goodness will be possessed by God 
in virtue of his possession of other properties, some of which would be 
classed as 'non-moral' whatever, if anything, that ultimately comes to.
If divine goodness differs in some way from all other goodness,then those 
divine properties in virtue of which divine goodness is possessed should 
include properties different from any which in principle may be found within 
the creation. There is an implication here that God is ontologically 
transcendent if he possesses transcendent goodness. Furthermore, 
associated with some aspects of CRB's to understand the nature of moral 
goodness in an unsurpassable being, is their inability to say in what it 
consists. Talk of transcendent goodness merely labels the perplexity; it 
does not specify any property.
The following chapters take up some of the results obtained so far 
concerning the transcendence of God, and examine potential philosophical 
problems to which they may be thought to give rise.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ANTI-REALISM AND MYSTERY 
1. INTRODUCTION
Whilst it is clear that unsurpassability entails a degree of mystery, 
it is less clear, perhaps, what particular degree is required. For 
example, must an unsurpassable being be mysterious to CRB’s in this life, 
but not so in the hereafter? Or again, if an unsurpassable being is 
mysterious to CRB'3 could this be a mere contingent fact - perhaps a 
result of divine choice; God hides himself from CRB's for his own good 
reasons, but he could have done otherwise, with the result that he would 
not have been mysterious to CRB's at all. Or must any mystery concerned 
in unsurpassability be stronger than this - of a kind which could not be 
dispelled even in a beatific vision, or of a kind which even an omnipotent 
being could not enable CRB's to penetrate?
Other things being equal, a being having a core of mystery which could 
not be dispelled in principle is greater than a being whose mystery was 
contingent - mystery that could at least in principle, be dissolved. The 
ceteris paribus refers to the philosophical constraints on mystery; if 
extreme degrees of mystery are incoherent - such that it would be logically 
impossible for any being to possess them, then needless to say unsurpassa­
bility will eschew such extremes. Broadly speaking, unsurpassability seems 
to require as much mystery as is logically possible.
I distinguished in Chapter 1 between mystery which involved the 
transcendence of CRB understanding, and mystery which involved the 
transcendence of CRB knowledge. In the present chapter I inquire into the 
limits of mystery in the latter sense, which may be thought to be imposed 
by anti-realist conceptions of meaning and truth. I discuss whether the 
level of mystery which is permissable is enough to satisfy the vague but 
insistent requirements of unsurpassability.
In the first half of the chapter, I make some general remarks on the 
issues surrounding the realism v anti-realism dispute, and distinguish
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between a number of possible realist positions* I then examine the 
degree to which anti-realist objections succeed against these various 
positions, and inquire whether the realist views which remain unscathed 
will suffice for the Theist.
For the purposes of the present discussion, a realist conception of
truth is one which, broadly speaking, allows that the truth condition for
a sentence may transcend our powers to know that it obtains* This is,
of course, a characterisation embracing a number of possible positions
about which we will shortly be more precise. As expounded by Dummett^
Frege's realist account of the meaning of a sentence falls into two parts,
sense and force. We can, on this account, detect within a given class of
sentences what Wittgenstein once referred to as a 'sentence radicle’ - a
content or sense which may be common to an assertion, a command, a question,
and so on. Consider, for example, the class of sentences: 'The Prime
Minister has resigned'. 'Has the Prime Minister resigned?' 'Resign,
Prime Minister', 'Would that the Prime Minister resigned', etc. The
common content, or sense, might be referred to as 'The Prime Minister’s
resigning'. The differences between members of this class are those of
force - roughly, the kind of speech act which would characteristically be
performed with each - assertion, question, etc. The realist closely
associates that aspect of the meaning of a sentence referred to as 'sense'
with truth conditions. '...to give truth conditions is a way of giving
2the meaning of a sentence', remarks Davidson .
The anti-realist denies that the truth condition of a sentence, if 
linked to its sense in the way that the realist claims, can be such that 
it may transcend our powers to know that it obtains. In outline, his 
reasoning is that we could not 'grasp' the truth conditions of sentences 
if they conformed to the realist conception of truth conditions; hence we 
would be unable to understand the senses of such sentences. Anti-realism 
is the descendent of logical positivism, which denied the independence of
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meaning from knowledge and evidence. The verification principle in its
various forms aimed at banning from the class of significant sentences those
who«truth values would be, in specified respects, beyond knowledge. The
positivists' most plausible defence of the verification principle was to
the effect that it embodied, in a precise and explicit form, both common
sense and scientific criteria of significance or meaningfulness that were
already in use in the linguistic community. Nevertheless, there were few
substantial arguments for the validity of the principle, whereas the modem
anti-realist does have arguments, as we shall see.
If the anti-realist retains the thought that a grasp of the truth
conditions for a sentence constitutes a grasp of the sense of that sentence,
he offers replacements for the classical realist conception of truth which
are such that, in his view they can be grasped by us - do not transcend our
powers of knowledge. For instance, the 'truth condition' for a sentence S
may be seen by the anti-realist as a condition in which it is Justified to
assert S - or perhaps the circumstances in which S is regarded as conclusively
verified. The anti-realist may abandon the alleged link between truth
condition and sense, opting instead for a connection between the :
sense of a sentence and the states of affairs which would be ruled out in an
3
assertion of that sentence . Again, however, the excluded states of affairs 
would have to be, on the anti-realist view, such that we could'recognise' 
that they obtained or know that they obtained. (More on 'recognition' 
later).
2. FOHMS OF REALISM
What precisely is the view held by a realist which Dummett and others
wish to attack. I mention ten possibilities, without any real hope that
these exhaust the range; (The expression 'sentence' will be shorthand,
unless otherwise stated, for the utterance of a sentence by a certain
art
speaker at a certain time in a certain context). R1-9,listed in 
roughly descending order of 'severity'. To avoid a number of complications
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I restrict the discussion for the most part to sentences susceptible of 
contingent truth.
R1 A sentence could be true even if it were logically impossible for any 
rational being to have the slightest justification for believing that it 
was true.
Comments There are few examples of sentences falling into this category 
which have the faintest plausibility as claimants for genuine intelligibility, 
in my view. 'any rational being' includes, of course, a being who is 
omnipotent, omniscient, and eternal, in so far as these are intelligible 
descriptions. Perhaps some counterfactuals provide slight encouragement 
to the potential R1 realist, although discussion of such examples is a 
specialised matter and would take us too far from our present purposes.
For instance: 'If an electron had been fired from C at time t, it would
have passed through point d'. If genuine indeterminacy reign3 here, it 
does look as though even God could not in principle have the slightest 
justification for believing it to be true; some may think that,nonetheless, 
they can understand perfectly well what it would be for the counterfactual 
to be true.
R2 Certain sentences might be false even where a rational being is 
possessed of the best possible justification that is available in principle 
for believing that they are true. Certain sentences, equally, may be true 
in the face of a rational being's having the best possible justification 
available in principle for believing them false.
Comment: This view expresses in extreme form a central theme of realist 
conceptions of truth; the independence of reality from the knower. The 
troublesome phrase in this version of realism is evidently 'best possible 
justification'. For it might be thought that the best possible justification 
was one which was logically indefeasible - that is to say, such that it is 
logically impossible for one so justified to acquire further beliefs which 
would render that person no longer fully justified. If so, this would
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restrict the extension of 'best possible justification' to that small 
number (if, indeed there are any at all) of incorrigible sentences. A 
sentence S is incorrigible for P iff'p believes s' entails the truth of S 
itself. No sentences with inferior epistemic status count as logically 
indefeasible. To see this, consider, for instance, the case where my 
justification for believing q is p, p entails q, and I believe that p 
entails q. This looks like a pretty strong justification. But it does 
not, of course, amount to logical indefeasibility. For whilst it may 
seem quite clear to me that p entails q, it is possible, for instance, 
for me to acquire further beliefs to the effect that I have a rare brain 
disease, which would justify me in doubting my ability to see simple 
logical relationships such as entailment. This would spoil the logical 
indefeasibility even if I credited myself with incorrigible access to p 
itself.
I will not attempt here to set out a clear account of 'best possible 
justification* - for beliefs in contingent truths; it is anyhow a matter 
of controversy among epistemologists. I merely wish to observe that in 
the vast majority of cases such justification necessarily falls short of 
logical indefeasibility, as defined above. I will have more to say about 
incorribility and its relevance to some of the anti-realist arguments later. 
R3 A sentence can be true even when it is logically impossible for any 
rational being to know that it is true.
Comment: This category of realism would appear to be required, for instance, 
if we were interested in the possibility of the truth of counterfactuals 
such as 'If Judas had been offered 20 pieces of silver, he would have 
refused to betray Christ'. God, if no one else, might (it could be argued) 
have some evidence for the truth of this counterfactual, but he could not 
know the truth of it, since such knowledge would be incompatible with human 
freedom. (i do not pronounce on the merits of such an argument here).
R4 A sentence can be true even when it is logically impossible for any
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created rational being (CRB) to have the slightest justification for 
believing that it is true»
Comment: I suggest that the unsurpassability requirements would be 
satisfied by a realism at this level - though possibly a realism one or 
two steps less severe might suffice. I will say a little more to clear
this matter up later in the chapter. It looks at any rate as though I
will need to argue that an R4 realism escapes the arguments of the 
anti-realist. The position in question amounts to this: there are truths 
concerning God which God can know, but which no other rational being can in 
principle have the slightest justification for believing. I do not think 
that taking the sense of sentences about, e.g. the remote past, as a grasp 
of the conditions in which such sentences are true, requires a realism as 
harsh as R4. It is logically possible for CRB's to have some justification 
for believing the truth of such sentences, even if, as a matter of 
contingent fact, there were none around to obtain any relevant evidence.
It is logically impossible for any of the CRB's who formerly existed, exist 
now, and will exist in the future to have any justification for believing in 
the truth of sentences about the remote past all of whose traces have long 
since vanished from the universe. But this does not amount to the same 
thing as it being logically impossible for any CRB to have justification 
for believing the truth of such sentences, unless it is implausibly thought 
that each and every one of the CRB's that has existed, exists, and will 
exist exists of logical necessity at the particular time that he exists.
R5 As R2, replacing 'rational being' with CRB. Either this, or an R4 
position would be the standard view held by a realist philosopher; it 
looks as though Strawson holds this position. '...the grasp of the sense 
of a sentence can be displayed in response to recognisable conditions - of 
various sorts; there are those which conclusively establish the truth or 
falsity of the sentence; there are those which (given our general theory( 
of the world) constitute evidence, more or less good, for or against the
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truth of the sentence'there are even those which point to the unavoidable 
absence of evidence either way. The appropriate response varies, of
course, from case to case, in the last case being of the form^ ’We shall
Anever know whether p or not' . . _
R6 A sentence could be true even if it were logically impossible for any 
CRB to know that it was true.
Comment: Again, the expression 'any CRB' gives a little trouble here. Is 
this type of realism required for the intelligible sense of sentences about 
the remote past (before there were any CRB's) or sentences about the remote 
future (after the last of the CRB's has gone out of existence) where a 
grasp of sense is equated with a grasp of truth conditions? It is 
logically impossible for me now to know what happened in 3,000,000,000 B.C. 
(we suppose that all traces have vanished). But it is only a matter of 
contingent fact that there were no CRB's around at the time who could have 
been in a position to know what happened then. I conclude that we do not 
require a realism as strong as R6 if we wish to understand the sense of 
sentences about the remote past (etc.) as a grasp of their truth conditions. 
R7 A sentence can be true even when it is as a matter of contingent fact 
impossible for a given CRB or community of CRB's to have the slightest 
Justification for believing that it is true.
R8 Certain sentences might be false even where a given community of CRB's, 
or a given CRB have the best possible justification available to them as a 
matter of contingent fact for believing that they are true. Equally 
certain sentences might be true in the face of a given CRB or community of 
CRB's having the best possible justification available to them as a matter 
of contingent fact for believing their falsity.
R9 A sentence can be true even when it is as a matter of contingent fact 
impossible for a given CRB or community of CRB's to know that it is true.
R10 Rather than realism about whole sentences, we can have realism about 
the components of sentences; I will simplify exposition here by talking as
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though sentences contain only two kinds of components — referring expressions 
and predicate expressions.
Realism about referring expressions. A referring expression 'R' (e.g. a 
name, expressions of the form 'the so and so', etc.) occurring in a sentence 
S belonging to a language L may denote one or more objects even though 
(specifying now the most extreme realist view of this type) it is logically 
impossible for any rational speaker of L to have the slightest justification 
for believing this. We can go on to specify less extreme realisms here, 
along the lines of R1-9 for whole sentences. For instance, we could have a 
realism in which we say that 'R' may denote even where no CRB could in 
principle know that it does, and so on.
Comment: The most severe form of this realism would be more extreme than 
any yet mentioned. It would entail R1 realism, but would be more extreme 
than it, since we can, or so it would seem, envisage a sentence whose truth 
it was logically impossible for any rational being to have the slightest 
justification in believing, yet containing a referring expression R such 
that it was logically possible to have some evidence that it denoted some­
thing. (it might be thought that evidence that 'R' denoted was as such 
evidence for the truth of a sentence containing 'R'; I would prefer to say 
that the truth of the sentence presupposed R having a denotation, and that 
this could be treated separately).
Realism about predicate expressions. An object may belong to the extension 
of a predicate P occurring in a sentence S of a language L even though (a) it 
is logically impossible for a speaker of L to have the slightest justification 
for believing that it does - (b)...(c) and so on specifying in turn, less and 
less extreme versions of this realism as before.
Comment: Again, the most extreme form of this realism is more extreme than 
R1 realism. We could envisage either: (l) that a sentence S contains a 
predicate P, where P occurs in other sentences, such that it is possible 
for a rational being to have some justification for believing that an object
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belonged to the extension of that predicate, having some justification for 
believing in the truth of one or more of these other sentences, even though 
it is not logically possible for the rational being to have the slightest 
justification for believing in the truth of S itself. Or: (2) a yet more 
extreme realism, holding that there could be a true sentence S containing a 
predicate P such that (a) no rational being could in principle have the 
slightest justification for believing in the truth of S, and (b) no rational 
being could in principle have the slightest justification for believing that 
any object belonged to the extension of P by having justification for 
believing in the truth of sentences containing P other than S itself. It 
is the form of realism sketched in (2) which the most extreme version of R10 
realism about predicates involves.
3. ANTI-REALIST ARGUMENTS
Before we consider some anti-realist arguments in detail, I want to look
at a position, related to the ideas involved in R10 realism, which concedes
quite a lot to anti-realism, but contends that its arguments concern our
understanding of components of sentences rather than sentences as wholes.
First,however, to sketch the two basic types of anti-realist argument:
5
According to the acquisition challenge many sentences are taught 
verbally - the trainee is told in what circumstances it is appropriate to 
use them, or told, in other words,what they mean. But not all sentences 
can be taught verbally. According to the challenger, the speaker, in other 
cases, is simply taught in situations of certain kinds that it is correct to 
utter these sentences - the important point being that the situations are 
the sort that he can directly recognise to obtain, or observe to obtain, 
(Later, I will subject the notions of ’recognition’ and the like as they 
occur in anti-realist moves, to close scrutiny). Now suppose we interpret 
the sense of a given sentence in some of the realist fashions sketched above. 
The challenger inquires how we could possibly have acquired an understanding 
of such a realist ’sense’. Consider, for instance, the sentence 'Caesar
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stubbed his toe whilst in Kent on June 2nd 55 B.C. 'Let us suppose 
that, as a matter of contingent fact, no CEB now can obtain the slightest 
evidence for the truth of this sentence. If, as B7 realists we say that 
this sentence could, even so, be true, we would claim that our understanding 
of the sense of the sentence consists in our grasp of the condition in which 
the sentence would be true,viz. our grasp of what it would be for Caesar to 
have stubbed his toe on the day in question. But, inquires our challenger, 
how could we possibly have acquired such an understanding? No training in 
responding to situations which we can recognise to obtain would have provided 
us with it. Hence we do not in fact possess it. The challenger may then 
proceed to offer alternative characterisations of in what our understanding 
consists.
It is generally agreed that the manifestation challenge goes deeper 
than the acquisition challenge. I take the broad outlines of a 
characteristic argument from Dummetis 'What is a Theory of Meaning 11':
(a) A speaker's understanding of the sense of a sentence consists in a 
practical ability.
(b) On the realist view, this understanding is a 'grasp' of the truth 
conditions of that sentence. In some cases, then, a speaker could manifest 
such understanding verbally - he could state the truth condition verbally. 
Dummett argues that this could not always be so - otherwise we could not 
escape the circle of language.
(c) Where verbal manifestation of understanding is not possible, in what 
does manifestation of understanding consist? It is easy enough to answer 
this question, Dummett thinks, when the truth condition for the sentence in 
question is one 'which (the speaker) can be credited with recognizing 
whenever it obtains - that knowledge will consist in his capacity perhaps 
in response to suitable prompting, to evince recognition of the truth of
C
the sentence when and only when the relevant condition is fulfilled' .
The class of such sentences is limited. But for a further class, we can
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explain how the speaker manifests his understanding as follows; there 
will be some kind of procedure which the speaker could carry out in a 
finite time which if followed would put the speaker in a position in which 
he can recognize whether or not the condition for the truth of a sentence 
of the class in question obtains*
(d) The class of sentences covered by (c) excludes a great variety of 
sentences - the use of the quantifier over an infinite or unsurveyable 
domain, counterfactuals, sentences concerning regions of space and time in 
principle inaccessible to us, etc* For such sentences we cannot ascribe 
knowledge of their truth conditions to speakers since there is no practical 
ability by means of which such knowledge could be manifested.
(e) This troublesome class of sentences is in fact so large that the source 
of the trouble, namely, the assumption that to understand a sentence is to 
•grasp' the condition in which it would be true, where 'true* is understood 
in some realist fashion, should be rejected* At this stage the manifesta­
tion challenger may proceed to offer alternative characterisations of a 
conception of truth to the realist conception.
Both the acquisition and manifestation challenges as outlined, treat 
of the understanding of sentences as wholes. Suppose that their arguments 
as they stand were conceded. It mi^it nevertheless be thought that some 
of those consequences of such a concession which would be most distressing 
to a philosopher of realist temper might be evaded by the following manoeuvre* 
I sketch a version applicable to the acquisition and manifestation challenges 
in turn.
First, as regards the acquisition challenge: it might be said that 
once a speaker has acquired an understanding of the use of a referring 
expression 'R' in a certain range of sentences, by being taught that it is 
'correct' to assert the sentences in situations which he can recognise to 
obtain, or observe to obtain, he is then able to employ 'R' in other 
sentences, and to grasp the sense of such sentences, even though the
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circumstances in which it is correct to assert such sentences are not 
recognizable by him. The speaker can lift 'R' from his training sentence, 
and combine it with other elements to foim new sentences whose asserti- 
bili ty conditions he could not have acquired in the way he acquired the 
conditions for asserting his training sentences.
The intuitive thinkihg behind this would be that the speaker understands 
the 'meaning’ of 'R' as a contribution 'R' makes to each sentence in which 
it occurs - there is something common to the contribution 'R' makes to each 
sentence in which it occurs, and the speaker has grasped this 'common essence’.
The same kind of idea may readily be portrayed with respect to 
predicate expressions. Second, with respect to the manifestation challenge, 
the manoeuvre looks like this: it should not be an obstacle to a speaker's 
grasp of the sense of a sentence that he is unable to manifest his under­
standing of that sentence as a whole in circumstances he can recognize.
This is because he may well be able to manifest his understanding of each of 
the components of which the sentence in question is composed, in other 
contexts. He can perhaps manifest his understanding of other sentences as 
wholes in which components of the problematic sentence may be found. The 
intuitive thinking is similar to thàt envisaged for the manoeuvre outlined 
for the acquisition challenge; the idea is that if a speaker can manifest 
understanding of a sentence S as a whole, containing, for instance, a 
predicate expression 'P', he can grasp what contribution 'P' makes to 'S' 
and hence grasp what contribution 'P' would make to a new. sentence, even if 
the latter was such that the speaker could not manifest his understanding of 
it as a whole.
Perhaps the 'truth value link realist' developed by Dummett is a step 
in this direction. Such a realist, for instance, learns the use of the 
predicate 'is in pain' in his own case, and thus, according to such a realist, 
can use it to attribute pain to another person - he can understand the 
sentence concerned even though; as a whole, it has truth conditions which
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he is not able to recognize as obtaining. (Dummett's realist only 
interests himself in discourse about times other than the present - the 
suggestion that such truth-value link realism can be extended to the
O
attribution of others*s sensations is made by McDowell ).
o
In a recent article, Sklar is more explicit in a wholesale advocation 
of the above manoeuvres for avoiding the most distressing consequences of 
anti-realist arguments. We use, he says, a predicate in a sentence whose 
truth condition we cannot get ourselves into a position to recognize 
obtaining 'by analogy* with the sense that predicate has in other sentences 
whose truth conditions we can recognize as obtaining. (He concedes that, 
even if successful, the method of semantic analogy would not help with 
those problems the anti-realist attaches to sentences involving quantifi­
cation over an infinite or unsurveyable domain). A similar proposal is 
advanced in respect of referring expressions.
I now want to argue that Sklar's position, unfortunately, cannot be 
occupied with any confidence, and hence that we must ultimately meet the 
anti-realist arguments head on. This latter I intend to do in the final
section of the present chapter. First, to tackle the Sklar option.
There is a difficulty in principle, to take the suggestion concerning 
predicates first, about the notion of 'analogy*. It relies on the seemingly 
uncontentious assumption that a given predicate '-is P' can have a particular 
sense or meaning, in its occurrence in the utterance of a particular speaker 
on a particular occasion, and (2) that the speaker can transfer this sense 
to a new sentence. The assumptions may seem not only uncontentious, but 
essential to account for speakers' capacities to produce and understand a 
potentially infinite number of sentences with the resources of a finite set 
of components. We are compelled, of course, to accept that speakers do 
possess such a capacity; it is when we come to describe in what this 
capacity consists that the problems begin.
First let us sketch an 'orthodox' description of part of this capacity
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before seeing what is wrong about such a description. In the training/ 
manifestation situation we have a sentence S in which may be found, for 
instance, the predicate ’-is P ’. A speaker understands S; hence he 
understands '-is P'. He understands, that is to say, that '-is P' is 
applicable to something just when that something possesses the property P. 
Hence he can understand the meaning of '-is P' even if it occurs in a new 
sentence whose meaning as a whole is such that he cannot acquire/manifest 
an understanding of it. The speaker will think that there will be an 
analogy between the truth condition for the new sentence, N and the truth 
condition for S; to understand what it is like for something to be P in the 
truth condition for N, he must look at what it was like for something else 
to be P in the truth condition for S, and perform an act of analogical 
transfer. '
On one interpretation of the Wittgensteinian rule - following 
considerations to which I suscribe, the orthodox description just sketched 
gets matters the wrong way round. On this interpretation, individually 
and as a community we just do apply ‘-is P' in new situations. But our 
applications of '-is P' in fresh instances is not because we discern that 
there is a manifestation of the property P in the new situation, all the 
while taking it for granted that '-is P' is applicable just when the property 
P is manifested. It is rather than we say that the property P is manifested 
on the new occasion as a consequence of our decision to apply the predicate 
'-is P' to that new situation. If we speak of '-is P' as having the 'same
meaning* in the new situation as in the old, this can only be as a 
consequence of our deciding to apply the predicate to the new situation as 
well as to the old. However, nothing in the rule - following considerations 
entails that our decisions are arbitrary; they are supposed to imply rather 
that the orthodox account of the way in which they are not arbitrary is 
mistaken.
If the rule following considerations do indeed show this, Sklar's
92
position looks shaky» He seems to require things to be as the orthodox 
description says they are. To see this, consider the following. We can 
only speak of an analogy between a truth condition (a) and another (b) 
after we have decided that (b) involves the manifestation of the same 
property as (a).' Yet, according to the rule following considerations, in 
so far as sense can be made of (b) involving the manifestation of the same 
property as (a), this could only be as a result of, or consequential upon, 
our deciding to apply the same predicate, say, '-is P' in (b) as in (a).
Hence we cannot be enabled to ascribe the predicate ’-is P' in (b) on the 
basis of what we would see as an analogy obtaining between truth condition 
(b) and truth condition (a).
I now sketch what I take to be Kripke's^interpretation of the rule 
following considerations; the great merit of his interpretation seems to 
me to be that it does not itself depend on anti-realist considerations, of 
the kind that I will be attacking at the end of the chapter - considerations 
upon which many of the still current 'private language arguments' still seem 
to depend.
Kripke presents the argument by means of a mathematical example.
English speakers us 'plus' and '+' to denote addition. On the orthodox
view of what it is to know the meaning of 'plus' or ' + ', I, as an english
speaker, have grasped a rule; the application of this rule 'determines my
answer for indefinitely many new sums that I have never performed before'^.
Suppose that '68+57' is a new computation for me. I perform it and get
1 2 5 - 1  think this is both arithmetically correct, and metalinguistically
correct - 'plus, as I intended to use the word in the past, denoted a function
which, when applied to the numbers I called '68' and '57' yields the value of 
12125' .
Suppose someone suggests that, as I used 'plus' in the past, the answer 
I intended for 68+57 should have been 5* I attempt to reject the suggestion 
by saying I am following the rule I followed on previous occasions. The
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difficulty now arises in determining what that rule was, since I can only
have thought of a finite number of applications of it. Perhaps 'in the
past I used 'plus' and '+' to denote a function which I will call 'quus*
13and symbolize by '©'. It is defined by: x © y = x + y, if,x,y,<57' .
= 5 otherwise
Though I would, of course, reject this extraordinary proposal, and would 
be 'right' to do so, it is not facts about my past usage that compel or 
justify the answer 125, rather than 5} nor instructions I gave myself in 
the past; ex hypothesi the computation '68 plus 57' is not included in 
such facts or instructions.
The difficulty posed by the rule - following arguments is the making 
sense of our common sense notions that our present usage conforms with our 
previous usage - viz. that we are following the same rule as we did in the 
past. Since what happened in the past can come under an indefinite number 
of descriptions. It could be supposed, in turn, that an indefinite variety 
of rules were being followed. Hence we cannot say that the answer '5' is 
wrong on the basis of 'facts' about previous usage of 'plus' or '+' of the 
form - I followed such and such a rule for the use of 'plus' or
Kripke reminds us that the rule- following considerations are not,
(of course) restricted to mathematical examples. For instance, I think, 
perhaps, that I know the rule for the use of 'table', so that I can apply 
the expression to 'indefinitely many future items'1 -^. I might think, then, 
that it is settled in advance on the basis of my grasp of the rule for 
'table' that the term in question would apply to a table found at the base 
of the Eiffel Tower, But before I actually go to the Tower, and employ, or 
fail to employ the expression, is its applicability really settled in advance 
by my previous usage? My previous usage might be said by a sceptic to be as 
follows; in the past, by 'table' I meant tabair, where a 'tabair' is 
anything that is a table not found at the base of the Eiffel Tower, or a 
chair found there.
As I understand it, the rule-following argument does not attempt to
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establish that there is no sense whatever to the thought that matters are
in some sense 'settled in advance'; it rather attempts to establish that
there is no sense to the thought that matters are settled in advance by
previous usage seen as following an established rule of the form, e.g.
apply '- is a table' just when the property of being a table is manifested.
And on Wittgenstein's view, content is given to assertions that, e.g. an
individual has mastered the concept of addition, in so far as the
individual's responses agree 'with those of the community in enough cases,
especially the simple ones (and if his 'wrong' answers are not often
bizarrely wrong, as in '5' for '68+57', but seem to agree with ours in
\ 15procedure, even when he makes a 'computational mistake')' .
It is worth emphasizing that there is nothing epistemological about 
these arguments; the problem is not - how do I know that I am following the 
same rule now as I did in the past? The problem is rather that we cannot 
make sense of the assertion that I am following such and such a rule on the 
basis of what I have done in the past. If we want to speak of Allowing 
a rule at all, then we will have to start with the applications, and 
describe them, if we choose, in rule-following terms; we must not think 
that we make the applications as a result of following a rule.
The same points made above in regard to predicate expressions may be 
applied to referring expressions - even names. I argue in the next 
chapter that despite the undoubted force of arguments deriving from 
advocates of causal theories of reference against descriptive theories of 
reference, in order for a speaker to refer to an existing object 0 with a 
referring expression 'H', even where 'R' is a name , he must have at least 
one true belief of the form'O is the thing, whatever it may be, that is p' 
(where p is some property). Hence, following the rules for the use of 'R' 
will involve, according to the orthodox way of looking at the matter, apply­
ing 'R' to an object only when it is p. We have seen that the orthodox 
view gets things the wrong way round as regards predicate expressions, on
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the basis of our understanding of the rule-following considerations - that 
we cau only speak of the same property being manifested/encountered again 
as an (at least partial) consequence or our decision to apply the same 
predicate expression again. A necessary condition for the applicability 
of a referring expression 'R' will be the applicability of a predicate 
expression. But the applicability of that predicate expression will be 
required before we can say that p is manifested again. Hence it cannot 
be part of a speaker's understanding of 'R' in a sentence whose truth 
condition he is not capable of observing/recognizing, that the referent 
of 'R' has the property p, this manifestation of p being grasped by analogy 
with other manifestations of p which the speaker is capable of recognizing 
or observing.
Accordingly, attractive though the Sklar proposals may seem at first 
sight to a philosopher of realist temper who also respects the force of 
anti-realist arguments, they fail to deliver the goods. Sklar's escape 
route proving ultimately to be of no help, we must meet the anti-realist 
argument head on. Before we do, it should be noted that it does not follow 
from our criticisms of Sklar that there is no sense in which we can manifest 
understanding of e.g. a predicate '-is p' in a sentence S whose truth 
condition we are incapable of observing/recognizing, by manifesting under­
standing of a sentence S' also containing '-is p' whose truth condition we 
are capable of observing or recognizing. Nor does it follow that there 
is no sense in which we can be trained in the use of '-is P' in the course 
of acquiring understanding of a sentence S containing this predicate, and 
proceed to use '-is P' with understanding in a further sentence S' whose 
truth condition is such that we could not have acquired understanding of S' in 
the way that we acquired understanding of S - viz. by observing its truth 
condition to obtain. It is just that Sklar's explanation of how this 
is possible falls foul of the rule following considerations.
4. THE RECOGNITION OF TRUTH CONDITIONS. AFP TNCORRTGIBILITY
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So far, we have followed common anti-realist practice by making 
rather free use of expressions such as 'observe*, 'recognize', and the 
like. In my view, however, it is the licence with which anti-realists 
use these expressions which proves to be the focus of the ultimate weakness 
of both the acquisition and the manifestation challenges. I now argue 
that both challenges rest on an erroneous picture of the 'recognition' of 
the truth condition of a sentence, which Dummett foists on to the realist.
I show that according to Dummett's own understanding of 'recognition', 
his preferred anti-realist conceptions of verification and falsification 
suffer equally from the challenges which are purportedly damaging to 
realist conceptions of truth.
Dummett's paradigm of the manifestation of a speaker's understanding 
of a given sentence is that its truth condition can be recognized 'whenever 
it obtains' or 'when and only when the relevant condition is fulfilled'.
The speaker could, for instance, show his recognition of the truth condition 
of the given sentence by uttering the sentence. Dummett's argument seems 
to be this. Were it merely logically possible for a speaker to manifest 
recognitional behaviour, when the relevant truth condition did not obtain, 
or, equally were it merely logically possible for a speaker to fail to come 
up with the recognitional behaviour, when the truth condition for the 
sentence in question did obtain, then the speaker simply would not possess 
a grasp of what it is for that truth condition to obtain. For, if some 
kind of grasp were still insisted upon, Dummett challenges the realist who 
insists on this to specify in what this grasp consists since, ex hypothesi, 
it cannot be manifested. In sum, Dummett seems to think that a speaker 
cannot fully understand the meaning of a sentence, if that sentence is such 
as to allow the logical possibility of error where the speaker asserts that 
sentence with 'full justification' or, indeed, if it is such as to allow 
the speaker the logical possibility of error when he fails to utter the
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sentence at all« On Dummett's favoured alternatives to truth conditions 
for what is understood when the meaning of the sentence is understood - 
viz. verification conditions or falsification conditions, the claim seems 
to be this. When a speaker 'recognizes* the verification condition-for a 
certain sentence, there is nothing left for him to be wrong about; the 
verification condition cannot obtain and yet the sentence fail to be 'true' 
in an anti-realist sense, for that sense would, in this instance, amount to 
nothing over and above the sentence being conclusively verified.
Dummett's mistake is, I think, his refusal to count as a manifestation 
of the understanding of a sentence, behaviour produced by a speaker when 
that speaker fails to possess incorrigible knowledge of the obtaining of 
the truth condition of that sentence. His mistake comes to the surface 
when we enquire whether verification conditions or falsification conditions 
could possibly be superior to 'realist' truth conditions in respect of being 
such as never in principle obtaining unless the speaker thinks he recognizes 
them, and always then. On the standard realist view such as R5» a speaker 
can on occasion know or recognize that a truth condition obtains, despite 
the fact that when he holds the best justification in principle available 
to him, it is still in principle possible for him to be mistaken. There 
can, on this view, be cases where he really does know that the truth 
condition obtains, despite the fact that it could have turned out, given 
the nature of the justification on which he is relying, that he was wrong.
For example, he, S, can know that there is a table in front of him 
where his justification for believing that there is a table in front of him 
- viz. full advice from the relevant senses, is defeasible - meaning, in 
this context, that it is logically possible for him to have further evidence 
which, if added to his original justification would not then any more amount 
to conclusive justification, and perhaps not even to any kind of justification. 
For example, S could have discovered (though he didn't) later on the same day 
that he recognized there to be a table in front of him, that he was suffering
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from a rare brain disease which causes table hallucinations. If S had 
discovered this, he would then no doubt have proceeded to claim, correctly, 
that he had not known after all, earlier that day, that there was a table 
in front of him. On the standard realist view under consideration, it 
does not follow from this possibility alone, that where S does not discover 
that he is suffering from a rare brain disease (or whatever), that he does 
not know that the table is there, even though his epistemic state at the 
time of the correct table belief is identical at that time to the epistemic 
state of someone who later discovers that they are suffering from the 
disease.
Dummett must think that the situation is different if we dispense 
with truth conditions of the realist type, and turn, for instance, to 
verification conditions. The thought presumably is that if S recognizes 
the condition which conclusively justifies him in asserting that the table
7 £
is there - i.e. that condition which 'conclusively verifies' the sentence j;H
'There is a table in front of me', then S cannot in principle be mistaken. £ £ 4 £
S can get into a position in which no further evidence could in principle C£.
% £
turn up which would defeat S's justification for believing that the verifica- "2
* r:
tion condition obtains. S could of course at times think that he was f£l
justified conclusively in his belief that the verification condition obtained, 
and be wrong - the anti-realist need not deny that» But the latter makes
i
i
the important additional claim, that it is, at least in principle, possible
for S to be fully justified in his belief that the verification condition :
■ • i
obtains, where 'full justification' amounts to incorrigible knowledge.
Yet surely it is impossible for S to observe incorrigibly that the 
verification condition obtains. This is because it is impossible for S 
to observe incorrigibly anything at all, except, perhaps, in an extended 
sense of 'observe', that he exists^. To make this point quite clear, I 
will rehearse one or two examples of a familiar type. Let the potential 
verification condition be 'It seems to me that something hot is touching my
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hand.' - chosen of course since sensation reports have traditionally been 
candidates for incorrigibility, I am blindfolded, and someone tells me 
that they are about to touch my hand with a red hot nail. It then does 
seem to me that something hot is touching my hand; I accordingly believe 
that 'It seems to me that something hot is touching my hand' is true, or, 
to put it another way, I believe that such and such a verification 
condition obtains. My blindfold is then removed, and a deception is 
revealed - the nail which touched my hand was in fact very cold. There 
now seem to be at least two possibilities; I may think still that it 
really did seem to me as though something hot was touching my hand. But 
equally, I may now believe that it did not, after all, sesnas though some­
thing hot was touching me, but as though something cold was touching me. 
Such a belief seems to make perfectly good sense. An adherent of an 
anti-realist version of the rule following considerations might claim that 
we could not in principle discover when I was 'right' in my claim that it 
seemed to me as though something cold (or hot) was touching my hand; hence 
that no sense could be attached to the claim that I might make a genuine 
mistake at the time about whether it seemed to me that something cold, 
rather than something hot, was touching my hand. But such argument depends 
on the anti-realist premiss (arguments for which I am at present attacking) 
that what (say CEB's) cannot in principle discover to be the case is not 
something that intelligibly could be the case at all.
Another possibility for me when the deception is revealed is for me 
to admit to a 'verbal error' - I can say 'I meant at the time to say that 
it seemed to me that something cold was touching my hand, but I slipped up, 
and said at the time that it seemed to me that something hot was touching 
my hand'. Some philosophers find it impossible to distinguish between 
'verbal errors' and 'genuine errors' about how things seemed to me. I can 
say little more than that I have no difficulty in understanding this 
distinction, even though I will admit that in many of the cases that are
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actually likely to occur, the borderline between verbal mistake and genuine 
error is not an easy one to mark.
My general contention here is that I can make mistakes in my assess­
ment of whether a given verification condition obtains: it is possible for 
that verification condition not to obtain even when I think it does; it is 
possible for that verification condition to obtain even whilst I do not 
'recognize' that it does - even when the verification condition in question 
involves how I am 'appeared to1 visually, kinaesthetically. etc. Such 
verification conditions were the best candidates for incorrigibility (apart, 
perhaps from those conditions for 'degenerate' existence sentences referred 
to above, and discussed by Lehrer). If they fail to make the grade, as I 
think they fail, the host of other verification conditions with which we 
deal, for sentences involving physical object sentences, etc. have no 
chance of pretensions to incorrigibility.
It follows from all this that, as far as the manifestation challenge 
is concerned, verification conditions and falsification conditions are in 
the same boat as truth conditions. It suggests that a grasp of, say, the 
verification condition for a sentence may be possible even though that 
condition may in principle obtain on occasion and the speaker not recognize 
it, or, in principle at least, fail to obtain on occasion when the speaker 
thinks that it does obtain. Dummett ought to say that there can be no 
such grasp, since we cannot, in his view, say in what practical ability a 
speaker could manifest such a grasp. If, of course, there can be under­
standing without incorrigible 'recognition' or 'observation', then we 
might as well stay with realist truth conditions as embroil ourselves with 
anti-realist notions of verification conditions or assertibility conditions; 
the latter do not accord with the 'requirements' of anti-realist accounts 
of meaning any more than the former do.
As regards the acquisition challenge, we may argue against Dummett and 
his:ilk in similar fashion. Dummett has difficulty in understanding how a
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Speaker could have acquired a ’grasp' of the truth condition of a sentence 
if it is supposed that this condition might be such, that, no matter the 
circumstances in which the speaker is placed, it could in principle, at 
least, obtain and the speaker fail to ’recognize’ that it does, or fail to 
obtain even though the speaker is quite certain that it does obtain. If 
there is a difficulty here, it is not a difficulty in particular for truth 
conditions as envisaged by the standard realist - e.g. of the R4 variety - 
it afflicts so called anti-realist alternatives too.
Some may object to my treatment of Dummett here, saying that Dummett 
himself never speaks of incorrigibility. Surely, they may say, he must 
have had in mind some other contrast between realist truth conditions and 
anti-realist verification conditions (or whatever) than that the latter 
enable incorrigible recognition, and the former do not. My response is 
this. If he, or other anti-realist writers intend a different contrast, 
what is it? If, for instance, he thinks of verification conditions as 
open to 'direct' observation, whilst classical realist truth conditions 
not necessarily being so, it is notoriously difficult to get clear about 
the meaning of 'direct'. Perhaps.we need to look again at the nature of 
the acquisition and manifestation challenges to see what could be meant. 
They seem to be saying that to understand a truth condition it would have 
to be possible to get it entirely within one's grasp - for there to be no 
more, as it were, than met the eye. For, if not, the thinking seems to 
go, the behaviour which constitutes understanding would not be 'directly 
tied' to the truth condition itself, or the training would not be tied to 
the truth condition itself', but only tied to 'symptoms' of the truth con­
dition or 'evidence' of the obtaining of the truth condition.
But what would this 'direct link' be? Non-inferential observation 
or recognition? Even if we could make sense of that, there is nothing 
about the absence of inference in an observational process which will 
guarantee that, e.g. the speaker produces recognitional behaviour 'when 
and only when the relevant condition obtains'. And there is nothing
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intrinsic to the process of inference which implies that, if I observe a 
truth condition to obtain, going through a process of inference as I do 
so, then I do not*really' have that truth condition 'fully within my grasp'. 
I conclude that Dummett does require for his argument the notion of - 
incorrigible recognition, and that it is because this is not possible in 
the vast majority of cases, and because anti-realist alternatives to 
classical realist conceptions of truth are in no better a position that 
his challenges fail.
5. HOW MYSTERIOUS IS GOD?
Even the most extreme form of mystery scarcely seems to require 
a realism strong than R4 - viz. - that there are truths concerning God 
for which no CRB can in principle have the slightest justification in 
believing. It must be admitted that, as we noted in Chaper'1, occasional 
thinkers such as Eriugena have, perhaps, espoused even more severe versions 
of mystery than this. It is only if such views entail the most extreme 
type of R10 realism - that, e.g. a predicate could be true of God even 
though in principle no rational being could have the slightest justification 
for thinking that it did, and no rational being could in principle have the 
slightest justification for thinking that the predicate in question applied 
to anything else, that a manifestation challenge, for instance, becomes a 
serious threat. For then, all logically possible forms of manifestation 
of understanding seem to have been ruled out.
But unsurpassability surely requires no more than that the being in 
question has a core of mystery which cannot in principle be dispelled by 
CRB's. Writers who have gone further than this have had other motives 
which we need not share. I conclude that anti-realist arguments present 
no threat to the realism required by the mystery of an unsurpassable being, 
where mystery is understood in its knowledge limitation sense.
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CHAPTER FIVE
REFERRING TO A TRANSCENDENT*GOD
1. TRANSCENDENCE AND THE DESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF REFERENCE
We can have beliefs which are about or of physical objects, people, 
fictional objects, abstract objects, possibilities, numbers, states of 
affairs, and so on. For instance: I believe that my house has a green 
front door. It may well be that this belief is about, or of, an actual 
house which belongs to me. Or - Jones believes that the next door 
neighbour's daughter has blue eyes; Jones belief may possibly be about
or of a certain girl who lives next door. Similarly we can have desires,
hopes, expectations, doubts, etc. which may be about or of such items. I 
say: 'My father is 66'. It is possible that I have said something about,
or of an actual man who is my father. I say: '4 is the square root of
16'. I have said something about, or of the number 4, etc.
In any tenable version of Theism, theTheist requires that he is able 
to have beliefs which are of or about God, and that he has the general 
capacity to conduct discourse which is of or about God. We may contrast 
two philosophical accounts of the words 'of' and 'about'. The first 
springs from the descriptive-intentional theory of reference, held by 
Frege, and championed in modern times by philosophers such as Strawson 
Searle, and Dummett. And the second arises from the 'new' theory of 
reference advanced by Kripke, Donnellan, Putnam, Kaplan, and others. 
Although the proponents of these views sometimes present them as incompat­
ible rivals, I will not assume this to be so here. The descriptivist 
would provide the following account of about and of where we say say:
'Jones belief that the next door neighbour's daughter has blue eyes is of, 
or about a certain girl, say Jane', viz. Jones thinks that there exists 
something which is the next door neighbour's daughter, and he believes 
that whoever is the next door neighbour's daughter has blue eyes: and - 
that girl Jane is_ the next door neighbour's daughter. Jones belief is 
true, or false, of Jane. Suppose Jones savs: 'The next door neighbour's
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daughter has blue eyes'. Then, again on the descriptivist view, Jones 
has said something of, or about, Jane, for instance, if she is the next 
door neighbour's daughter. Generally, if a description d is used as a 
referring expression in a sentence, and a property is attributed to the 
referent of that subject term, then we can identify a given existing 
individual A with the referent, and pronounce that something has been 
said of or about A, just when the description d is applicable to A.
Where a proper name is used instead of a description as the subject 
term in a belief or an utterance, various descriptivist accounts are 
possible; I  outline two. Consider the sentence (s).  'Jane has blue 
eyes'. S can be of or about an actual girl Jane where: a community of 
speakers within which the name 'Jane' has currency associate with that 
word a number of beliefs of the form - Jane is whoever is the p1; Jane 
is whoever is the p2...pn (not every individual in that community believing 
that Jane has all the properties p1...pn, but.each individual having a 
cluster of beliefs taken from the set, where there is sufficient overlap 
between the clusters for the name 'Jane' to have a clear use in that 
community) - and the actual girl Jane possesses 'sufficient' or'most' of 
the properties involved in the community's cluster of beliefs.
A second type of descriptivist account concerns only the individual, 
not the community, and is applicable either to beliefs or utterances.
Jones may have said something of or about a certain girl Jane in an 
utterance of the sentence S, if he has a number of beliefs of the form - 
'Jane is whoever is the p1...pn', and Jane herself is all or most of the 
things Jones believes. Similarly, if Jones believes that Jane has blue 
eyes, then his belief may be of or about Jane herself if Jones has a 
number of beliefs of the form 'Jane is whoever is the p1...pn' and Jane is 
most of, or a sufficient number of these things^.
Searle characterises the beliefs held by Jones and/or the community 
in the above sketches - beliefs e.g. of the form 'X is whoever/whatever is
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the p' as beliefs that such and such 'identifying descriptions' are
applicable to X* He understands 'identifying descriptions' as follows:
'At the extremes ...(they)...fall into two groups; demonstrative
presentations - e.g. "that, over there" and descriptions in purely general
terms which are true of the object uniquely - e.g. "the first man to run
a mile in under 3 minutes 53 seconds". Both the pure demonstrative and
the pure descriptive are limiting cases...most identifications rely on a
mixture of demonstrative devices and descriptive predicates - e.g. "the
2man we saw yesterday" .
The descriptive-intentional account of 'about' and 'of' would be 
applicable to Theistic belief and discourse as follows. Taking the 
second 'individual based' account first, which can cover both beliefs and 
utterances; consider Jones' belief that God is looking after him. Jones 
belief is of, or about a real existent God if - Jones associates with 'God' 
the beliefs that he is whoever is p1...pn, and, the real existent God does 
have these properties p1...pn. Similarly, suppose Jones says 'God is 
looking after me'. Then Jones has said something of or about such and 
such an existent E, if Jones believes that God is whoever is p1...pn, and 
E is p1,,,pn.
The descriptivist account which brings in the community would allow 
Jones to have said something of or about God in: 'God is looking after 
me' if 'God' is associated in Jones' speech community with a cluster of 
beliefs of the form 'God is whatever is the p', and a real existent, God, 
fits these beliefs.
It will not have escaped notice that in the application of the 
descriptivist's account of 'about' and 'of' to the context of belief and 
discourse about or of God, the expressions 'sufficient' and 'most' were 
omitted. This is a point I must now take up - first by reverting to 
non-theistic contexts, where descriptivists employ these expressions when, 
for instance they claim that most of the beliefs of, say a speaker
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associated with the proper name 'N' must be true of an existent E if his 
utterance 'N is is to be about, or of Ej they imply that a looseness of 
fit is permitted, perhaps even to the extent that the speaker might have a 
few beliefs associated with 'N' which are false of E, and yet that speaker 
might still be saying something about or of E. Searle's theory of proper 
names seems to permit this, though he does not discuss the possibility that 
some of the beliefs in question might be false. His view of when a speaker's 
utterance 'Aristotle was four feet tali' is of or about the formerly existing 
Greek philosopher comes to this: The speaker associates with the name 
'Aristotle' one or more beliefs of the form 'Aristotle is whoever is p', 
taken from a disjunction of - beliefs of this type who members are made up 
from the beliefs of the community at large associated with the name 
'Aristotle1. The speaker must believe 'enough', 'sufficient', or even 
'most' of the disjuncts, but we cannot, in Searle's view, be precise about
t3
how many of the disjuncts the speaker must believe . ;* L
Now even if we are in broad agreement with the descriptivist account, 5
it may be argued that we ought to distinguish among those beliefs that the I#
speaker might associate with 'Aristotle', and suggest that some of them are • 
more 'important' than others. Though it is not easy to get clear about the 
notion of 'importance'. It might be defined by reference to the belief most 
commonly held in the community in association with the name 'Aristotle' - but 
there are clearly problems with this suggestion. For instance, the beliefs 
that Aristotle's local community associated with 'Aristotle* were probably not 
the beliefs that we, in a twentieth century speech community, associate with 
that name - ours being things like: 'Aristotle is whoever tutored Alexander 
the Great','Aristotle is whoever authored the Nicomachean Ethics', etc.^
One move might be to identify 'important' with 'essential' (in its 
technical sense as defined in chapter 1). Then we might say that looseness 
of fit between beliefs and object about which or of which a given belief or 
assertion is supposed to be, should not be permitted to extend to the objects
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essential properties. Surely, it might be argued, someone who wishes to 
have a belief of or about an item cannot fail to believe that that item 
has such and such an essential property which it does in fact have. Even 
more evidently, it might be said, surely someone who wishes to have a belief 
or make an assertion which is of or about a certain item could not at the 
same time believe that the item lacks a certain property which in fact it 
essentially possesses. The same point could be made on the ’individualist' 
account given by a descriptivist for saying of, or saying about. And the 
same point in terms of the descriptivist account which brings in the 
community would go as follows. Looseness of fit would not permit beliefs 
of the form 'N is whatever is @', where @ was an essential property, to be 
entirely absent from the linguistic community in which 'N' is supposed to 
be current. Even more so, it does not permit the belief that, for instance 
'N is whatever thing it is that is not @' to be current.
To take the points again in an example: if, for instance as good 
descriptivists we were assessing whether Jones’ belief that Aristotle was 
four foot tall was of, or about the formerly existing Greek philosopher, 
and we ascertained that Jones failed to associate with 'Aristotle' the 
belief that he, whoever he was, was a person (the property of personhood 
being of course an essential property of Aristotle), or,worse still, we 
ascertained that Jones believed that Aristotle, whoever he was, was not a 
person, we would conclude that Jones' belief was not of or about the 
formerly existing Greek philosopher. If Jones said 'Aristotle was four 
feet tali' and we made similar discoveries about Jones beliefs we should, 
so the argument runs, conclude equally that Jones has not said anything 
about or of the formerly existing Greek philosopher, if we are concerned 
with the descriptivist account given for 'about' and 'of' on the 
individualist basis. On the 'community' account, the example would go like 
this. Jones says 'Aristotle was four feet tali'. We ascertain that 
neither Jones nor any of the rest of his speech community associate with
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the name 'Aristotle' the belief that Aristotle, whatever it was, was a 
person# So we are forced to conclude that Jones said nothing of or about 
the formerly existing Greek philosopher#
If we are determined to be descriptivists, whatever version of a. 
descriptivist-intentional view that we adopt, things look decidedly unhealthy 
when we come to the case of God# One version of descriptivism will say 
that there cannot be believings of or sayings of God without beliefs in all 
God's essential properties. We saw in chapter 3 that not only Jones but 
any speech community of CRB's of which Jones might be a part will be 
necessarily limited in various ways with respect to certain of God's 
essential properties. If we accept that much of what a CRB cannot know or 
cannot understand about God is explained by God's ontological transcendence, 
it will be certain properties that God essentially has and that everything 
else essentially lacks, that CRB's cannot know about or cannot understand.
If understanding failure precludes belief, then, on a descriptivist account 
of about and of it is impossible for CRB's to say things of God or to 
believe things about God. Whether, and in what sense understanding failure 
precludes belief are questions I take up in the next chapter. But even if 
we resolved this matter in favour of the descriptivist Theist, there is still 
the knowledge limitation to contend with. It seems to imply that only if 
Jones, or the community, depending on the descriptivist view we are taking, 
has true beliefs about all God's essential properties, will Jones beliefs or 
utterances be of or about God. Since Jones, and any other CRB are barred 
from knowing that all these beliefs are correct - barred even perhaps from 
having any justification for thinking they are all correct, it will be more 
by good luck than good judgement, as it were, that Jones beliefs or sayings 
will be genuinely of or about an epistemologically transcendent God. This 
is a most undesirable result.
Even if it is quite wrong to saddle the descriptivist with the 
modification of the original Searlian view, the modification being to the
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effect that absence of belief about an item's essential properties may be 
an obstacle to having beliefs of or aboutthat item, we can make the same 
kind of point as we have outlined in the forgoing paragraphs once more, 
whilst substituting expressions such as 'important', 'significant' for 
'essential'* For instance, if we as descriptivists observe that neither 
Jones nor any of his speech community associate with the name 'Aristotle' 
the 'important' property that Aristotle was a person (and surely this 
property should come out as important, whatever criterion we use for 
assessing importance) then it is at least arguable that we ought to say 
that Jones belief or assertion is not of or about the Greek philosopher*
The results of chapter 3 suggest that it is impossible for CRB's to 
know that a number of their beliefs about God involving what by any 
standards will be 'important' divine properties are true. It was argued 
in chapter 1 that the taint of mystery cannot be restricted to any one 
clearly defined area of the divine nature; hence the chances are that at 
least part of that aspect of the divine nature which be be regarded as 
'important' is afflicted with some degree of mystery. If Jones' set of 
true beliefs of the form 'God is whoever it is that is p1, 'God is whoever 
it is that is p2,' etc. cover those substitutions for p1, p2, etc. which 
involve all God's 'Important' properties, this will be a matter of sheer 
luck. For, as we have just seen, at least some of God's 'important' 
properties will be such that Jones could not know that God possessed them 
and even such that Jones could not have the slightest justification for 
thinking that God possessed them. Hence it will only be by 'good luck' at 
most that Jones belief, or Jones assertion, that, say, God is looking after 
him, will be of or about an actual supreme being, if there is one, Further­
more, if in some sense inability to understand God precludes belief, the 
descriptivist will have to come to an even more disquieting conclusion as 
far as the Theist is concerned, and say that CRB's in general cannot have 
beliefs or make assertions which are about or of an epistemologically
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transcendent supreme being.
A descriptivist who disliked this result might decline to be saddled 
with the modification to his doctrine which attempts to 'weight' properties 
one against another. He might stay with what is apparently the Searle 
view, insisting that so long as there is some degree of fit, things will 
be fine. I find this version of descriptivism implausible, but all the 
same, even if we accept it, it still has consequences which the Theist 
would dislike. There will always be a risk that Jones' set of beliefs of 
the form 'God is whoever it is that is p' etc. will have an insufficiently 
satisfactory 'degree of fit' with the properties of a supreme being, if 
there is one.' The supreme being must be epistemologically transcendent, 
and vague as the notion of 'satisfactory degree of fit' may be, it looks 
perfectly possible for Jones to lack many of the possible true beliefs of 
the form 'God is whoever it is that is p' - so many, in fact, that Jones 
belief or assertion that, for instance, God is looking after him would not 
be of or about the supreme being, if there is one.
Here in outline, then, is the reason why the Theist who has realized 
the implications for transcendence of crediting the object of his devotion 
with unsurpassability, should avoid a wholesale committment to a 
descriptive-intentional account of 'about' and 'of'. My next task is to 
rehearse at some length, philosophical considerations which should persuade 
us that the descriptive-intentional account cannot be wholly correct for 'of' 
and 'about', at least when they are employed in contexts in which real 
existents are involved (as opposed to fictional objects,abstract objects, 
and the like, for which the descriptive account may well be correct).
Beliefs and utterances which are meant to be of or about God are meant 
to be of or about him qua real existent.
In section 2 I intend to argue (l) that 'of' and 'about' come in a 
range of strengths, and that the 'strongest' senses require causal links 
between an object 0 and a belief or an utterance which purports to be of
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or about 0, and (2) that if we do have the strongest sense of 'about' or 
'of, then, though the believer or speaker still requires at least one 
true belief of the form '0 is whatever it is that is p' an appreciable 
degree of falsity and/or lack of certainty as to the truth is possible as 
regards other beliefs held of the form '0 is the thing, whatever it is, that 
is p'. Hence, I go on to contend, the Theist should look to the strongest 
sense of 'about' or 'of' when he has beliefs or utterances of or about,
God; he should look to causal links of some kind between God and the 
Theist's beliefs or utterances. Then it will be permissable for there to 
be a substantial 'lack of fit' between the theist's corpus of beliefs of 
the form, 'God, whoever" he may be, is p', and a real unsurpassable being, 
while at the same time the Theist will be able to have beliefs or make 
assertions of or about that unsurpassable being.
2. OF AND ABOUT
There is nothing original about the view I am now going to advance;
it is closely related to causal theories of reference advanced by Kripke,
5Kaplan, and Donnellan and I draw heavily upon their insights, together 
with those of other philosophers working in the same area. For convenience 
I shall speak mainly of beliefs which may be said to be about or of such 
and such an item - but this should be taken to do duty for any attitude
which may be said to be about or of a given item.
6Quine distinguished between opaque and transparent belief. He 
claimed to discern at least two possible truth conditions for (1) 'Tom
i
believes that Cicero denounced Catiline'. In (a), the transparent condition, 
Cicero is believed by Tom to have denounced Catiline or, to put it in manner 
favoured by Quine; Tom believes Cicero to have denounced Catiline. Using 
my 'of' or 'about' gives clumsy but equivalent versions - i.e. Tom believes 
of Cicero, that he denounced Catiline; or, Tom believes about Cicero, that 
he denounced Catiline. The position of 'Cicero' in (a) according to Quine, 
is purely 'referential'. Other referring expressions which denote the same
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individual may be substituted for it salva veritate - e.g. ’Tom believes 
that Tully denounced Catiline'. In (b), the opague truth condition, on 
the other hand, the initial referring expression that Tom would employ in 
an expression of his belief cannot be substituted for salva veritate... If 
Tom does not believe that Cicero is Tully, then his claim not to believe, say, 
Tully denounced Catiline must be given full credit. On the Quinean under­
standing of (b) Tom is not related by believing what he believes to any 
person, let alone Cicero. It is no part of the truth condition that any 
other person exists at all.
It would be a mistake to think of transparent belief and opaque belief 
as two different kinds of belief. (Quine may not have been clear on this).
It is rather that we have two different kinds of report of a belief. As far 
as I know this important point is due to Searle. (1 ), the verbal formula­
tion of a report of what Tom believes, has at least two distinct truth 
conditions. The condition for the truth of the transparent report includes 
external elements in addition to the 'state of mind' of the believer, Tom, 
and attends not at all to the terms which the believer would regard as 
adequate to express his belief. The condition for the truth of the opaque 
report, on the other hand, is only concerned with the state of mind of the 
believer; it attends to those expressions which the believer himself would 
regard as satisfactory expressions of what he believes, and that is why 
co-referring expressions are not substitutable salva veritate.
If we attempt to express these two truth conditions in formal terms, 
we can 'quantify in' to the expression of the transparent condition, but we 
cannot do so into an expression of the opaque condition. So the former 
becomes (2) (Ex) (Tom believes that x denounced Catiline) and the latter 
(3) Tom believes that (Ex) (x denounced Catiline). (2) could be read as: 
there is someone of whom, or about whom Tom believes that he denounced 
Catiline, whilst (3) could be expressed thus; Tom believe that there is 
someone such that he denounced Catiline.
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In my view we can make exactly the same kinds of remarks concerning 
contexts of reported speech; thus we can have (4) 'Tom said that Cicero 
denounced Catiline' as a report of what Tom said with either a transparent 
or an opaque truth condition. In the former we could say - Cicero was said 
by Tom to have denounced Catiline - or Tom said of, or about Cicero, that he 
denounced Catiline. The opaque truth condition (by far the most common, I 
imagine, unlike the case of belief) attends essentially to the question 
whether Tom would accept the form of words used by the person reporting 
what Tom said, as an apt expression of what Tom said. If the opaque truth 
condition obtains, Tom is not thereby related to any person, let alone 
Cicero. The quantification point is similar too; for the transparent 
condition for reported speech we have, e.g. (Ex) (Tom said that x denounced 
Catiline) and for the opaque condition - Tom said that (Ex) (x denounced 
Catiline)•
Some previous discussion in this area tended to assume a simple 
dichotomy between opaque and transparent reports of, say, belief. Quine, 
at least, clearly saw that matters wer e more complex than this, even in 
the Cicero example. There is the question, for example whether 'Catiline' 
occurs referentially - whether, that is to say, he is such that Tom believes 
of him that he was denounced by Cicero, and accordingly whether 'Catiline' can
O
be replaced by a co-referring expression salva veritate. Loar and
q
Strawson among others, in their more recent discussions, draw our attention 
to the fact that there is not just one non-opaque truth condition for a 
belief report such as (5) 'Philip believes that the liberal candidate will 
be elected'. We could, of course, have a report which is purely opaque - 
viz. Philip believes that there is someone such that he is the liberal 
candidate and he will be elected. Once we go beyond Philip's state of 
mind in our report of his belief, we have a number of choices10. (These 
are not entirely free choices). We could say that a certain person,
11whoever he is, who answers to the description 'the liberal candidate' is
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such that Philip believes of hint that he will be elected. Or again: a 
certain person, whoever he is, who answers to the description 'the liberal 
candidate' is such that Philip believes of him that he is the liberal 
candidate and he will be elected.
It would be appropriate for us, as Philip's interpreters, to make 
such reports if we believed that there was someone of whom, or about whom 
Philip had his belief, but we did not have any particular individual in 
mind - if we merely believed an existential proposition and were not seeking 
to link Philip's belief to a particular individual whom we would identify in 
our report. In contrast to these, there is yet another non-opaque truth 
condition for (5), which is: Jones (say) is such that Philip believes that 
he is the liberal candidate and that he will be elected, or that man (if he 
is present so that we can point to him, for example), is such that Philip 
believes that he is the liberal candidate and that he will be elected. We 
would now be committing ourselves, in our report of Philip's belief, to the 
truth of the assertion that this particular individual, whom typically we 
name or pick out with a demonstrative expression, is the one about whom 
Philip has his belief. For convenience of exposition I will sometimes blur 
these complexities, and speak as though our belief reports are either opaque 
or transparent.
A potentially misleading implication of the discussion so far also must 
be mentioned here; that a given report of a belief - i.e. a report as 
expressed by a particular utterance by a speaker on a particular occasion 
has only one truth condition - but this may not be so. The reporter of 
the belief may be saying that, say Tom's belief is of or about such and such 
an individual, and also in his report attempting to indicate a form of words 
which Tom would accept as an expression of his belief. Thus failure of sub­
stitution salva veritate is not a sufficient condition for the absence of the 
transparent truth condition* What we can say, I think, is that the presence 
of substitutivity is a sufficient condition for it to be the case that the
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person who is reporting, say, Tom's belief is including as part of the
truth condition for his report elements in the external world over and
above merely 'what is in Tom's head'. Again, in later exposition, I
will speak mainly»as if the truth conditions do not combine in this way,
but are only to be thought of individually.
The opaque/transparent distinction is closely associated with the
12distinction between de dicto and de re belief. Sosa makes this distinc­
tion in the following terms, which I think are seriously misleading.
'Belief de dicto is belief that a certain dictum (or proposition 
is true, whereas belief de re is belief about a particular res 
(or thing) that it has a certain property. (And similarly for 
knowledge, desire, etc. and for more complicated cases'.
This misleads since it suggests that there are two kinds of belief in
connection with the de dicto/de re distinction; if there are kinds of
beliefs, this has nothing to do with the de dicto/de re distinction. All
beliefs (presumably) are beliefs that a certain dictum (or proposition) is
true, and - I would want to say - some of these beliefs are beliefs about a
particular res (or thing) that it has a certain property. Following Searle,
as I did earlier with the opaque/transparent distinction, I would want to
apply the de dicto/de re distinction, not to beliefs, but to reports of
beliefs.
One simple criterion for whether a belief report is de re, is whether 
quantification into the clause governed by the belief construction is 
permissible. So, imagine that in 'Jones believes that Smith's murderer is 
insane' we are to decide whether quantifying into our report is per missible. 
One way of settling the matter is this. If we, as reporters of Jones belief 
believe that there is an individual who is Smith's murderer then we can make 
our report in such a way that quantifying into it is permissible. If we do 
not believe this, then quantifying into our report of the belief is not 
permissible. So, more indirectly, the criterion for de re belief under 
consideration is whether we, as reporters of the belief, think that the
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referring expression following ‘believes that' denotes. If we think 
that 'Smith's murderer' denotes, then we report Jones belief de re, regard­
less of whether Jones knows anything about the individual denoted, and
t
regardless of whether there is any kind of 'connection' between Jones 
and that individual. So we are prepared to report that there is an 
individual of whom, or about whom, Jones has his belief.
But is the question of the denotation of.the referring expression 
following 'believes that' the only matter to be considered? The criterion 
seems rather too simple. Perhaps we can have a de re belief report and a
correct use of 'about* and 'of' where this is the only consideration. But
aI would want to argue that we can haveAmuch strony?rsense of 'about' and 'of' 
when the event or state which is, say,Jones believing that such and such a 
referring expression denotes, is in some way caused by the actual denotation 
of the said referring expression, ultimately if not immediately. Whether 
or not such a connection obtains will be a matter of contingent fact; a 
necessary condition for our justifiably reporting Jones as having a belief 
about or of a particular individual in the strongest sense of 'about' or 
'of' is that we have good grounds for thinking that the causal 1 -inViwg does 
obtain. This does not mean that we would have to have any notion of the 
details of the causal linking. And the latter is always, I think, a 
matter of degree. The 'Smith's murderer' example is on the borderline 
between cases where there is a full-blooded causal link of the 'right kind', 
and cases where there is no causal link whatever. When reporting Jones 
belief inthis instance, we probably suppose that he knows at least one thing 
about the individual about whom he has the belief - that he is Smith's 
murderer, and we would suppose that Jones' knowledge is in a sense caused 
by the murderer - viz. by the murderer actually committing the crime; he 
causes there to be a bloody corpse which subsequently causes certain 
perceptions in Jones; or, alternatively, causes perceptions in others who 
then cause Jones to have the information that they have, and so on. So far,
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these are merely preliminary remarks; I will now discuss a series of 
examples to justify and explore the claim that a causal link is required 
for the strongest senses of 'about' and 'of'.
There are various kinds of examples of alleged de re belief report 
which leave out the 'appropriate' causal connection. In the first category 
I consider, the referring expression which follows the 'believes that' 
construction in some sense has a guaranteed denotation. I do not mean a 
logical guarantee; I wish specifically to exclude examples such as '9', 
which necessarily denotes 9 so long as we retain our present conventions.
I am thinking rather of 'ordinal properties' such as 'the shortest spy',
'the tallest man', 'the fourth largest freshwater lake', 'the first man 
to step on the moon', and so on. In theory, no property of this kind is 
such that only one item possesses it because of the logical possibility of 
two or more spies of the same height, two or more lakes of the same size, 
two or more men stepping on to the moon simultaneously, etc. Kaplan 
suggests that we could, nevertheless, devise quasi-ordinal properties which 
would be possessed only by one individual, if possessed by anything at all. 
We could use the
'well-known fact that two persons cannot be born at exactly the 
same time at exactly the same place (where the place of birth is 
an interior point of the infant's body). Given any four spatial 
points, a,b,c,d, not in a plane we can use the relations t1 is 
earlier than t2, and p1 is closer to a (b,c,d) than p2 to order 
all space time points'.13
We could then make up properties of spies, for instance, which only one spy 
could possess. So without entering into this complicated type of qualifica­
tion every time, I will assume for the sake of argument that expressions 
such as 'the shortest spy', 'the tallest man', and the like are such that 
only one individual could possess them.
Thus it may appear that 'the shortest spy' must denote something. We
14then arrive at Kaplan's notorious 'Balph believes that the shortest spy 
is a spy'. If our believing that the referring expression following the 
'believes that' construction denotes, is our criterion for our reporting
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Ralph's belief de re, then we can so report it here* Our de re report
may be construed as follows« we are saying that there is an individual of
whom, or about whom, Ralph believes that he is a spy.
, Most would agree that something has gone wrong in this example.. I
suggest that two things are wrong. The first, which I will not discuss,
is that it is hard to imagine a sensible context in which anyone would
15make such a report of Ralph's beliefs . The second is the thought that 
we would be happy to report Ralph's belief de re even though we might 
believe that Ralph has never met any spies in his life, nor met anyone 
else who has, seen any pictures of spies, read any reports about spies 
written by people who had seen spies, etc. (Perhaps Ralph thinks a 
priori that if there are nation states, etc. then there must be spies).
In brief, the odd thought is that we would be happy to report Ralph's 
belief de re despite our belief that there is no causal link between the 
shortest spy, and Ralph's believing that 'the shortest spy' denotes.
•Odd' here, does not entail 'incorrect', however. If someone wants to 
insist that a de re report is permissable, I would not argue the point, 
but I would insist that the sense in which Ralph's belief is about the 
shortest spy is a weak one.
Of a similar character is Sosa's 'Shorty' story . (Sosa is pursuing
a very different line from the one I am taking here).
'...suppose a sergeant, after consulting with higher authority, 
returns to his platoon and says to the shortest man "Shorty, 
they want you to go first". Actually, the desire expressed 
by the higher authority was that the shortest man go first*.
(Sosa fails to add that the higher authorities presumably believe that
there are no men inthe platoon who share the lowest stature). Mow, up to
a point, it is perfectly legitimate for the sergeant to speak as he does to
the man in his platoon. There is a weak sense in which the authorities'
want is of or about the shortest man in the platoon and that is Shorty.
Yet in the stronger sense of 'about' and 'of' for which I am campaigning,
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the authorities do not have an attitude which is of or about the actual 
man addressed by the sergeant; it would be reasonable for Shorty to 
respond to his sergeant. 'You say they want me? But they've never even 
heard of me, let alone met me'.
We could move towards the stronger sense by degrees; the sergeant is 
in the general's office, describing each of the men in his platoon, and 
naming each man as he does so. The general hears from the sergeant about 
the shortest man - the sergeant tells the general that, among other things, 
the man answers to the description 'the shortest man'. So the actual 
individual Shorty is dausally linked with the general's belief that 'the 
shortest man' denotes a man in the platoon about whom the general has heard 
from the sergeant; the sergeant has seen Shorty on many occasions - so 
Shorty has caused the sergeant to have perceptions and beliefs; the 
sergeant in turn has passed on information to the general, causing the 
general to believe that 'the shortest man' denotes a certain man who has 
properties p, q, etc. In a more direct case, the general is looking at 
the platoon himself and thinks to himself, on noticing Shorty, 'I want 
that man to go first', There is a clear causal link between Shorty and 
the general's 'that man'.
Good cases for a total absence of causal connection, yet where 'of' and 
'about' are permitted, may be thought to be found among 'future objects'. 
Adapting another of Kaplan's examples, Jones dubs the first child to be 
born in the 21st century 'Newman 1'. He forms beliefs about the child, 
based perhaps on his theories of the likely nature of child socialisation 
at that point in time - for instance, he believes that Newman 1 will be 
bad-tempered. If we rule out the possibility of universal atomic holocaust, 
and add any qualifications that may be required to ensure that there could 
(logically) be ohly one 'first' child, then it seems that 'Newman 1' is 
'bound' to have a denotation. Accordingly we can report Jones belief de re 
as follows; there is, or will be, someone of whom or about whom Jones
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believes that he will be bad-tempered. Donnellan1^ suggests that it 
would be
•incorrect to say to John who turns out to be the first 
child born in the 21st century WI believed about you some 
twenty five vears before your birth..." (that you would be 
bad tempered)'.
I do not quite agree with Donnellan; it would not be obviously incorrect 
for Jones to say this to John. On the other hand, there is certainly 
something odd here, which Donnellan is trying to make plain. One could 
imagine a response from John, akin to Shorty's. 'You had no beliefs about 
me in particular; it would not have mattered who was the first child b o m  
in the 21st century, as far as you were concerned. My brother, for 
example, might have been born before me; then you would have been talking 
to him and not me'. My own diagnosis of what is odd about this case 
should by now be obvious; the actual individual John cannot causally
affect Jones' belief twenty-five years previously.
18D. W. Stampe suggests an interesting example in which it might 
appear that we could have the strongest sense of 'about' and of 'of* 
in a belief about a future object. This would be in a case where the 
belief is caused by something which also causes the existence of the 
future object. (Stamjeis not discussing belief, so I adapt his example 
considerably in my account). Suppose Jones believes that a storm will 
take place at 2 p.m. His belief is caused by the barometer indicating a 
fall in pressure; this in turn is caused by the fact that the air pressure 
really is felling. And that fall of air pressure itself will cause, let us 
suppose, the storm], Jones can have a belief about, or of, this particular 
storm, so the argument goes, in view of the common cause; and it is a 
belief about it in the strongest sense. This is shown, it is claimed, if 
we suppose
'the conditions suddenly change, the barometric pressure rises 
and the clash of fronts does not occur, but now, conditions again 
change, and some causally quite independent meteorological 
development brings in a storm, just at two o'clock.19
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Stampe seems to think it is quite clear that this would not be the 
storm Jones originally believed would occur at two o'clock. Stampe 
describes his judgement as 'intuitively clear' - it is not clear to me, 
since it would appear to rest on some kind of necessity of origin doctrine 
for storms '...could this very storm have been caused by a different clash 
of fronts?' w e  seem to hear the Kripke of 'Identity and Necessity' 
inquiring. I would have thought that the answer was - yes it could.
And so I reject Stampe' example.
20A more convincing instance might be where we had a collection of 
car parts which were going to be made, say in 1998 into a car. We might 
have a belief about this car - say that the car will break down in the 
autumn of 1999* There is a sense in which the present existence of the 
car parts are 'partial causes' of the future car, and they are also a 
causal element in my belief that 'the car' will have a denotation - viz. 
something which will be a car, with properties p, q, etc. I would admit 
that my present belief is about that future car in a fairly strong sense, 
if not the strongest possible sense. Despite these examples, it is clear 
that in the majority of cases, we only get strong 'abouts' and 'ofs' where 
causal chains run from objects in the past to present beliefs.
The second group of examples I want to consider concerns situations 
where the believer, or the possessor of whatever attitude is in questioh, 
etc. is fortuitously correct in his belief. I will not dwell on these, 
since causal theorists have made these sorts of cases very familiar. Jones 
believes that the man on the other side of the room drinking champagne is 
happy. The man he is actually looking at is drinking water, but is indeed
happy. There is another man on the other side of the room - his glass is
concealed — he is drinking champagne, and he also is happy. Imagine that 
we as interpreters report Jones belief de re - we would permit quantification 
into our report of his belief, and say that there is a man about whom, or of 
whom, Jones has a belief, if we were relying solely on the c riterion that
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we believe that 'the man on the other side of the room drinking champagne' 
denotes; perhaps we earlier saw the glass which is now concealed, etc.
But surely, in this case, matters have gone so far adrift that such a de re 
belief report is positively wrong; the man over there drinking champagne 
is not a man about whom Jones has his belief. Perhaps, in this situation 
Jones does not have a belief about anybody. Perhaps his belief is about 
the actual man who is drinking water. What prompts these thoughts is the 
fact that there is not, ex hypothesi, a trace of causal connection between 
the man drinking champagne, and Jones' belief.
Unfortunately, as discussions of causal theories have shown, it is 
only too easy to cook up far fetched complications in such examples - e.g. 
Jones cannot see the water drinking gentleman directly - he is seeing a 
reflection of the man in a mirror, the presence of which Jones is unaware; 
it is the champagne drinking man who has placed the mirror in a strategic 
position. So the champagne drinking man is - in a devious way-a causal 
factor in Jones' belief; yet we would want to say that he is the 'wrong 
sort' of causal factor, and that he is still not the individual about whom 
(in the strong sense) Jones has his belief, or of whom Jones believes 
something. I will not attempt, in the present discussion, to say what 
the'right kind' of causal linking is; clearly a causal connection of some 
kind or other is not a sufficient condition for the strong sense of 'about' 
and 'of' which I am urging exists in regard to real objects and people.
I would want to say that the 'right kind' of causal connection is a 
necessary•condition.
I now try to disentangle the question of whether someone may be
reported as having a belief about a thing, in the strongest sense of 'about'
from questions of the scope of referring expressions in contexts of
propositional attitudes. This involves re-tracing ground already covered,
21but in different guise . In'Jones believes that a man in a brown hat is 
a murderer', we may intend, in this report, that 'a man in a brown hat' should
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have smallest scope. If so, I would want to maintain that the report 
only covers Jones' state of mind; we might report him in this way even 
if we did not think there ever had been a man in a brown hat, and that 
the whole thing was a figment of Jones' imagination. On the other hand, 
we might intend the description to be given largest scope. Then we 
would have: concerning a certain man in a brown hat; Jones believes of 
him or about him that he is a murderer, iVow it does appear that the 
latter reading is just about possible even where there is no causal 
connection between the man in the brown hat and Jones beliefs. Although 
we may wonder, as we did earlier in other examples, what grounds we could 
have for interpreting Jones as having this belief, and we might feel 
disinclined to allow the widest scope for the description in our report of 
his belief unless we had grounds for thinking that the right kind of causal 
connection between Jones and the man in the brown hat obtained. However, 
there are no hard and fast decisions to be made here; if we did allow the 
wide scope construal of our report, where we had no ground for tMnTHng 
the causal connection obtained, we could not be accused of a definite 
error. My concluding observation on this is as before; were there the 
appropriate causal link, Jones could believe something, or say something of, 
or about, the man in the brown hat in a stronger sense than if there were 
not.
Similarly, the question of whether the referring expression following
'believes that' is a rigid designator, is independent logically from the
question of whether there is the right kind of causal link between the
object about which the belief is held and the belief, allowing for the
strong sense of •about' or 'of'. To understand this, consider the follow-
22
ing. In what Devitt describes as an 'abnormal' case, divers might name 
the heaviest fish in the sea 'Oscar', though they have never encountered 
this fish, and, as far as they know, neither has anyone else. Nonetheless, 
'Oscar' rigidly designates the particular fish which is, as a matter of fact,
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the heaviest fish in the actual world. ’Oscar' designates that fish 
in all possible worlds in which it exists. For 'Oscar' satisfies Kripke's 
'test' for rigid designation. Oscar might not have been the heaviest 
fish in the sea; but it is not the case that Oscar might not have been 
Oscar. Now, one of our divers might believe that Oscar preferred depths 
of greater than10,000 feet. We have the 'believes that' construction, 
followed by a rigid designator. We have, or so I would maintain, the 
weak sense of 'about' or 'of' when we say that the diver has a belief about 
Oscar or of Oscar; ex hypothesi there is no causal contact between Oscar 
and the diver - nothing that the diver believes about Oscar has, in the 
explanation of his having that belief, the actual fish Oscar himself. In 
other cases, on the other hand, we can have 'believes that' followed by a 
rigid designator, and a clear causal link. I conclude that the question 
of rigid designation is independent from the question of the existence of 
causal links.
I now want to develop a more extended example, inspired by Sosa's 
'Shorty' story mentioned earlier. Let us imagine that the tallest man in 
the world is named Lanky. He is a member of an obscure tribe that lives 
in the Amazonian jungle. His tribe has no contact with the outside world.
No one in the world community apart from his tribe has any knowledge of his 
existence, let alone of his height. His tribe are perhaps aware that he is 
their tallest member, but they have no more grandiose beliefs about him, having 
no opportunity to compare his stature with that of members of other 
communities. Two doctors in New York discuss the medical characteristics 
that the tallest man in the world will have. They decide, for convenience 
and quite coincidentally, to refer to the tallest man in the world as Lanky. 
They elaborate theories about what other physical features very tall people 
will have - that they will have weak hearts - that they will have spinal 
defects, and the like. One of the doctors, Dr. Jones, believes, on the 
basis of these theories, that Lanky has a weak heart.
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Now if, per impossibile, the actual Lanky were to come to know that 
Dr. Jones had this belief 'about' him, let us try to imagine Lanky's 
reaction. 'If I had not grown so tall, and my brother had developed the 
supreme stature, instead of me, then Dr. Jones belief would have been.about 
my brother and not about me. If Dr. Jones belief is about me at all, 
then, it is scarcely about me in any very strong sense. It is only if I 
myself am a causal factor (of the 'right kind') in Dr. Jones having that 
belief, that his belief can be about me in the strongest sense. Now it is 
not that Dr. Jones belief, which includes, in particular, the belief that 
'Lanky' denotes a certain individual who has properties p, q, etc. is not 
about me (strong sense)’ unless we can say that he would not have had his belief 
unless I had helped, however distantly,to cause him to have it. After all, 
many types of causes could have effected his belief. It is rather that., as 
a matter of fact, I must be a causal factor in his having the belief in 
question if I, or anyone else, is to be able to report him correctly as 
having a belief about me in the strongest sense. To cite a specific 
implication: had the course of history been exactly the same as it in fact 
was, with the sole change that I, Lanky, never existed, then either Dr. Jones 
would have had his belief or he would not. If the latter, then Dr. Jones is j 
ahout me in the strong sense; if the former, then Dr. Jones is probably only I 
believing something about me in the weaker sense'. j
There are one or two points that could be quibbled over here. First, i 
it would be perfectly possible for Dr. Jones belief to be- over-determined; ’j 
for there to be two sets of conditions each of which, without the other, j
would be sufficient for the belief in question to occur. For example, there 
might be a psychoanalytic cause of Dr. Jones' belief and a cause which somehow 
involves Lanky himself. Either might be alone sufficient for Dr. Jones
i
belief* Perhaps, then, Lanky ought to say: 'Had the course of history been
exactly the same as it in fact was, with the sole change that I, Lanky, never j
I:
existed, then either Dr. Jones would have had his belief, or he would not. |
If the latter, then his belief is about me in the strong sense« If the 
former, then Dr. Jones belief is probably about me in the weaker sense«
But if there was all along another condition which was sufficient for the 
dector's belief to occur, then it is not clear, given that the doctor would 
retain his belief in a possible world in which I am absent, whether his 
belief is about me inthe strong sense or in a weaker sense.
Second, we might wonder whether the course of history could remain 
exactly the same with the sole change that Lanky never existed. Perhaps 
a clause should be added by Lanky to the effect that this change, together 
with the minimum of other changes which would be necessitated by his absence, 
are being envisaged by the counterfactual's antecedent.
We can now add details to the initial example, taking one step at a 
time, so as to steer it towards situations where the strongest sense of 
•about' and 'of' prevail. (l) A reliable report reaches the doctors that 
the tallest man in the world lives in the Amazon basin; a member of the 
Guiness Book of Records staff, McRosser, happens to be passing through the 
area - the first white man to visit. Though he measures Lanky's height, he 
has no time to take in any of Lanky's other details. (2) As (l), but 
McRosser also manages to photograph Lanky, and sends a print to the doctors. 
(3) As before, and McRosser also goes to see the doctors himself, and tells 
them of his encounter with Lanky« (4) As (3) plus the result that Dr. Jones 
goes to visit Lanky himself, taking with him diagnostic equipment. On thé 
basis of the visit, he forms the belief that Lanky has a weak heart.
In al.l the situations (1 ) to (4) it seems fair to say that Dr. Jones 
has a belief about Lanky, or a belief of Lanky. It seems clear to me, at 
any rate, that -in the example as originally described, only the weak sense 
of 'about' and 'of' is involved, whilst in (4) the strongest sense of 'about* 
and 'of' is involved. I would not care to say at which point the sense 
changes - there may be no definite point. If pressed, I would say that 
even in (2) the strong sense is present. In (l) I am not entirely certain.
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Tet Dr. Jones even here can believe that 'Lanky' denotes a certain individual 
who is the tallest man in the world and who is that individual in South 
America, about whom there has just been a report* Hence the real Lanky is 
in the causal ancestry of Dr. Jones belief about what 'Lanky' denotes» 
suggesting that the strongest sense of 'about' and 'of' may well be present.
It might now be objected that the stronger sense of 'about' and 'of' 
simply means that the believer has more beliefs about the object of his 
belief, and that causal links between his beliefs and the object are 
irrelevant. Thus, so it might be argued, in (4) Dr. Jones will have far 
more beliefs about Lanky in the end, than he would have in (1). I would 
agree that as we move from the example as originally described, towards the 
situation as portrayed in (4)* Dr. Jones does acquire more beliefs. But 
I would maintain that this is not the point. We could have imagined, if 
we had wished, that even in the situation as originally described, Dr. Jones 
believed a large number of things 'about' Lanky - not only that he has a 
weak heart, but that his toes are splayed in such and such a way, that his 
bones have such and such a calcium content, that his backbone has such and 
such a curvature, and so on. The real Lanky would still be entitled, it 
seems to me, to make a response similar to the one suggested above, and to 
deny that the strong sense of 'about' is involved.
The objector could make a further move. He could point out that we 
have restricted the doctor's beliefs to general medical features of the 
tallest man. Suppose, however, that we added to the original situation 
beliefs involving certain individuating properties of Lanky; thus Dr. Jones 
might believe that Lanky was b o m  at such and such a time and place, that he 
killed an alligator on January 12th 1980 at such and such a place, and so on. 
The view that the more beliefs Dr. Jones had about Lanky, the nearer he 
would be to the strong sense of 'about' and 'of' could then be maintained.
I would doubt that it is even intelligible to ascribe to Dr. Jones 
such beliefs. But even if I am wrong about this, and Dr. Jones could in
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principle have all sorts of weird and wonderful beliefs about Lanky
Lanky's original response would still seem to have considerable forces
'If I had never existed, the course of history otherwise remaining the
same, you would still have had these beliefs - that I was b o m  in such
and such a time and place, etc. This decisively suggests that your
beliefs are not about me then in the strongest sense.'
Before returning to the question of beliefs and utterances about an
epistemologically transcendent God, I want to relate the foregoing
discussion to the dispute between those philosophers who might be s.tyled
neo-Fregeans, and causal theorists, concerning what it is for a belief to
be about or of one object rather than another, or what it is for an
utterance to be about or of one object rather than another.
24On the Fregean side, Searle still claims that a speaker's intention
to refer to one object rather than another can be entirely characterised
in terms of that speaker's intention to refer to the thing, whatever it
25is, that has such and such a property or properties. Loar says some­
thing similar. A belief being about a particular object is simply a 
belief about the thing, whatever it may be, that satisfies an individual 
concept. For Loar, 'satisfying an individual concept' is just the having 
of certain properties; he singles out three groups as especially important. 
Firstly, there is a perceptual group of properties - e.g. the thing, whatever 
it is, that I see, or saw, hear or heard, and so forth. Secondly, there is 
the comprehensive property of satisfying a complete 'dossier' - a very 
detailed specification which an object might fit - and thirdly, there is
the property of being 'the such and such which is called N, or the such and
26 27such referred to by x' . Schiffer , whose views resemble Loar's, claims 
that the property or properties concerned are not purely qualitative, but 
contain an essential indexical element of the foim - the thing, whatever it 
is, that has such and such a unique relation to the person who has the belief 
in question.
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Wittgenstein remarked: 'If God had looked into our minds, he 
would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of*• Yet it 
is precisely this that is claimed by the philosophers of the last paragraph, 
or so it might be thought, McDowell, quoting Wittgenstein with approval, 
remarks:
'•..rummaging through the repository of general thoughts 
which ...we are picturing the mind as being, God would fail 
to find out precisely whom we have in mind. Evidently that 
(mythical) repository is not the right place to look. God •
(or anyone) might see whom we have in mind, rather, by - for 
instance, seeing whom we look at as we speak - seeing relations 
between a person and bits of the world, not prying into a 
hidden place whose contents would be just as they are even if 
there were no world - is (in part) what seeing into a person's 
mind is'. 29
30And at the end of the same paper he says:
•One cannot intelligibly regard a person as having a belief 
about a particular concrete object if one cannot see him as 
having been exposed to the causal influence of that object in 
ways suitable for the acquisition of information (or mis­
information) about it'.
Now I have been arguing that a causal linking between an actual object 
or person, and the belief of someone who has a belief about that object or 
person in the strongest sense, is a necessary condition for that strongest 
sense. This may appear to put me at odds with the most extreme Fregean 
position. In this, as I have characterised it, for my belief or utterance 
to be about an object X in any sense of 'about' worth having it is sufficient 
for me to believe correctly that X is whatever it is that has such and such 
a property. Whereas on my view,the Fregean will get at best a very weak 
sense of 'about' here.
In the paper from which I have quoted, McDowell concedes that Jones 
must have some beliefs or other of the form 'X is whatever it is that is p' . 
if Jones is to be able to have beliefs about X, but he claims in extreme 
Kripkean fashion that all such beliefs might be false. Here I think he 
goes too far. He is concerned to reject what he calls 'psychologism1 - to 
reject the need, in particular, for special kinds of mental occurrence
28
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whenever we have a belief about a certain real object* For example, 
speakers do not, he argues, consult an internal recipe to see whether an 
object they actually encounter is that object about which they believed 
that it was, say, p, whether the 'internal recipe', is thought of as a 
conscious mental representaticn, or something more tacit and implicit*
He thinks it is enough, if say Jones is disposed to manifest such and 
such recognitional behaviour towards X, disposed to respond 'intelligently 
(with understanding) to uses of the name on the part of others, in speech 
acts constru'able as being about...(x). I would agree that this might 
well be enough. But given an appropriate dispositional account of belief 
(like the one I support- in the next chapter) might this not just be having 
at least one true belief of the form 'X. is the thing, whatever it may be, 
that is p'. If so, this would in part vindicate the Fregean line on the 
matter and count against an extreme Kripkean view.
Further compromise with the Fregean might be effected. He might be 
persuaded to insist on a special M-set of properties m1...mn which would play 
the following role. When Jones believes that X is @, and his belief is of or 
about X in the strongest sense, his beliefs of the form 'X is whatever it is 
that is p' must include at least one true belief where the value of p comes 
from the M-set. M-set properties should include reference to perceptions 
and/or memories. When substituted in beliefs of the form'X is whatever it is 
that is p' we would obtain: 'X is whatever it was that he saw^'X is whatever 
it was of which he had a memory image', and the like. M-rset properties could 
include vague references to perceptions and memories of individuals other than 
Jones, who have caused Jones to believe that they have had the perceptions or 
memories. The connections could be more indirect still - to enable Jones, 
for instance to have beliefs which are strongly about Aristotle. Generally 
speaking, if we hold causal theories of perception and memory, we would now 
think that with the insertion of a member of the M-set, a causal link was 
being built in between X itself and Jones's believing that X denotes such
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and such. If the Fregean will say this kind, of thing, I have no quarrel 
with him. If X possesses a property from the M-set, this could provide 
the basis for Jones to have a belief about X in the strongest sense since, 
for it to be true that X is the thing, whatever it is, that has such a 
property, there must be a causal link 'of the appropriate kind' between 
Jones and the real object X.
3. BELIEFS AND UTTERANCES ABOUT GOD WITH CAUSAL LINKS
Suppose that it is possible for there to be causal links of the 'ri^it 
kind* between, say Jones and God. Then, although Jones, if he is to be 
able to believe something about or of God in the strongest sense, or say 
something about or of God in the strongest sense, must have at least one 
true belief of the form 'God is the thing, whatever it may be, that is p', 
the rest of his beliefs of this type may not be accurate - and some of 
them may even be false.
For it seems generally plausible to claim that the clearer the causal 
links between an object 0 and a believer, say Jones, the less accurate any 
beliefs of the form '0 is the thing, whatever it may be, that is p' are 
required to be for Jones to have a belief about 0. The less clear are the 
causal links, then the more accurate must be beliefs of the form '0 is the 
thing, whatever it may be, that is p', if Jones is to be able to believe 
something or say something which is in any sense about 0. If, for instance, 
it would be true to report Jones de dicto as believing that a certain house
is on fire, then, if it is clear that Jones is looking at a barn, not a
house, and it is the barn that is causing his belief, then it may be right 
to report Jones de re as believing that the b a m  is on fire; Jones belief 
would be of, about the b a m  in the strongest sense. But there are, of 
course, limits to this latitude. If, for instance, it would be true to 
report Jones de dicto as believing that an alien space ship was on fire, 
then, even if it were clear that it was the burning b a m  that was causing
Jones belief, it would hardly be correct to report Jones de re as believing
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that the barn was on fire; Jones belief this time would not be of, or 
about the barn.
Generalising from the last paragraph to Theistic beliefs and utterances, 
we can say the following. Suppose, as we have before, that Jones believes 
that God is looking after him, or that Jones says: 'God is looking after 
me'. Jones associates with God the following beliefs - that he is whoever 
it is that is p, q, r, etc. Or Jones' community in which the word 'God' 
has currency associate with that name the beliefs that God is whoever it is 
that is p, q, r, etc. Then, even if many of these beliefs are not accurate, 
or even false, then, so long as the appropriate causal links obtain between 
God and Jones and/ or between God and the speech community,and so long as 
Jones and/or the speech community has some degree, even if quite small, of 
accurate belief that God is whoever is the p...then Jones can both believe 
and say things about or of an epistemologically transcendent God in the 
strongest sense of 'about' or 'of'.
I will not attempt to say much about the nature of the 'appropriate 
causal link' between believer, utterer, or speech community and God.
Causal theorists in general have not found it easy to provide comprehensive 
accounts of so-called non-deviant causal chains in their characterisations 
of perception, action, and so on. I see no intrinsic reason, however, why 
such an account should prove especially more difficult in the present case 
compared to others. I merely indicate forms of causal linkage that are at 
least prima facie plausible candidates.
It seems possible that God causes beliefs in CBB's through ordinary
perceptions they have of the physical universe. They would encounter God
'in virtue of' encountering objects, patterns of events, or whatever, - items
which are causally related to God in an appropriate way. I follow Frank
32Jackson in his discussion of the 'in virtue of' relation . A car is red 
in virtue of the body of the car being red. A car touches the kerb in 
virtue of some part of the car touching the kerb. Jackson lives in
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Australia in virtue of living in Melbourne« I see the table in virtue of 
seeing its top. I hear the aeroplane in virtue of hearing a thunderous 
sound« I sense the earthquake in virtue of sensing the vibration in my 
chair. Jones (perhaps) meets/encounters God in virtue of seeing a beautiful 
sunset; in virtue of having a loving relationship with a friend, etc.
It also .seems possible that God causes beliefs of the kind in question 
through the having by CEB's of special experiences, of the type reported by 
mystics; or that God causes the beliefs 'directly' - that is to say, in 
the present context, that CRB's acquire the beliefs without having any kind 
of sensory experience, and God enters into the causal explanation of the 
acquisition of these beliefs 'in the appropriate way'. And there are 
further possibilities still; but I cannot explore them thoroughly here.
4. KNOWING WHO GOD IS
Even someone who had followed sympathetically the whole of the argument 
of this chapter so far might feel uneasy, and try to express the uneasiness 
as follows. Tou have said how Jones beliefs or assertions could, at least 
in principle, be of or about an epistemologically transcendent being, even 
where Jones beliefs as regards that being are for the most part inaccurate 
or false. But you have said little of matters from Jones point of view.
Can, for instance, Jones know who God is if he is epistemologically 
trainscendent, and, if so, how? My response to this question, which 
constitutes this, the final section of the present chapter, will turn out in 
the end to cover little new ground - the main points will turn out already 
to have been made in the earlier examination of 'about* and 'of'. But 
some study of the notion of 'knowing who* should serve to advance matters a 
little further. I acknowledge much help from a paper entitled 'Knowing 
Who' by Steven Boer and William Lycan . Their paper is long and complex;
I draw upon their insights by providing my own simplified versions of their 
views where appropriate.
We/may distinguish initially between two kinds of situations, type (a)
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and type (b) in which a person, say Jones, knows/does not know who someone 
is.
Type (a): I first describe the paradigm cases, and then elaborate to take 
in less central cases. Jones has a person P in sight. If P is in a 
group, then Jones can pick him out from his fellows. Jones may say, 
pointing at P: 'I know who P is'. 'P* would be a name,Jones says: 'I 
know who Smith is' - (pointing at Smith). 'He's the son of the Archbishop'. 
Jones is not compelled to use a name - he might instead employ a 
demonstrative: 'I know who that man is (pointing). He's the son of the 
Archbishop'. Or, for instance, Jones hears two men talking in the next 
room. Again, he can say: 'I know who Smith is* (meaning the one with the 
high-pitched voice that both he and his friend can hear). 'He's the son 
of the Archbishop'. Or: 'I know who that man is - the one with the high- 
pitched voice. He's the son of the Archbishop'. The name or demonstra­
tive picks out someone currently being perceived.
Moving now to more indirect forms of (a). Jones sees P in a crowd, 
and could have picked him out - the crowd was close enough for Jones to see 
each individual clearly, and so on. We bracket consideration of whether 
Jones knows who P is - whether, that is to say, he could have pointed to P 
and said, for instance, correctly - 'I know who P is. He's the son of the 
Archbishop'. Instead, we focus on a conversation which takes place later. 
Jones still, has a clear memory of the people he saw, and can describe them 
individually. He outlines P's appearance to Smith, and inquires: 'Do you 
know who.that was'? Suppose that Smith does know - i.e. knows something 
of the kind 'That must have been the son of the Archbishop'. Then Smith
knows who P is in an essentially similar fashion to the way in which Jones 
knows, if he knows at all, in the paradigm case initially described. Smith 
knows who that man is, where 'that man' rigidly designates the individual 
described by Jones, and there is a causal link of the right kind between 
the man, and Smith's utterance of the expression 'That man' which goes
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through Jones via his memory.
Jones might of course inadvertently provide a description of someone 
whom he did see and could have picked out, but who was not the individual 
he intended to tell Smith about - an individual he also saw. Suppose it 
is purely, fortuitous that the description Jones uses fits the individual K 
that he did not intend to talk about. Then, surely, Smith cannot know who 
K is - since Jones will not have spoken in the strongest sense of or about 
K - a conclusion of course argued for in this chapter. Suppose on the 
other hand that K is in part causally responsible for Jones' use of the 
description he produced, despite the fact that Jones himself did not intend 
to speak of K. Then, perhaps, Jones may still know who that is in a 
fashion resembling our type (a) paradigm; only, however, if it is 
plausible to claim that Jones spoke of '. (in the strongest sense) K, despite 
his failure to intend to do so.
These remarks are, of course, more in the way of elementary appeals 
for a view of reference which includes a causal element. We need to note 
that the kind of causal effect exerted by individuals onthose who claim 
correctly to know who they are may be of a great variety of kinds; other 
kinds of causal influence still will not entitle anyone to know who the 
individuals are. The chain of causes from an individual to someone who 
knows who that individual is could be very extended and indirect. Jones 
and Smith inthe twentieth century could wonder who it was that Aristotle 
saw — if we imagine that Aristotle saw someone one particular January 
morning in Greece, and recorded this fact. If Jones knows who Aristotle 
saw, this could still be, I would maintain essentially a case of knowing 
who resembling the type (a) paradigm.
Where Jones does know who P is in an (a) type situation, he will know 
something of the fonn 'P is the q', where 'the q' is some description or 
other. For instance, Jones might know who P is if he can say, correctly, 
'That man is the Town Clerk'. 'That man is the owner of the fleet of taxis'
137
and so on. Boer and Lycan argue that if Jones knows that P is M ,  
where *NN* is a proper name, then, ultimately this will not amount to Jones 
knowing who P is unless Jones knows who M  is. For if Jones did not know 
who P was, and was told that P was M ,  this would only help Jones if Jones 
already knew who NN was. Whereas, if Jones did not know who P was, and 
was told that P was the q, this might well be sufficient; Jones need not 
know who the q is in some further sense.
The idea is that something of the form'P is the q1 will ultimately 
silence and satisfy a questioner who wants to know who P is, whereas an 
answer of the form 'p is M '  is essentially incomplete. Similarly, if 
Jones knows that P is x where x involves demonstrative reference to something 
being perceived, or to something which was perceived, x being something like 
•the man I saw last week down by the river', 'the man Jane heard whistling 
at 2 o'clock this morning', there is again a sense in which this does not 
help Jones to know who P is unless he already knows, for instance who the 
man he saw last week down by the river is - that he is the son of the 
Archbishop, or whatever. Obviously, in some contexts, knowing that P is 
the man seen down by the river last week could well be said to be knowing 
who that man is; I am not trying to restrict the uses of 'knowing who', 
but to discuss the characteristics in particular of type (a) knowing who.
The essential incompleteness of answers of the form 'P is x' also shows up 
as follows; if Jones does not know who P is, where P is in clear view of 
him, it will not help Jones to know that P is the man seen down by the river 
last week, unless Jones already has a satisfactory answer to the question;
'Who was the man you saw down by the river last week'?
The point not yet touched on is what values 'q* can take in answers of 
the form 'P is the q'. If Jones does not know who P is, an answer like 
'He's the man with 10,000 hairs on his head' is unlikely to be satisfactory.
I discuss this shortly.
I turn now to the second kind of situation (b) in which Jones knows
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(does not know) who the q is, where'the q' is some description. In a 
paradigm case, Jones is confronted with a group of people, He wants to 
know who the son of the Archbishop is - i.e. he wants to know which of that 
group is the son of the Archbishop. If he eventually comes to know, in
this situation, who the son of the Archbishop is, he will be able to point 
perhaps to a certain person and say 'I know who the son of the Archbishop 
is. That man is the son of the Archbishop'. Jones may have a name, rather 
than a description in mind-perhaps he wants to know who Smith is - i.e. he 
wants to know which one of them is Smith. This is not essentially 
different from the case where he wants to know who it is that answers to a 
given description, since he will hardly wish to know who Smith is unless he 
associates with 'Smith' at least one description.
We can describe more indirect cases of knowing who in (b) type situations 
also. For instance, Jones might have Smith describe to him occasions on 
which Smith saw various people, and Jones might wonder who was the son of 
the Archbishop. He might wonder, in other words, which of the people that 
Smith saw was the son of the Archbishop. He might eventually come to know 
that a certain individual, on the far left of the group of people that Smith 
saw down by the river last week was the son of the Archbishop. Boer and 
Lycan suggest that the most frequent answer to the question 'Who is the q' 
in (b) type situations introduce a name. 'Who is the Archbishop's son'? 
•Jones'. 'Who is the owner of the fleet of taxis'? 'Snodgrass'. But, 
they claim, though it is the most frequent answer it is essentially 
incomplete, relying as it does on people already knowing who Jones or 
Snodgrass are (for instance) in an (a) type situation as described above. 
People will need to know at least one thing of the form 'Jones is the p', or 
'Snodgrass is the r'.
Clearly, the situations envisaged as (b) types, where the answer to 
'Who is the q'? involves pointing someone out will be relatively few in 
number. If we accept that the most frequent answers to questions of the
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form 'Who is the q'? introduce names, which in turn require knowing who 
in an (a) type situation, it is upon the latter that we should concentrate. 
Before doing so, I will mention very briefly a third type of situation that 
Boer and Lycan discuss where the 'knowing who’ locution appears; I can 
know who the f is if I know that the f is the g, where 'the f' and 'the g* 
are both descriptions. Jones knows who the highest paid official of • 
Puddletown is. He knows that the highest paid official of Puddletown is 
the town clerk. Jones knows that the heir to the throne is the Monarch's 
eldest son, etc. These are essentially general, and need not be about 
existing individuals at all.
It is possible, however, as Boer and Lycan point out, that, say 'the 
heir to the throne’ could be taken to have wide s c o p e i n  which case Jones 
knowledge would be as follows: concerning the individual who is in fact the 
heir to the throne; Jones knows that he is the Monarch's eldest son. Such 
knowledge might well be a species of (a) type knowing who, It need not be 
(a) type knowing who, all the same. Remember Dr. Jones, who might well 
have had the following item of knowledge: the tallest man in the world 
a weak heart - one version of which would reasonably be expressed as: 
concerning the individual who is in fact the tallest man in the world - 
Dr. Jones knows he has g weak heart. But the absence of any causal link 
between Lanky and Dr. Jones in this example means that it cannot be (a) 
type knowing who.
I would argue that it is necessary for the Theist to be able to know 
at least in principle, who God is in an (a) type situation. We need to 
see why this is so. For it might be thought that we could know who P is 
in a satisfactory enough way by knowing that P answers to a certain set of 
descriptions. And if we could bracket off considerations relating to 
God's mystery, which I argued at the beginning of this chapter militated 
against the descriptivist-intentional account of 'about' and 'of' in the 
context of belief and discourse about God, it might be thought that we could
140
know who God is by knowing that he answers to a certain set of descriptions.
I can know who Othello is in the fashion presently being envisaged, 
certainly. But this is not a happy parallel. Could we not know who Moses 
was (is) in this way too? For the purpose of much discourse about Moses, 
it does not matter whether he is thought of as someone who really existed, 
or instead as some fictional character out of the bible. So, up to a point, 
we can know who Moses is in a similar fashion to the way in which we know 
who Othello is.
But once we are concerned in our discourse to talk about Moses as 
someone who really existed, things change. It must be possible for someone 
to know who Moses was in an (a) type situation when Moses was alive. In 
the paradigm case, them would have had him in view. Pointing to him, 
they would have been able to say, correctly, ’He is the q' or'He is the r'. 
Though cases deviating appreciably from this paradigm may be envisaged.
For instance, someone could know who P was in an(a) type situation even 
where no one ever knew that that man - i.e. someone they could see or hear, 
or even, more weakly, remember seeing or hearing - was the so and so.
Imagine that P was a hermit — his mother alone and unconscious during his 
birth on a desert island, dying immediately after giving birth to him. P 
lives his life in solitude on the island. After his death, when his corpse 
has been devoured by wild animals, passing archeologists discover evidence 
that someone lived in a cave on the island. They might correctly be said 
to know who P was in an (a) type situation if they said ’That man is the 
one who carved the pictures of animals in the stones at the top of the hill*. 
It would be true that their demonstrative ’that man' would not be causally 
involved in any direct fashion with the hermit P himself. But it is 
conceivable that there could be a more oblique causal involvement via the 
evidence left in the cave. So the demonstrative expression 'that man' 
could be used to designate that particular man - the hermit - even though 
they did not have perceptions caused by the bodily presence of the hermit -
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even though they were not in contact, however indirectly, with anyone else 
who had such perceptions.
The objector might acknowledge these points for the example of Moses, 
etc. But he still might object to the requirement of somekind of causal 
contact between God and Theists if they are to know who he is. For, the 
objector might contend, God is an extraordinary being with extraordinary 
properties. The properties of omnipotence, and of unsurpassability itself 
could not, in principle be possessed by more than one being. Thus we have 
no possibility of the kind frequently invoked by causal theorists, that the 
'wrong' individual fits the properties that a believer believes something 
to have, thus turning out on the descriptivist-intentional account to be 
the individual of whom or about whom the believer has his belief, even 
though there isn't the faintest causal contact between the individual in 
question and the believer.
Yet if this were the best way of knowing who God is - if the possi­
bility of knowing who God is in an (a) type situation were unavailable, 
the case of God would resemble the case of the fictional Othello, or the 
case of an abstract object. Whilst God is, of course set apart from all 
other existents, and henoe the unavailability of an (a) type knowing 
ybQ> - might not be thought to be to his philosophical discredit, it is 
a point that should give us pause to think. There is a logical or 
categorial difference between e.g. fictional objects and real objects, or 
between abstract objects and real objects. The characterisation of 
'categorial difference' is an abstruse matter. Even without this, however, 
it seems obvious to me that God should be more like tables, chairs, human 
persons, than like fictional objects and abstract objects. Yet in this 
crucial area of 'knowing who', God, according to our object»^ resembles 
fictional objects and abstract objects rather than the 'real objects' of 
the universe. This alleged feature of God seems to me to give him the 
wrong ontological status. To retain the 'concrete reality' of God, however
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different this may be from all other particulars, we must insist on the 
possibility of knowing who God is in an (a) type situation.
When the Theist knows who God is in an (a) type situation, he knows 
something of the form 'God is p', where p is some property. But our study 
of trascendence suggests that there may be difficulties about this. If 
the Theist could get by so long as there was one value for p, and it did 
not matter much what this was, all would be well. However, maybe more 
than one value is required, and maybe these values should involve crucial 
properties such as divine goodness. Yet CRB's are limited in respect of 
their knowledge and understanding of these properties.
I now argue that this difficulty is not insurmountable. Boer and 
Lycan put forward the view that knowing who someone is always includes a 
reference to a purpose - knowing who someone is for such and such a purpose, 
'...the question 'who is'? often leaves us in doubt as to what to say by 
way of reply. If our background knowledge about the questioner and the
context of utterance provides no strong clues as to his purpose in asking,
35we will inquire 'Why do you want to know'?
If the purpose is locating P, then knowing he is the fourth son of the 
Duke of Puddletown is useless, whilst knowing that he is the man in the 
kitchen peeling potatoes may do very well. If the purpose was - to 
ascertain P's family connections - whether he is of common stock, or whether 
he is of the 'quality', then 'He is the fourth son of the Duke of Puddletown' 
may be fine.
For what purposes does the Theist require to know who God is?
Certainly not to 'locate' him, if God is thought of as omnipresent. The 
broad purposes of the Theist seem to be worship and prayer. What is it, 
then, to know who God is for the purpose of worship and prayer? It might 
be thought that knowing just one or two items of the form 'God is p' would 
not be sufficient; that a CRB, to know who God is for the purposes in 
question would have to know all that must be true of God if he is to be an
unsurpassable being« And since this is impossible« because an 
unsurpassable being must be mysterious, CRB's could not know who God is 
for the purpose of worship, and hence could not worship»
This line of thought may be countered as follows: in the last -section 
of Chapter 2 I concluded, it is true, that the worshipper must think of 
the object of his worship as unsurpassable. Suppose,then, that to know 
who God is requires the worshipper to know that he is unsurpassable.
Whilst this would mean that the worshipper must know that the object of 
his worship has a certain nature in yirtue of which he is unsurpassable, 
it does not follow that the worshipper is required to have detailed 
knowledge of all the aspects of that nature. Perhaps the CRB could 
acquire the belief that God is unsurpassable, with some appropriate causal 
link between God and that CRB, in a way which did not involve the CRB in 
acquiring true and accurate beliefs about the entire divine nature and 
'concluding' that the object of his worship, in virtue of such a nature was 
unsurpassable. I do not think, then, that there is any good reason to 
think that there is a sense of 'knowing who' from which a CRB is barred 
when confronted with the case of a mysterious God, a limitation which would 
prevent worship. In the following chapter, however, I will need to consider 
the difficulties attached to answering the distinct question - what is it to 
know who God is for the purpose of joint worship - and, more generally, what 
is it to know who God is for the purpose of being able to think of others 
as worshipping the same God as I am.
I have argued in this chapter that if a causal element is built into the 
account given of the expressions 'about' and 'of' in the context of utterances 
and beliefs of or about God, then no intractable philosophical problems are 
posed by God's epistemological transcendence. I have also argued that 
though there may be senses in which Theists do not "know who God is", if, 
for instance, knowing who is understood as knowing all about someone, there 
is no good reason to think that Theists cannot "know who God is" for the
M3
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I suggested in Chapter 3 that an unsurpassable being would to some 
extent be beyond the powers of CRB's to describe him» In the present 
chapter, one of my aims is to defend the philosophical respectability of 
CRB beliefe concerning such ineffable aspects of God - that is, to defend 
and account for the possibility of beliefs which cannot be expressed in 
language« Let me first explain why I think that this is important for the 
Theist.
If a community of Theists were restricted to the possession of beliefs 
about God which were in principle expressible in a language mastery of 
which CRB's were -capable, such beliefs might well be insufficient to enable 
CRB's to view each other as worshipping, or even discussing, the same being.
A parallel situation might be two hunters, H1 and H2 discussing lions: H1 
discusses lion 11, and H2 discusses lion 12. It might in fact be true 
that both H1 and H2 have beliefs of or about a certain lion Leo, and that 
both H1 and H2 are speaking of, or about, that certain lion Leo, where 'of' 
and 'about' are occurring in their strongest sense, as discussed in the last 
chapter« There would be causal links of an appropriate character between 
Leo and H1, and between Leo and H2, etc. But it may well be thought that 
for H1 to regard H2 as discussing, and as having beliefs concerning the same 
lion as he is discussing and has beliefs concerning, H1 must see H2 as having 
a number of beliefs of the form 'The lion in question is whatever it is that 
is p, whatever it is that is q', etc. - beliefs which H1 himself has. H2 
must see H1 in similar fashion.Without a sufficient number of shared lion 
beliefs, it may be argued, H1 and H2 might never be able to see each other 
as thinking and speaking of the same lion, even if they are in fact doing so.
An objection to this line of argument is the following. It could be 
contended that just one shared belief of the form 'The lion is whatever it is 
that is p' would do, so long as p was selected from a certain group of
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properties. Examples from this group would be; '- is whatever it is that
I saw by the river at midday yesterday'; is whatever it is that I heard
|
devouring a carcass in the thicket at 10 o'clock this morning', etc. An
important feature of this group of properties is that they have causal 
elements built into them, if we accept a causal theory of perception. And 
given this, it might be argued, should H1 and H2 share just one of these 
beliefs, they could each feel justifiably sure that the other was thinking 
of and speaking of the same lion, in the strongest senses of 'about' and 'of. 
The objection might go on to concede that without a shared belief from this 
special group, H1 and H2 would need to share a reasonable number of beliefs 
of the form 'The lion is whatever it is that is p'.
Unfortunately, even if this would do in the case of the hunters and the 
lion, it will not do for a community of Theists. For apparently analogous 
properties of God to '-is whatever it was that I saw by the river yesterday', 
though (perhaps) available, do not pull off the same trick. Suppose that 
Theist A believes that the being he is discussing is 'Whatever it was that I 
encountered yesterday while watching the beautiful sunset', and takes it that 
the 'encounter' involves some kind of causal influence of the object of his 
encounter on his, Theist A's beliefs. Suppose that Theist B believes the 
same kind of thing, and that each are aware of the other's belief. Now the 
obvious difference between this and the lion case is that the lion property 
could only be possessed by one lion, and each hunter will know this. But 
there is nothing about '- is whatever it is that I encountered yesterday 
while watching the beautiful sunset*, which guarantees that only one being 
possesses such a property - and I cannot see that either Theist could suppose 
otherwise.
It might well be that both Theists encounter the one and only 
unsurpassable being, in some sense of 'encounter' whilst watching the sunset, 
that God caused them to have certain beliefs, and that both now are in the 
general state of being able to have beliefs and to make statements of, or
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about God in the strongest senses of 'about* and 'of'. But taken alone, 
their belief that God is whatever being it was that they encountered 
yesterday does not justify either of them in thinking that the other is 
thinking of speaking of the same being.
The suggestion could be made at this point that Theist A might believe 
that the being about whom he is talking is - both whoever he encountered 
yesterday whilst looking at the sunset, and is omnipotent. Theist B 
might have a similar belief. If so, the suggestion might continue, it 
would be perfectly reasonable for A to take B as having beliefs about and 
making statements about the very same being about whom A is making statements 
and having beliefs. it would also be reasonable for B to make the same 
move vis a vis A. For (we will continue to assume) it is logically 
impossible for two omnipotent beings to exist at one and the same time - 
and we may impute an understanding of this point to both A and B. Hence, 
the present suggestion might conclude, this is as far as we now need to 
proceed with the question of what beliefs are required for A and B to see 
each other as worshipping one and the same God. We need not, for instance, 
worry about whether A and B have toshare, knowingly, beliefs that they do not 
fully understand or beliefs that they are unable to express, and so on.
Now in response to this suggestion, I would agree that if A is able to 
see B as believing that the being about whom he is talking (etc) is both 
whoever it was that he encountered yesterday whilst gazing at the sunset, 
and whoever it is that is omnipotent, then, if A has similar beliefs about 
a certain being, it is very reasonable for A to see B as talking (say) about 
that same certain being. And vice versa. But I would want to contend 
that A cannot properly interpret B as believing that the being he encountered 
on the previous day (etc) is whoever it is that is omnipotent in isolation. 
Theist A would also need to be able appropriately and intelligibly, to see 
B as having a number of other beliefs about the being in question as well.
I would want to claim that we cannot be wholly precise about the required
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extent of these further beliefs, and hence we do after all need to go on and 
worry about whether Theists are going to have to have beliefs which they 
cannot wholly understand, or beliefs which they are in principle unable to 
express. Let me explain.
We must think cf the matter from, say A's point of view. A tries 
to attribute to B beliefs according to some 'principle of humanity'. Very 
probably on such a principle, A will try to attribute to B beliefs for 
which B apparently thinks he has some grounds or justification; he will 
interpret B as having beliefs also which apparently cohere with B's other 
beliefs - at least for the most part. Now in what circumstances would it 
be appropriate and intelligible for A to interpret B as believing that B's 
encountered object is omnipotent? It is easy to imagine circumstances in 
which A can appropriately interpret B as having beliefs that the object of 
his encounter is very powerful indeed. Such circumstances might be, for 
example, circumstances in which he can appropriately interpret B as believing 
that his encounter had such and such experienced features.
We need not, I think, engage in discussion of the precise definition of 
omnipotence; let us assume that there is a degree of power that may be 
possessed by a being that could not be exceeded; and that an unsurpassable 
being would possess this, or as much of it as would be compatible with the 
rest of his nature. Omnipotence»nthis sense would (of course) be a much 
more extreme attribute than the attribute of being very powerful.
It is very difficult to see what experienced features of an encounter, 
taken alone, would lead B. to believe with any justification that the object 
of his encounter was omnipotent, and not just very powerful indeed. So A 
could not really make any sensible imputation to B of the belief that B's 
encountered object was omnipotent and not just very powerful indeed, if A 
were relying solely on what B apparently got from his encounter. And, 
anticipating argument to come, it would scarcely be enough eithej} should A 
grasp that B is disposed to say 'God is omnipotent' or even that B is
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disposed to 'assent inwardly' to the proposition that God is omnipotent, 
for 1 to interpret B appropriately as believing that the object of his 
encounter (whom he calls God) is omnipotent. Surely A must suppose B to 
have other beliefs in addition about the object of his encounter, for A 
appropriately to interpret B as having the belief that his encountered 
object is omnipotent and not just very powerful indeed. I will spend a 
little time developing this point.
Believing that the object of his encounter is omnipotent is probably, 
for B, believing roughly that the object of his encounter has as much power 
as it is possible to have. It is believing that the encountered object has 
a degree of power that is unsurpassable. (Host theists, and we will assume 
that A and B are part of this majority, will not have in mind a good philo­
sophical account of omnipotence when they believe that the object of their 
worship is omnipotent).
What are the circumstances, then, in which A may appropriately interpret 
B's words and actions as expressions of a belief in the omnipotence of his 
encountered object, as opposed to the expression of a belief that his 
encountered object is very powerful indeed? It seems to me that A needs 
in addition a justification for interpreting B as having a general belief 
in the unsurpassability of his encountered object. If B has such a general 
belief, then A can see this belief of B as influencing what helief B has 
about the degree of power possessed by his encountered object. But of 
course, we need also to consider the nature of the circumstances in which 
it is appropriate for A to interpret B as having this general unsurpassa­
bility belief. Again anticipating to some extent argument to come later 
it would scarcely be enough should A grasp that B is disposed to say 'God 
is unsurpassable', or even inwardly to assent to the proposition that God 
is unsurpassable. A needs in fact to see B as having a number of beliefs 
about the nature of his encountered/worshipped object, from which B can 
see himself as 'moving' with some justification to the belief that the object
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is unsurpassable. B will have a sort of bi-partite belief structure in 
his mind, the elements of which provide each other with mutual support. 
(Hopefully the whole edifice has in the end independent support also).
B's belief about the nature of his encountered/worshipped object prompts 
him to believe that the object is unsurpassable. But at the same time the 
process is also working the other way. B's general belief in the 
unsurpassability of his encountered/worshipped object influences some of 
the detailed beliefs he has about the object's intrinsic nature.
I do not think that we can lay down just how comprehensive must be the 
corpus of belief that A sees B as having, before A can see B has having a 
fully fledged belief that the object of B's worship is unsurpassable. A 
would probably take the view that unlimited comprehensiveness is ruled out 
by God's transcendence. The point is, however, that unsurpassability stems 
in part from aspects of God which cannot be captured in language. Though 
we cannot pronounce conclusively on the matter, saying that if A is 
precluded from seeing B as having beliefs concerning those ineffable aspects 
of God, then A cannot see B as believing that the object of B's worship is 
unsurpassable, it surely would be a disturbing result for the Theist if it 
could be shown a priori that any attempt to interpret a fellow theist as 
having an inexpressible belief would be doomed to failure. If we could 
achieve some grasp of just how it might be that A could see B as having 
in expressible beliefs about God, this would be, at the very least,to do 
something towards defending the possibility that A regard B as worshipping 
the same ,God as A, even if that God is epistemologically transcendent.
For Theists to be able to regard each other, then, as worshipping the 
same God, they must consciously share a substantial number of beliefs about 
his nature. It follows that each Theist must have a reasonable number of 
beliefs about the divine nature to share at all - even if these beliefs 
cannot cover in a comprehensive fashion all aspects of the divine nature.
It would not be possible to restrict the area of the divine nature covered
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by such CUB beliefs to that which is entirely within the understanding 
capacities of CRB’s for two reasons. Firstly, because, as we have seen 
we cannot draw clear lines between aspects of the divine nature which are 
comprehensible and aspects which are incomprehensible. Secondly, because 
a central aspect of God, namely his goodness, about which CRB's surely will 
have some kind of beliefs, does not lie wholly within the compass of CRB 
understanding, as we saw in Chapter 3. The second task of this chapter, 
then, will be to examine how far God's incomprehensibility precludes belief.
1 hope to show that at least some of the barriers we have discovered to 
understanding the divine nature are not barriers in quite the same way to 
the having of beliefs about those aspects of the divine nature.
Thus the work of this chapter takes the following form. In sections
2 and 3 I embark upon a general discussion of the concept of belief, out of 
which I develop a loose dispositional account of belief, which I try to show 
is compatible with the existence of inexpressible beliefs. In section 4 I 
distinguish between different kinds of incomprehensibility, arguing that 
whilst some kinds do preclude belief as I understand it, others do not, and 
that not all the understanding failures to which the Theist is destined fall 
into the former category.
2. THE NATURE OF BELIEF
Consider 'Jones believes that p'. Let us exclude from discussion any 
of the possible truth conditions for this sentence which are 'transparent',
'de re', or whatever, taking in features of the world distinct from Jones in 
addition,to something about Jones himself. It is then natural to think that 
there is also a truth condition for this sentence which purely concerns itself 
with Jones; that this sentence may be true just when Jones is in a certain 
kind of state, a state which disappears when Jones no longer believes that p. 
It is equally natural to think of this state as something of which Jones can, 
at least in principle, be aware. Traditionally, such a belief report would 
be characterised as reporting Jones attitude to a proposition. The
154
implication is that when Jones has an attitude, he is in a certain state. 
When his attitude changes, he undergoes a change of state. (i will follow 
Armstrong's usage of the expression 'state' to mean - the possession of a 
property for a certain length of time - the property being non-relational 
and such that 'there is some classification of the object relative to which 
the state is an accidental or changeable feature of the objedt'^).
Now if Jones has an attitude to a proposition - or indeed any kind of 
attitude at all, it must surely be possible in principle for him to be 
introspectively aware that he has this attitude. If not, we could scarcely 
understand what it would mean•to attribute an attitude to him. (if I 
am barred from introspective access to my unconscious attitude A, this 
arises from the contingent nature of my psyche. I would contend that I 
am not barred in principle from access to A. An alternative way of looking 
at this is to say that 'X has an unconscious attitude A' only speaks in a 
certain way of behaviour patterns to be expected from X, and that this 
represents a considerable divergence, say on the part of the Freudian, 
from the orthodox meaning of 'attitude').
For the Theist who espouses the possibility of inexpressible beliefs, 
this 'natural' view of belief presents problems. For on the 'natural' view 
of belief we are characterising, when Jones has an inexpressible belief, he 
must still have a certain attitude to a certain proposition, which will 
involve him in being in a certain type of state. On the natural view,
Jones ought in principle to be able to be introspectively aware of this 
state - of his having the said attitude to the said proposition. But some 
account of in what introspective awareness would consist, were it to occur, 
is required. Could Jones 'have the proposition in mind', or 'entertain the 
proposition'? It might, for example be suggested that he could somehow 
employ private mental imagery - visual or auditory imagery, for example, to 
'represent' the proposition in his mind. But if he could in some such way 
employ imagery to 'represent' the proposition in his mind, when enjoying
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introspective access to his having the appropriate attitude to the 
proposition, it isvery difficult to understand how it could be that, at 
the same time he might be unable in principle to employ verbal representa­
tion in any CRB language mastery of which, in principle he is capable, 
whether 'mentally' or orally. In sum, the point is this. If Jones can 
have introspective access to his having an attitude to a proposition, there 
must at least in principle be some way in which he could 'represent' that 
proposition in his mind. But if he could in principle so 'represent' the 
proposition, it is very difficult to see how at the same time that 
proposition could be inexpressible in principle in any CRB language.
Accordingly, in this section, I want to argue against the'natural' 
view of belief characterised above. In brief, the view says that when 
Jones believes that p, he has an attitude to a specific proposition - he 
has a belief with a certain specific content; the having of this attitude 
is his being in a certain type of state: he in principle can be 
introspect!vely aware that he is in that type of state. If Jones believes 
that p, and Brown believes that p, then their beliefs on this view have the 
same content; however much they may differ from each other in other ways, 
they will at least resemble each other in both being in a certain kind of 
state. If Jones believes that p at t, and later, at-1 + 1 also believes 
that p, then whatever else has changed, he is in a certain type of state at 
t + 1 which is the same type of state that he was in at t.
I argue first against the claim that Jones believing that p can be 
identified with Jones being in a certain state of type @. (i will refer to 
this claim as realism about specific belief ascriptions). I try to expose
the weakness of the undoubted psychological motivation that exists for 
making such an identification. Secondly, I argue against the view that 
beliefs have a specific content - a view more than suggested by the presence 
of the word 'proposition' and a view which is closely associated with realism 
about specific belief ascriptions. If the 'natural' view of belief can be
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shown to "be untenable, then the way is open for consideration of an 
alternative view which would not preclude the having of inexpressible 
beliefs.
Before objecting to realism about belief ascriptions, we need to 
understand more clearly what it is, and the motivation of those who adhere 
to it. I begin with an example which does not involve belief, whose 
realist character is pretty evident, 'X is cubical' is true, if it is 
true, of an object in virtue of a certain three-dimensional property of 
that object - in virtue of that object being in such and such a type of 
state - i.e. a state of being cubical. The essence of a realist concep­
tion of 'X is cubical' in the sense of 'realist' that I want to employ in 
this chapter, is as follows. That state of the object in virtue of which, 
say, 'X is cubical' is true, is at the same time that state of the object 
in virtue of which 'X is not cubical', is false. (The point of this 
should, I hope, become clear fairly soon).
2
I disagree with the view formerly held by Dummett, that bivalence 
is a mark of realism. Strictly, my view is that bivalence may be a 
sufficient condition for realism, but is not a necessary condition. The 
reason for my disagreement that I want to mention here concerns the 
essential vagueness of some empirical predicates. Imagine a series of 
colour shades - a,b,c,d,e,f,g, etc., in which the shades next to each 
other are observationally indistinguishable, whilst the shades at a 
distance from each other are observationally distinguishable. Imagine 
also that the distance from a to g is sufficient for 'a is red' to be true, 
and for 'g is red' to be false. Then as realists we say that there is 
something about a in virtue of which 'a is red' is true, and there is 
something about g in virtue of which 'g is red' is false. But there will be 
shades in between - perhaps c and d of which it is neither true that they 
are red, nor false that they are red. If we tried, in a Fregean spirit, 
to tighten up the predicate ' - is red' so that,say, shades up to and
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including d were red, whilst shades after that were not red, we would in
fact be changing the sense of our present predicate. Furthermore,there
are reasons for supposing that the tightening up manoeuvre could not, in
3
principle succeed . So we could be realist, for instance about colour 
predicates, without insisting that, of a given shade, it was either true 
that it was red, or false that it was red, etc. On a realist view, we may 
be able to say of a proposition attributing a given colour to a given shade 
that; it is false that the proposition is true, and false that it is false.
Let us now proceed to a realist characterisation of (n ) 'Jones believes 
that p'. On the realist view, if (N) is true, then Jones is in a specific 
state of a certain type in virtue of which it is true, and in virtue of 
which 'Jones does not believe that p' is false. At a given time, if we 
ask whether or not Jones believes that p, an affirmative or a negative 
answer may, on this view, be objectively correct. If the affirmative 
answer is correct, this excludes the correctness of the negative answer, 
and vice versa. The realist about belief ascriptions might still concede 
that at a given time t, there might be no correct answer to the question: 
•Does Jones believe that p'? This might be so because of an irremedial 
vagueness in the concept of 'believes that p'. It would then be false 
that the proposition that Jones believes that p was true, and false that the 
said proposition was false.
A non-realist characterisation of (n ) simply denies the realist claim. 
At a given time t, it may in some fashion be 'appropriate* (this to be 
explained in the detailed working out of the non-realist theory) to say 
'Jones believes that p'. But whatever this 'appropriateness' amounts to, 
it does not rule out the possibility that in principle, at least, it would 
be just as 'appropriate' for Jones or someone else, at that time t, to 
claim that Jones does not believe that p. A realist prejudice, which I 
shortly attempt to undermine, grounds our language about belief; in 
consequence we may well feel at this point that the non-realist account 
sketched here 'must' be wrong; that if it is 'appropriate' to say that
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Jones believes that p at t, then anyone who denies this is straight­
forwardly contradicting the first assertion.
Why shodld we be realists about belief ascriptions? As I say, common 
idiom clearly indicates that we are. 'I used to believe in God but I no 
longer do so' suggests a persisting state of mine, which has now vanished. 
'Theydiscovered that Jones believed that his son was dead, though Jones 
himself claimed to believe that his son was still alive'. This suggests 
that 'Jones believes that his son is dead' is true in virtue of some state 
of Jones. 'Only Jones knows what he really believes' once more suggests 
that there is a state of Jones in virtue of which such and such belief 
ascriptions will be true; this time, the implication being that Jones is 
the best authority as to the nature of these states.
I want to suggest that our psychological motivation for realism about 
belief ascriptions rests on an analogy we assume to exist between belief 
ascriptions and pain ascriptions, or ascriptions of other mental states of 
which we are 'directly aware'. I will first explain this, and then argue 
that it is. merely psychological - that the motivation it provides us is not 
soundly based.
Many belief ascription realists would, I think, be happy to compare 
'Jones believes at p' with 'Jones is in pain'. How realism for pain 
ascriptions is surely correct. 'Jones is in pain' is true of virtue of 
some type of state of Jones; also in virtue of his being in that type of 
state, 'Jones is not in pain' is false'. Ve do not say that, no matter 
what type of state Jones is in, either he is in pain or he is not in pain, 
for there may be essentially vague borderlines between pains and itches, 
pains and tickles, etc. We feel especially certain of realism for pain 
ascriptions since we can know in our own case that we are in pain. If, at 
t, Jones is in pain, he can know 'directly' that he is. Our conviction 
that we have direct and certain access to states of being in pain, etc. means 
that we can almost literally feel the impossibility of the joint truth, of
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•I am in pain* and 'I am not in paiA'.
The 'directness' of our access here is important, and yet this
expression is notoriously difficult. Accordingly, I will speak, instead
of 'direct' and 'indirect', of 'mediate' and 'immediate' objects of-
awareness - conscious mental states such as being in pain falling, of
course, into the Immediate' category. I follow Prank Jackson in making
the immediate/mediate distinction in terms of the ’in virtue of' relation.
(See Chapter 5» section 3 for brief remarks on this). Jackson defines a
mediate object of perception for a person S at time t as occurring if and
only if S sees x at t, and there is a y such that (x^y) and S sees x in
virtue of seeing y. And he explains that an immediate object of perception
A
is one that is not mediate . I shall assume that it is legitimate to 
generalise from Jackson’s 'perception' to a more unspecific 'awareness' which 
can include perception.
Fain, then, on this ctfinition, can be an immediate object of 'perception' 
or awareness; I need not be aware of my pain in virtue of being aware of 
something else. I could perhaps become aware that I was in pain in virtue of 
my being aware of something else; pain could in principle be on occasion a
mediate object of awareness for me. But this would be exceptional. So
be
Jones, say, canAimmediately aware of that in virtue of which 'Jones is in 
pain' is true; he can, as it were, inspect directly the condition that 
makes 'Jones is in pain' true, and 'Jones is not in pain' false. Belief 
realists may well think that having an attitude towards a proposition, this 
characterised as some, kind of state of the individual believer to which he 
has introspective access and for the existence of which he is the best 
authority, is like being in pain. They think that Jones, say, can inspect 
directly the condition that makes 'Jones believes that p' true. It must be 
admitted that there is some sense in which we can, on occasion, know in our 
own case whether or not we believe that p. So if the realist account of 
belief ascriptions is wrong, then a non-realist account of 'knowing in my
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own case that I believe that p' must be forthcoming. But first, we must 
examine the objections to the realist account.
I am going to argue that one difference between pain and belief is 
that I cannot be immediately aware that I believe that p; I can only be 
mediately aware that I believe that p. Whereas I can be immediately aware 
that I am in pain. Now I can, of course, be immediately aware of a 
conscious feeling of conviction that p, or of assent to the proposition 
that p. But it will be my contention that feelings of conviction, and the 
like, cannot be identified with beliefs, and hence, though I can of course 
become aware on occasion that I believe that p in virtue of being aware of 
feelings of conviction, etc. this awareness will not be an immediate 
awareness.
If believing that p were identical with having a conscious feeling of 
assent, then whilst asleep or unconscious, I would no longer believe that p, 
or alternatively, would believe that p in some other sense. This is a 
standard point; it would be highly implausible to claim either that I do 
not believe things when unconscious, or to claim that I do believe things 
when unconscious, but in some other sense than the sense in which I believe 
things when conscious.
Further, if believing that p were identical with having a conscious 
feeling of assent, then it would be impossible for me to have that feeling 
of assent, and yet not believe that p. But this is not in fact impossible 
at all. Consider the following. At time t I feel convinced that I believe 
that the.gun in my hand is loaded; I have immediate introspective knowledge 
of my feelings of assent to the proposition in question. At a later time 
t+1 I find myself, as it were, though retaining my '^feelings of conviction, 
deciding to perform one or more actions which are such that, given the rest 
of my stock of beliefs at t+1, and my intentions at t+1, I would not perform 
those actions if I 'really' believed at t+1 that the gun in my hand was 
loaded. At t+1, I intend to shoot Jones, and I have the appropriate stock
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of beliefs about the properties of guns, human susceptibilities to death 
from penetration by bullets, and that Jones is a few feet away from me.
Given all this, if I 'really* believed at t+1 that the gun in my hand was 
loaded I would pull the trigger; yet at t+1 I take out ammunition and try 
to load the gun. A number of accounts of my situation over the period t 
to t+1 might be true; I will sketch two.. On the first account, I never 
believed even at t that the gun in my hand was loaded; my subsequent actions 
'show' this; on such an account, I might think that feelings of conviction 
that p were a good guide as to whether I had the belief that p, but that 
sometimes I had these feelings even when I did not in fact believe, and I 
might conclude that in this instance I made a mistake at time t about what 
I believed. On a second account, I could say that I have changed my mind 
since t; at t I really did believe that the gun in my hand was loaded, but 
at t+1 I no longer believe that p. Surely, it is logically possible that 
either one or the other of these two accounts should be true. And it seems 
to follow from the mere logical possibility that the first account is correct, 
that a feeling of assent to p cannot be identical with a belief that p.
This point may be reinforced by making remarks which echo Kripke on the 
necessity of the identity of Hesperus and Phosphorus . If a certain state 
of mine, which is, as a matter of fact my believing that p, is identical 
with a certain conscious feeling of assent, then this is not a matter of 
contingent fact. It is not logically possible for this particular state 
to be distinct from my conscious feeling of assent. Yet the truth of the 
first account of the situation portrayed above would mean that my conscious 
feeling of assent would be distinct from that certain state of mine which 
was, as a matter of fact my believing that p.
Once we get away from the idea that I have immediate access to the 
truth condition of 'I believe that p' in the same kind of way as I have 
access to the truth condition of 'I am in pain', one psychological motive 
for realism about belief ascriptions has gone. The ground is prepared for
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examining some more definite objections to belief ascription realism, and 
I turn now to the first of these. There seem to be imaginable situations 
in which I can both believe that I believe that p, and believe that I do 
not believe that p, at one and the same time. On the -realist view, both 
of my second-order beliefs cannot be true; at best one of them can be 
true. I want to suggest that both of my second order beliefs could at 
least be 'appropriate'.
Suppose that from t1 to tn I think I lack the belief that Smith is 
the murderer; perhaps I think this because, on each occasion within this 
period when I consciously think about whether Smith is the murderer, I 
feel that I do not assent to the proposition 'Smith is the murderer'.
But suppose also that throughout the same period I feel frightened when I 
see Smith: I feel I do not want my daughter to marry him, even though 
before t I was quite happy about this. Ever since t, whenever I have seen 
Smith I have panicked and run away from him. So, when I dwell on my state 
of mind with respect to 'Smith is the murderer' I believe that I do not 
have the belief that Smith is the murderer. When, on the other hand, I 
focus on my other emotional feelings and on some of my actions, I believe 
that I do believe that Smith is the murderer. I could switch from one to 
the other within the period of time that we could call the specious present; 
to all intents and purposes it looks as though at one time I could both 
believe 'correctly' that I believe that p, and believe 'correctly' that I 
do not believe that p. The realist does not want this, since, according 
to him, when I believe that p, I am in a specific state of a certain type, 
in virtue of which 'I believe that p' is true, and in virtue of which'I do 
not believe that p' is false.
The belief ascription realist has a possible account of the situation 
as sketched above. He could claim that the presence of both the feelings 
of conviction, and the conflicting fears, propensities to certain kinds of 
actions, and so forth, would be a sign or symptom that I neither believed
that Smith was the murderer, nor did not believe that Smith was the 
murderer. My underlying dozastic state, he might maintain, would be in 
a kind of no mans land - objective enough, but just not something in virtue 
of which 'I believe that Smith is a murderer' would be true, and ’I-do not 
believe that Smith is a murderer' false.
All I want to do is to urge that it is at least possible that the 
non-realist account is the correct one. After all, were I to have the 
state of mind with respect to 'Smith is the murderer' alone, without the 
other feelings of fear, and propensities to such and such actions as 
described above, then I would have little hesitation in claiming that I 
did not have the belief that Smith is the Murderer. Were I to £iil to have 
such a state of mind with respect to 'Smith is the murderer', and were I 
also to have the fears and propensities to actions as described, I, or a 
third party, might reasonably ascribe to me the belief that Smith is the 
murderer. The fact that it seems at least intelligible that both of my 
second order beliefs about whether I believed that Smith was the murderer, 
might appropriately be ascribed to me at one and the same time counts 
against realism about specific belief ascriptions.
The second objection to the realist account of belief ascriptions is 
that it has difficulty in providing a satisfactory account of what the 
states of the person concerned are supposed to be. We have already seen 
that identification of the having of a specific belief with a conscious 
state of mind will not do; but of course there are other options open.
There are 'realist' versions of dispositional theories of belief; I now 
want to spend a little time in making some critical observations about them. 
My main stalking horse will be Armstrong in his 'Belief, Truth and Knowledge'.
In a realist dispositional theory of belief, the having of the belief 
is identified with the state which underlies the disposition to behave in 
such and such ways. A comparison is made with the dispositional properties 
of substances, such as the solu bility of salt in water. A given piece of
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of salt may never get itself dissolved throughout its life history. 
Nevertheless, we still may say correctly that it is solu hie, and the 
sense of our assertion may be regarded as being composed of two components. 
The first of the components consists of the truth of certain conditionals. 
The antecedents of these conditionals mention possible states of affairs 
involving the salt being immersed in water. The consequents state whether, 
and how fast, etc. the salt will dissolve in the water. The subject matter 
of the second of the components consists of the underlying state of the salt 
which explains the conditionals of the first component being true of the 
salt; this underlying state consists of occurrent non-relational properties 
of the salt - viz. certain aspects of its atomic, molecular and chemical 
composition.
The idea of underlying states is transferred by Armstrong to beliefs 
the sense of a belief ascription can in the same way be regarded as being 
composed of two components. The first component is a set of conditionals. 
Presumably (and I now no longer follow Armstrong) in the antecedents are 
specified (say) Jones' other beliefs, his intentions, and the physical 
circumstances of his body. The consequents state what he will do. Now 
the nature of the second component - the underlying state of the person 
which explains why it is that the conditionals of the first component do 
indeed hold, seems to me to be problematic. Armstrong would wish to talk 
of neurophysiological states and properties, and possibly of events with 
such properties; a dualist might wish to.talk of 'mental' states which 
were not conscious states. If we took Armstrong's line, however, we could 
scarcely speak of just one type of state explaining the set of conditionals 
involved in believing that p; there would surely be very many types of 
neurophysiological states which could explain a particular set of 
conditionals, even within one and the same person. And if we think of 
several people .'having the same belief we would not necessarily expect, 
as neurophysiologists, to discover, on investigating their brains, that they
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were all in the same type of state; on the flimsy evidence we have at 
present, it seems that there will be many types of state which could 
underly' say, believing that p. In short, a type-type state identity 
theory looks very implausible. *f we were going for an identity theory, 
and attempting to express it in terms of states (this may well not be a 
good rnove- an event identity theory might be a better bet, but it is 
states and properties with which I am concerned in the present discussion), 
we would do better to attempt a token-token state identity theory.
According to this, a .particular token state of Jones - from say t to t+1 
would be identified with a particular instance of his believing that p, 
which took place from t to t+1.
On such a view, we have moved a long way from the initially 
characterised realism about belief ascriptions; we have a multitude of token 
physical states, explaining the truth of conditionals concerning behaviour, 
in virtue of which 'Jones believes that p' can be true; also, given the 
variety of brain constitution, etc. from one individual to another, a token 
state of Jones when he believes that p need resemble not at all the token 
state of Smith when he believes that p. We would seem to have lost any,. - 
way of accounting for what is common to Jones and Smith when they both believe 
that p, or what is common to Jones at t, and at t+1 should he both believe 
that p at t and at t+1.
All this, of course, is only if one insists on a psycho-physical 
identity theory, as Armstrong would seek to do. One might instead, insist 
that mental properties and states could not be identified with physical 
states in any fashion. A dualist might allow that therpossession of mental 
properties was supervenient upon the possession of physical properties, but 
maintain the distinctness of the kinds of properties. (lunderstand the 
term 'supervenient' in a standard ways if p type properties are supervenient 
upon q type properties, then if two objects do not diverge in respect of 
their q properties, then they cannot diverge with respect to their p
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properties; if two objects differ in their p properties, then they must 
diverge in respect of their q properties. The modal force of 'cannot' 
and 'must' will depend on the area of theory to which the notion of 
supervenience is being applied. In meta-ethics, for instance it has 
sometimes been thoughtof as a metaphysical or even logical necessity, 
whilst in philosophical psychology, it is arguably a weaker modality that 
is concerned, where the necessity would be 'nomological' or 'physical'^). 
Such a dualist, then, might still hold that there was a type of mental 
state common to all those times when Jones believed that p, and that there 
was a type of mental state common to Jones and Smith when they both 
believed that p. Such a mental state need not be thought by the dualist 
to be a conscious state.
The dualist's reasons for holding such a realism, if derived from 
alleged introspective access to belief states, do not convince, as I have 
already argued. His reasons may rather derive from a consideration of 
the conditionals governing the behaviour of the believer. If so, I now 
argue that such reasons will not be good reasons. Armstrong is well aware 
of the differences between dispositional properties such as solu bility or 
brittleness, and the property of believing that p, even if the latter is in 
some sense a dispositional property. There is, for example, only one type 
of manifestation of brittleness - the cracking or breaking of the material 
concerned. There is only one type of manifestation of solu bility - the 
dissolving of the material in the appropriate solvent. But given the kind 
of antecedent which might be specified in a conditional which is supposed 
to be true of Jones when he believes that p, virtually any kind of behaviour 
may figure in the consequent; virtually any kind of behaviour can manifest 
a particular belief. The only unifying factor of a set of actual and/or 
possible manifestations of a belief that p, is that they do manifest the 
belief that p. Armstrong would want to identify the belief that p with 
the state which underlies these manifestations. He thinks it is possible
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for there to be first person access to the occurrent state underlying the
i
disposition, even if that occurrent state is not a conscious state. But 
ve have found no compelling reasons to postulate such a state, and some 
objections to such a postulation.
So far I have focussed on the word 'state' as it appears in the 
characterisation of belief that p as an attitude of an individual towards 
the proposition that p - viz. some kind of state of the individual believer 
to which he has introspective access and for the existence of which he is 
the best authority. There is also, however, the question of the 
'propositional content' of the belief; the view that beliefs have specific 
contents. I now turn to a discussion of thi3, and argue that there is no 
clear sense in which a belief ean have a specific propositional content.
In Armstrong, this issue comes up in the form of a discussion about 
the beliefs of creatures without language. If someone thinks that beliefs 
do have a specific content then they clearly require an account of the 
content of beliefs of creatures who lack language. I first develop the 
matter in my own way, before turning to the way in which Armstrong seeks 
to solve the difficulty.
Suppose we wish to report de dicto (see the discussion of the last 
chapter) the beliefs of a dog. We say, for example, that the dog believes 
that the X is ®. If we construe this report on a reasonably close analogy 
with our de dicto reports of what a person with a language believes, it 
suggests that we believe that the 'propositional content' of the dog's 
belief is that the X is @; we make no reference to any part of the world 
external to the dog, as we believe that world to be. An initial problem 
is immediately evident; whenreporting a person's beliefs de dicto, we 
assume, or even make explicit if necessary, that the propositional con­
tent of that person's belief is that which would be expressed by a form 
of words that-the believer would accept as an expression of his belief.
In -the case of the dog, we are going to have to make a lame remark to the
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effect that if our de dicto report of what the dog believes is 'correct', 
then if it had been the case that the dog understood language, it would 
have accepted, for example, 'The I is @' as an adequate expression of 
what it believes. And things get worse, when we reflect, as indeed 
Armstrong does, that a necessary condition of understanding 'The X is ©' 
is the possession of the concept of X, and of O.
Armstrong's examples might help at this point. (l) A dog digs 
frantically at the place where he buried a bone; we consider whether it 
is appropriate to report the dog de dicto as believing that he has a bone 
buried there* (2) The dog rushes to the door on hearing the master's 
voice; we consider whether it is appropriate to report the dog de dicto 
as believing that [kis master is at the doo;q I would agree with Armstrong 
though some would not, that the dog lacks our concepts of burying, bone, 
his master, and the door, even though I am not entirely clear about the 
notion of 'having a concept', and must rely on an intuitive understanding 
of it. So our de dicto report of the dog's belief how includes the curious 
counterfactual - had the dog understood language and possessed concepts 
which it in fact lacks, it would have accepted 'The X is @' as an 
expression of its belief. We might well now begin to wonder what the force 
might be of insisting that the content of the dog's belief is that the X is 
©.
Armstrong’s way out is that 'in saying that the dog believes that his 
master is at the door, we are, or we should be, attributing to the dog a 
belief whose exact content we do not know, but which can be obtained by
substituting salva veritate in the proposition 'That his master is at the
7
door' . The implication is that there could be an accurate and correct 
de dicto report of what the dog believes, only we do not at present know 
what this is. Further scientific investigation may possibly reveal it.
The belief report that we do make about the dog, according to Armstrong, is 
'de re' or 'transparent' - I use scare quotes since I do not use these
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expressions in quite the same way as Armstrong.
g
S. P. Stich in criticising this move of Armstrong claims that, in 
effect, a belief report of the general sentential form 'Jones believes 
that the X is ©' does not possess, as a possible truth condition, the 
'de re' condition that Armstrong suggests. Quine's criterion for 
transparent or de re belief reports, rightly or wrongly is the possibility 
of substituting co-referring expressions for X salva veritate. But 
Armstrong's criterion for his 'de re' truth condition is the possibility 
of substituting for virtually anything in the belief report sentence salva 
veritate, including predicates. On Stich's view, if we take Armstrong's 
*de re' truth condition of the belief report 'Jones believes that the 
department chairman is going to audit his class' together with (x) (x is 
going to audit Jones class s x has witnessed the birth of a giant panda in 
captivity), we can, by substitution, arrive at 'Jones believes that the 
department chairman has witnessed the birth of a giant panda in captivity'• 
Needless to say, this is an unfortunate consequence, and suggests that 
there is something wrong with Armstrong's notion of a 'de re' belief report. 
* Stich goes on, wrongly in my opinion, to concede to Armstrong that 
though Armstrong's 'de re' truth condition for belief reports is not 
possible in english, Armstrong has the 'right' to introduce such a truth 
condition if he wishes. I am not clear as to the force of 'not possible 
in english', and I suggest that Stich should not have made the concession 
anyway, since it would not be intelligible to have a 'de re' belief report 
truth condition of the kind which Armstrong suggests. The point about der
re belief reports of the orthodox type is that when we, as reporters of 
someone's beliefs, think that their belief is about or of a certain 
individual, we may choose to report their belief in such a way that we 
refer to the individual in question with an expression which we believe to 
denote that individual, whether or not the person whose belief we are ‘ 
reporting thinks that the expression we use denotes the individual they
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take themselves to have a belief about* Now suppose that we wished to 
extend the idea of a de re truth condition to properties as well as to 
individuals. Imagine* for example* that we think that Jones has a 
belief which is about or of a certain individual, N* and about or of a 
certain property, ©ness. Thi3 requires, not only the intelligibility of 
supposing that there are individuals in the external world whether or 
not, and however they are referred to - a straight-forward and 
uncontentious assumption, but also the intelligibility of supposing that 
there are certain properties in the world however they are picked out by 
speakers, and even if they are not picked out at all* Depending on 
precisely how this thesis is expressed, it may well prove controversial 
in some quarters; but let us, for the sake of discussion, make this 
assumption also* So, in our extended de re report of Jones belief, we 
attempt to put not only X, but also ©ness outside the scope of the belief 
construction, with a result that would go roughly as follows* There is an 
individual, X, and a property, ©ness, of whom, or about whom, and of which 
or about which Jones believes that it has that property. In this extended 
de re report, as in the more orthodox type, we need not take into account 
the way Jones would refer to the individual he takes his belief to be about. 
Furthermore, we need not, it may be supposed, take into account the 
particular predicate Jones would employ to ascribe the property he believes 
an individual to possess*
Now my objection to Armstrong's 'de re' belief report, and a fortiori 
to Stich's concession, is that even if we can imagine a kind of extended de 
re belief reporting in which we had freedom in the way we referred to the 
property concerned in the belief - a freedom which escaped the authority 
of the believer himself, and which allowed certain predicate substitutions 
salva veritate, this freedom could never extend to the permissability of 
the substitution of predicates which were merely extensionally equivalent, 
as in Stich's example, where is going to audit the class* and 'has
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witnessed the birth of a giant panda in captivity' were regarded as 
interchangeable. Such freedom is not consistent with our understanding 
of what it is to report someone's belief.
If we were trying to extend de re belief reporting to properties, 
the least we could do would be to use an expression which we believed 
picked out the same property as the one with which the believer was 
concerned. Thus, imagine that Jones believes de dicto that Susan's 
eyes are the colour of the sky; we believe that there is such a person
as Susan and that she is the neighbour's daughter; in an orthodox de re
belief report we could say that Jones believes that the neighbour'3 daughter's 
eyes are the colour of the sky. Suppose we also believe that, in this
world at least, 'is the colour the sky', ascribes the same property as
'- is blue'; then, in our extended de re belief reporting of Jones belief, 
we might say that Jones believes that the neighbour's daughter's eyes are blue 
It is this kind of extension to de re belief reporting that Armstrong 
could have suggested. It would require,of course, a satisfactory criterion 
of property identity - a criterion for telling when two verbally distinct 
predicates ascribe the same property to an individual. Suppose, at least, 
for the sake of argument, that such an extension is legitimate, and we 
could use it to report not only the beliefs of dogs, but the beliefs of 
creatures without language in general. Would not the intelligibility of 
such an extension still depend ultimately on the possibility of there being 
a true de dicto report of the creature's belief, even if we, the reporters, 
do not know what it is? I would have thought that it did.
We are still faced, then, with the problem of in what the content of 
a belief which would figure in a de dicto report, would consist, when 
considering the case of creatures without language. It might be suggested 
that a language C could be developed in which the (say) canine concepts of 
master, door, bone, etc. were expressed, so that when we said - had the dog 
had a mastery of C, he would have expressed his belief in such and such a
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way, this would give us an account of the content of the dog's belief.
For, the suggestion might continue, the counterfactual's antecedent is 
now no longer bizarre, as was the previous counterfactual considered above, 
which involved us in considering what would have been the case had the dog 
understood a human language. We now do not have to imagine the dog 
transformed, in those seemingly impossible ways required for the dog to 
master a human language; the hypothesis is merely that the dog articulates 
in some primitive linguistic fashion, concepts it already possesses.
But even if we could make sense of all this, it only puts the problem
back a stage. We now have the problem of saying in our language what the
dog language expresses; the content of our de dicto report must be able
to reflect in some fashion what the dog would want to 'say'. / We would
need to be able to say in our language what concepts were had by the dog.
Wow we can bring off such a feat fairly easily when the cases of the
'simplest' concepts are concerned, whose application may be demonstrated
ostensively - e.g. colour and shape concepts, and the like. But when we
shift no further than to the concept of a persisting individual, it is very
difficult to see what it would mean for someone to insist that creatures
without language definitely could possess such a concept and that they would
have expressed that concept in their own special language had they possessed
it. Any behaviour that they might manifest towards, for instance, 'Quine's
rabbit', could be seen as manifesting a 'concept' of an individual
persisting rabbit, a 'concept' of rabbit states that belong together, a
9'concept' of rabbithood that manifests itself spatio-temporally, etc.
An insistance that such find such a languageless creature possesses a concept 
of an individual persisting rabbit as opposed, for example, to the possession 
of a concept of rabbit states that belong together, and hence that had that 
creature had its own language it would have expressed such and such a belief 
in words involving the concept of an individual persisting rabbit, seems to 
have no possible foundation. There seems to be nothing about the creature
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in virtue of which one concept attribution would be correct, and another 
not. I conclude in general that there are peculiar difficulties attaching 
to the thought that the beliefs of languageless creatures can have a specific 
conent which could be embodied in a de dicto report of such beliefs. Unless 
we take the view that languageless creatures do not have full fledged beliefs 
(and I do not take this view), this result poses a threat for the general 
thesis that beliefs have a specific content of a kind which can be captured in 
de dicto belief reports.
I turn now to arguments against the idea that there are individual 
belief states with specific contents which derive from Quine’s work on 
indeterminacy and holism. Suppose that the following de dicto belief 
report about Philip is 'true'; 'Philip believes that the liberal candidate 
will be elected*. Philip believes that there is a certain individual who 
is a liberal candidate and who will be elected. Now in order that Philip 
believe that a certain individual exists, he must believe, among other 
things, that there is someone who is uniquely p, where p is a property, 
p cannot be a purely qualitative property, otherwise it will not 
individuate the individual as far as Philip is concerned. For Philip to 
believe that the certain individual is the one and only one that is p, he 
must (in many cases tacitly) believe that embedded in p is a reference to an 
item to which he, Philip is uniquely related. This relationship may consist 
in the item's spatio-temporal relationship to Philip and/or it may involve 
Philip's perceptions and memories. So Philip must believe a number of 
other things in order for him to have the particular belief about the liberal 
candidate. It would be unintelligible to report Philip as having this 
belief, and not as having any other beliefs. The individual beliefs 
cannot 'exist' in isolation from other beliefs. Just how many other 
beliefs are required is not a question that has a clear answer. Philip's 
beliefs, like everyone elses, come in clusters which are interconnected and 
depend on each other, either logically or in 'weaker' relations such as
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the inductive relation between evidence and conclusion« Even if Philip 
has a general belief about a liberal candidate, and not a belief that there 
is a certain individual who is the liberal candidate and who will be elected 
- the general belief being - if there is a liberal candidate then he, 
whoever he is, will be elected, such a belief still could not (logically) 
be held in isolation. Philip still requires other beliefs which secure, 
so far as he is concerned, at least, the uniqueness of a constituency for 
which there might be liberal candidates at all. Furthermore, he must have 
beliefs about what elections are and about what it is to be a candidate, 
what it is to be an M.P. and so on. Another examples general beliefs of 
the kind which might figure in high level laws of physics make no reference, 
it is often said, to particular individuals. But even if this is true, it 
is also true (we are told, with great frequency) that parts of theories are 
inextricably interconnected with other parts; it would be impossible to 
believe in a certain part of a theory without having at least some beliefs 
about other parts of the theory.
We may refer here to the distinction between epistemological and 
ontological holism. It is an ontological holism for which I am arguing 
in the case of belief; epistemological holism for beliefs would merely say 
that we could not know that, say, Jones believed that p independently of 
knowing whether Jones also had all sorts of other beliefs. Whereas I am 
saying that we cannot isolate the content of any one belief and even think 
of it separately from the content of other beliefs. Were there specific 
states corresponding to each belief with such and such a content, this 
would not then be so; one would then have been able to imagine a cluster 
of beliefs as being composed, as it were, of its atomic elements - the 
individual beliefs each with their specific contents. The version of 
holism to which I suscribe appears to indicate that talk of single beliefs 
is a loose way of capturing something about a person - I will say a little 
more about this shortly.
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Some philosophers might be disposed to realism about individual belief 
ascriptions on the ground that it is reasonable to ascribe to, say Jones,
A
a belief that p if he says that p in 'normal' circumstances - 'normal' meaning 
not in the course of acting a play - not in a situation where lying.might be 
expected, etc. There might be problems here in the way of explaining 
'normal' satisfactorily, but let us kccept this ground for belief ascriptions 
for the sake of argument. Niow, I think that holism which focusses on the 
connections between beliefs about matters of fact, and beliefs about the 
meaning of sentences, can provide an argument against realism about 
individual belief ascriptions held on the above grounds.
The well-worn point here is that when we attribute a belief to a 
speaker on the grounds that he has uttered such and such a sentence, we 
must at the same time be attributing to him beliefs about the meaning of the 
sentences he uses, among other things. If Jones says 'There is a mountain 
in the dining room', this could be seen as a symptom of (l) a belief that 
there was a chair (say) in the dining room, plus a mistaken belief about 
the meaning of the word 'mountain', (2) a belief that there is a mountain 
in the dining room, plus mistaken beliefs about the characteristics of 
mountains - perhaps Jones has never seen a real mountain, and does not 
realize that their size would normally preclude his belief being true. 
Evidently there are further possibilities. In order for Jones' saying 
that p to manifest Jones' belief that p, Jones must have other beliefs too - 
it would be unintelligible to insist that Jones saying that p could manifest 
his belief that p 'on its own'.
An indirect route to realism for individual belief ascriptions could 
be had, it might be argued, via the notion of intention^. The first move 
would be to claim that realism for individual ascriptions of intention is 
certainly true. If Jones intends to unlock the front door there is some 
type of state, it might be thought, of Jones in virtue of which 'Jones intends 
to unlock the front door' is true, and in virtue of which 'Jones does not
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intend to unlock the front door' is false. Now if, so the argument 
continues, Jones performs action A with intention I, then we can conclude 
that he must have such and such a belief about how he is to achieve what 
he intends. The plausibility of this may seem to be increased when .we 
reflect that our knowledge of our intentions can be immediate, unlike our 
knowledge of our beliefs. I can know immediately that I intend to shoot 
Jones; I do not have to become aware of this in virtue of becoming aware of 
any kind of inner feeling or state which is distinct from the intention.
If I point the gun, press the trigger, and shoot Jones, and I have the 
intention of killing Jones, then, so the argument goes, I must believe that 
pointing the gun and pressing the trigger is very likely to effect Jones' 
death.
My objection to this line of argument is to the presence of the word 
•must'. If it is insisted upon in all cases, it appears to rule out the 
possibility of certain kinds of irrational actions. For example, imagine 
that I intend to unlock the front door. I take out the back door key and 
attempt to unlock it. A natural inference on the part of someone trying to 
understand me, is that I believe that the back door key is the front door 
key, or that the back door key unlocks both doors, etc. But whilst this is, 
a natural inference it does not have to be 'correct'. I might just be 
behaving stupidly - I might be drunk or tired. It is true that drunkeness 
or fatigue might induce within me some very strange beliefs, so that I 
believe temporarily that the back door key is the front door key, or whatever. 
But equally, it might not; it might not change my beliefs, but merely cause 
me to behave in a confused and muddled fashion. I would have standard 
beliefs about the key - namely - I believe that it is the back door key, 
that it unlocks the back door and not the front - yet I intend to unlock 
the front door with it. The confusion or muddleconsists in an incongruity 
of belief vis-a-vis intention. This incongruity could go even further.
I might not even believe that the object I have in my hand is a key, and 
yet still intend to unlock the front door with it. A very peculiar, and
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highly unlikely state of mind, we would all agree, but not, I think, to 
be ruled out a priori*
The phenomenon might be compared with the possession of incompatible 
beliefs. I can believe both p and not p - though once I consciously 
appreciate my position, I will rapidly give up one, or both beliefs. The 
relinquishing of the belief or beliefs need not be an instantaneous process, 
however, especially if I am very tired, drunk, emotionally disturbed, or 
whatever. Similarly, if I am able to dwell consciously and rationally 
upon such an incongruity as the above example envisages between belief and 
intention, I will relinquish either belief, or intention, or both. But 
in situations of fatigue, (etc.) I am not in a position to 'dwell 
consciously and rationally' on my situation.
Hence, whilst there is, of course, an intimate connection between 
intentions and certain kinds of belief, the connection is not so intimate 
as to prevent me from having on occasion crazy intentions, given the beliefs 
I also have. In short, there is no easy route from action and intention to 
an individual belief ascription which would support the position of the 
realist about individual belief ascriptions.
I end this section with one or two remarks concerning my own under­
standing of belief ascriptions* The ascription of a belief to an animal, 
for instance, is coarse grained. It labels, very crudely, an element in 
our explanation (in the case of animals, mainly explanation at the first 
level - see Chapter 3); it did such and such an action; it had such and 
such a purpose or intention; we say it believed such and such, since 
believing such and such, with that intention, explains its action at the 
first level* For instance, consider the dogs' action of removing the 
contents of the bag and eating them. We consider that the dog's dominant 
intention was to get something to eat; hence we say it believed that there 
was something to eat in the bag, since this, together with the intention, 
explains the dog's action at the first level. There is a blank space in
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the first level explanation of the dog's removal of the content of the bag, 
etc. Once we have assigned a dominant intention to the dog, we fill the 
blank space when we ascribe a belief to the dog, but there is no precise 
or determinate type of state of the dog in virtue of which this particular 
individual belief ascription is true,
I take a broadly similar view of belief ascriptions to persons. To 
say that 'Jones believes that p’ is to make a less than precise gesture at 
whatever it is about Jones that (a) together with his intentions explains 
at the first level his actions,and (b) explains at the second level his 
actions, which will involve accounting for his having the intentions which 
he in fact has. But the expression 'whatever it is about Jones' does not 
refer to a specific state of Jones corresponding to his belief that p; it 
refers, if at all, to Jones total doxastic state (which cannot be viewed as 
a set of all the individual types of belief states which go with Jones' 
individual beliefs, since there are no such things a3 these individual types 
of belief states). This total sfete, together with his intentions, explains 
Jones actions at the first level and may also help to explain at the second 
level too.
Indeterminacy reigns, in my view, in the following way. There is no 
one correct answer to the question 'What does Jones believe at time t'?
Ve can say, for instance, that he believes that p at t, if we can put this 
together with other beliefs we ascribe to him, and add his beliefs to his 
intentions, to provide an appropriate first level explanation of his action. 
Jones can do no more than this himself, except in the sense that he may 
have access to certain data not available to U3 unless he tells us. He 
may, for instance, feel he knows that p - he may feel inclined to assent to 
the proposition that p - he may feel disposed to aay sincerely that p, etc. 
There may be more than one possible explanation of Jones action that is 
plausible, covers all the data, and so on. It may be that according to a 
second explanation, it is not the case that Jones believes that p at t.
There is an important dispositional element in our ascription to Jones
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of the belief that p. This consists of an indeterminate collection of 
conditionals of the kind sketched earlier in the discussion of dispositional 
accounts of beliefs such as Armstrong's. Thus, if we tell someone that 
Jones believes that p, we are giving them some guide as to the behaviour 
they may expect from Jones. But it is only a guide at all if that someone 
has a fair idea of what else Jones believes, and what his intentions are.
The conditionals are true-of Jones in virtue, perhaps of his total doxastic 
state; the more central members of the set of conditionals (though no 
members are essential) concerning themselves with Jones saying that p in 
certain circumstances, assenting inwardly to p, etc. So, on many occasions 
when Jones is inwardly inclined to assent that p, then, on the present theory, 
it will be appropriate for him to claim to believe that p, and it will be 
appropriate for an interpreter, if he becomes convinced that Jones inwardly 
assents to p, to ascribe to Jones the belief that p.
The loose dispositional theory of belief ascription I have just sketched 
seems to me to allow for the possibility of inexpressible beliefs in a way 
that the realist theories I have attacked on philosophical grounds do not.
The loose theory does not imply that there is a special type of state to go 
with a belief that p; it does not imply, therefore, that, say Jones, when 
he believes that p, must have access in principle to a certain state of his - 
a state which is the having of an attitude to a certain proposition - with 
all the problems this involves if Jones' belief is then claimed to be 
inexpressible. The loose theory allows that feelings of conviction, etc. 
may be relevant to whether Jones believes that p, but asserts that it is 
not essential that, even in principle, the believer should be able to have 
such feelings•
According to the loose theory, some sets of conditionals concerning 
(say) Jones' behaviour are 'amenable' to the characterisation 'manifestation 
of Jones belief that p', where p may be expressed in some form of words.
On such a theory, there seems to be no reason to deny that other sets of
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conditionals concerning behaviour are also amenable to the characterisation 
- 'manifestation of Jones belief that ' where the belief cannot be 
expressed verbally. There must, of course, be something common to those 
sets of conditionals which manifest expressible beliefs, and those which 
manifest inexpressible beliefs, for us to be prepared to talk of belief 
at all in the second case. What is common? Each set of conditionals is 
true of Jones, we may suppose, in virtue of his total state at the time 
concerned. Whatever it is about Jones which grounds each set of conditionals 
has roughly the same role in the first level and second level explanation of 
Jones actions, whether expressible or inexpressible beliefs are involved.
We thus have a species of a functional theory of belief.
3. INEXPRESSIBLE BELIEFS
In the light of the view of belief so far outlined, I want now to 
say a little more about how it might be that Theist A could see Theist B 
as having an inexpressible belief. A move that a Christian Theist (and 
possibly, other varieties of Theist also) might be inclined to make is this. 
Inexpressible beliefs can be communicated through the medium of behaviour.
A very saintly person for example, who had very rich and detailed beliefs 
about God might be able to convey some of what he believes through his 
loving actions towards his fellow human beings.
An initial objection to such a move might be that we are simply 
imagining a special kind of language that might develop within a community 
of Theists; language whose components were elements of non-verbal 
behaviour rather than verbal behaviour. But I would not accept this 
objection. All forms of language are to some degree intentional. We 
choose to use actions of certain types with,,or without, but mostly with, 
the assumption of an agreed set of conventions employed by our community, 
to perform that large array of speech acts with which all language users 
are familiar.. A wide variety of linguistic devices are possible - we 
don’t have to make sounds with our mouths - we could use a gesture system,
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etc. And it is also arguable that language - the system of actions that 
it involves, requires that such actions are performed with special kinds 
of communication-intentions, and of course, Grice, has so argued. How 
whilst the behaviour which the Theist might claim can communicate to. someone 
else the fact that I have an inexpressible belief, and something of the 
nature of this belief, will be intentional, in the sense that it will 
consist of genuine actions on my part, such behaviour need not be of a 
kind about which I can form communication-intentions.
It may also be objected that there is a lack of precision in the 
description of the behaviour that is supposed to be able to communicate 
to another, inexpressible beliefs. A description such as ‘loving actions' 
covers a vast range of possibilities. How could it be that 'specific 
propositions' were conveyed from one individual to another, as opposed 
say to some vague and generalised manifestation of trust in a loving deity? 
But such an objection fails to understand the role of behaviour, say on the 
part of Theist A, as data on which Theist B can build an interpretation of 
what Theist A believes, etc. A particular action which is not involved 
. in a language system, unlike a particular utterance, is unlikely be itself 
to indicate the presence of a 'particular belief' (understanding the latter 
expression, of course in a loose and not realistic fashion). It is rather 
that that action, set in the context of the rest of the agent's behaviour, 
and his circumstances as the interpreter believes them to be may prove 
suggestive.
Now imagine that we see someone treating every person that he meets 
with the most extraordinary charity and kindness. He excels in this 
especially, perhaps, when he has been praying to God, or when he has been 
recently present at an act of worship. He tells us that his widest 
intention, in each of those actions in which he serves his fellow human 
beings, is to serve God. On this ground we proceed to ascribe to him such 
an intention. We now have actions, and a widest intention; we seek to
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supply a missing element in the explanation of his behaviour by ascribing 
beliefs to him.
Supplying the missing element is a complex process inasmuch as we 
require something which will play appropriate role3 in both first and 
second level explanation of our saintly individual's actions. I want to 
suggest that it is especially in the second level explanation, where the 
presence of the saintly individual's extraordinary intentions is accounted 
for, that the question of inexpressible beliefs will arise. For the actions 
to be understandable at the second level, our saint needs to believe that 
God is unsurpassable. This cannot consist merely in a belief in the 
abstract proposition that God is unsurpassable, but will require beliefs 
concerning God's intrinsic nature in virtue of which he is unsurpassable.
One adequate second level explanation would bring in the saintly 
individual's emotional responses, which would generate B-wants to perform 
those loving actions concerning which he forms his intentions. A complete 
version of such a second level explanation would include what the saint 
believes about God which gives rise to his emotional response; and possibly 
only the inclusion of some inexpressible beliefs about God can account fully 
for the emotional response concerned.
The saint might act in 'cold blood'; if so, we would have to look to 
second level explanation of another kind. Perhaps the saint decides, all 
things considered that he ought to perform loving actions with the intention 
of serving God. His reasons for forming the intentions to act are the 
reasons for his thinking that he ought to perform the actions in question. 
These reasons will consist at least in part of beliefs about God's intrinsic 
nature. We may find, as interpreters, that a second level explanation 
which only includes those reasons had by the saint which consist of 
expressible beliefs would be less than complete; that it is only if the 
saint is ascribed extra beliefs about God which cannot be expressed that the 
explanation is completed. There is no way of being more precise about this,
1.
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since, as we saw in the earlier discussion of second level explanation 
in Chapter 3, such explanations do not seem susceptible of regimentation 
in any neat philosophical theory.
We have not exhausted the range of possible 'cold blood' explanations 
at the second level. The agent might not think that performing all the 
loving actions was what he ought to do, all things considered. He might 
think, rather, that such actions would be good, and that he would be acting 
supererogatorily if he did them. He would have reasons for thinking the 
actions would be good; these reasons would account for his forming the 
intention to perform these acts of supererogation, with the widest intention 
of serving God. These reasons would include beliefs about God's intrinsic 
nature, and for a full second level explanation, the 'missing belief element' 
might have to extend beyond merely expressible beliefs.
To sum up, the idea is that the saint may have inexpressible beliefs 
about God which could come across to us, his interpreters, through his 
behaviour, with the aid of which we might achieve a full first and second 
level understanding of his actions. It is arguable that his beliefs could 
not be communicated to us in this way unless we also had beliefs about the 
nature of an unsurpassable being; that we could not, without these, perform 
an extended application of a 'principle of humanity' that seems to be 
required here when we strive for understanding at the second level. That 
is to say, without ourselves believing certain things about an unsurpassable 
being, we could not as it were put ourselves in the saint's place, and 
imagine what we would 'need to believe' to form the intentions to act as 
he does. I take this thought no further in the present work.
All that has been sketched in this section is a mere possibility. I would 
not care even to attempt to show that it actually happens. But if indeed it is 
a possibility, we have what we may well require for the possibility of 
community worship of an unsurpassable being - the possibility of inexpressible 
belief, and the possibility that one member of a community could reasonably
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understand another member as having such a belief.
4. INCOMPREHENSIBLE BELIEF
To understand something is to have achieved something; but it is not 
obvious that there is something common to the achievements involved in, 
for instance, understanding a sentence of a foreign language, understanding 
a person and his actions, understanding the nature of volcanoes, or 
understanding such and such a mathematical system. This point should 
make us alive to the importance of grasping the nature of the understanding 
failure that apparently arises in the case of an epistemologically 
transcendent God.
I cannot believe that p when I cannot understand what it is that I am 
supposed to be believing. This is a plausible claim, but we must grasp 
the nature of my understanding failure. This situation will arise, for 
instance, when I cannot understand the sentence or sentences which 
purportedly have the sense that p, or express the proposition that p.
We can perhaps distinguish here between my failure to understand a given 
string of words inasmuch as it does not even seem to make up a sentence 
which has meaning as a sentence type, and my failure to understand the 
sense or proposition expressed by an utterance of a sentence of whose 
meaning qua sentence type I seem to have some grasp. In the former 
category we could cite instances such as 'The cook that the maid that the 
nurse met saw heard the butler'^. Here, the string of words does in 
fact make up a meaningful type of sentence, but many of us, at least, find 
this difficult to grasp. As far as we are concerned, the string of words 
do not make up a sentence whose meaning qua sentence type we understand.
(A standard characterisation of the meaning of a sentence type would be 
that which is common to it and its translation into a foreign language).
In the second category we have sentences upon the meaning of whose 
sentence types we seemingly have some grip, but where we cannot grasp the 
sense or proposition expressed - or, to put the matter rather paradoxically 
but in some ways more illuminatingly, we have sufficient grasp of the putative
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sense to appreciate that there could not in principle be a truth condition 
for the sentence. Examples are obvious - 'I was born before my grandfather*. 
'The chair is red and green all over*. *1 am the barber who shaves all the 
barbers who don't shave themselves, and I shave myself'.
It is not clear to me, however, that we can draw a hard and fast line 
between the two categories. There is a substantial class of examples 
which might be argued to fall into either category. For instance,
'Colourless green ideas deep furiously'. 'The moon's father washes
adjectives’, 'The music is hygroscopic'. We could think of these on the
one hand, as strings of words which have clear meanings qua sentence types, 
but also such that, if used in a speech act, we would have no ultimate 
grasp of the sense or proposition expressed - no grasp of the truth condition 
for the sentence as used in that utterance. Or, on the other hand, we 
could quite reasonably think of them as strings of words which just do not 
make up sentences which have meanings qua sentence types at all.
It may well be thought that it is the incomprehensibility manifested 
by examples of either of the above categories - most probably of the second 
category, which arises from God's epistemological ttranscendence. We have, 
it may be thought,strings of words purportedly concerning God, which get as 
far as making up sentence types with a meaning of sorts, but which cannot 
be imagined to express an intelligible sense or proposition; we cannot 
grasp the condition which would make such sentences true as used in 
utterances by Theists. In particular, the line of thought continues, we do 
not understand the truth condition for 'God is transcendently good'; our 
failure to understand resembles our failure to understand, for instance 
'I was bora before my grandfather'. The Theist would say, it might be 
claimed, that whilst our position with respect to 'I was bora before my 
grandfather' is epistemologically similar to our position with respect to 
'God is transcendently good', the latter ultimately expresses a sense or 
proposition - there is a truth condition for it - whilst the former lacks
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these assets.
I now argue that the Theist cannot embrace this kind of incomprehensi­
bility as being involved in the conclusion of the unsurpassability argument, 
in so far as the Theist is required to believe things about God even where 
these touch on aspects of God which he cannot understand. I try to show
in particular that our failure to understand 'God is transcendently good' 
is not in fact entirely of this kind.
I just cannot imagine what it would be like to believe - even to think 
I believed, that I was b o m  at a time before my grandfather. Nor can I 
conceive of a situation in which I would interpret someone else as having 
such a belief. A weli-wora move at this point is to claim that I can at 
least have a second-order belief; the belief that 'I was b o m  at a time 
before my grandfather' expresses a true proposition; the same trick can 
allegedly be turned in regard to third person belief ascriptions; if 
Jone3 says, with evident sincerity and being apparently of sound mind, etc.
'I was b o m  at a time befo're my grandfather' then I might say that Jones 
believes that he was born at a time before his grandfather. Since I, the 
reporter of Jones belief, have no real idea of the de dicto content of 
Jones belief, all. I can mean in such a context is something like the 
followings Jones has a certain belief whose de dicto content can be 
expressed by the sentence (in his mouth) 'I was born at a time before my 
grandfather'.
Nowl think that there are plausible cases of such second order belief; 
they are cases of believing on authority; I will explain what in my view 
these cases amount to, and then show that those beliefs without tinderstanding 
which may be required of the Theist whose God is epistemologically 
transcendent cannot be of this kind. A mathematician may tell me a 
theorem proved by Godel. I may well fail to understand what he says.
But I might have good reason to think that he is talking sense, and has 
expressed a coherent and important proposition with the sentence he has
187
communicated to me. My belief 'in what he said' may be strong enough to 
encourage me to repeat the sentence to someone else who might ask me, for 
reasons best knownto themselves, whether I know anything proved by Godel.
It seems fairly clear that I cannot believe the proposition which the 
mathematician believes, and communicates to me. I believe, rather, that 
instances of the sentence type in question may be used to express a 
certain true mathematical proposition. Of course, there is room for 
degrees of understanding here. Even in the case as described it is not 
just a pure second order belief that such and such a string of symbols may 
be used to express a truth. I would also believe that it is a mathematical 
truth - I may have some understanding of individual symbols in the sentence - 
perhaps enough understanding to enable me to use the symbols myself in other 
sentences, etc. The more understanding I have of this kind, the more the 
second order belief would be supplemented by a belief about the kind of 
proposition that might be involved. In the most extreme cases, where there 
is very little more than the second order belief alon£, the authority is 
essential. Evidently, the Theist may have beliefs of this kind - he may 
believe, on the authority of the church and/or the authority of someone 
whom he believes to have had significant religious experiences, or on the 
basis of some other kind of authority, that certain sentences can express 
truths. If the sentences are very 'difficult' indeed, the status and 
character of the authority is crucial; the Theist in the most extreme case 
might be able to glean virtually nothing of the subject matter of the 
proposition concerned from the words of the sentence; the authority informs 
him that the proposition is about God, that it is 'important', and so on.
The authority narrows the range of the subject matter of the Theist's 
second order belief - otherwise the Theist may have no idea of what kind of 
proposition is involved. It is vital to the Theist who has this kind of 
second order belief on authority, that the ultimate source of his authority 
has a good grip on what proposition it is that the sentence expresses.
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Indeed, unless it seemed possible that from time to time individual Theists, 
at least, could go beyond the mere second-order belief to some understanding 
of what proposition is involved, the whole proceeding would seem entirely 
pointless. Those Theists who had to believe on authority would be unable 
to see the importance of so doing, unless they thought that the ‘authority' 
ultimately had a direct access to the proposition itself. In the most 
extreme case that we can imagine, God himself might cause a CRB to believe 
that such and such a string of words formed a sentence which could express 
a crucial proposition about God, where the CRB in question did not under­
stand what possible truth condition an utterance of the supposed sentence 
could have. But if all CRB's were barred from comprehending the supposed 
sentence, the putative revelation would seem pointless, and not one that an 
all-wise Deity would attempt.
I conclude that the incomprehensibility involved in God's 
epistemological transcendence cannot be wholly of the type to be found 
either in the first or second category discussed above, and that this 
conclusion cannot be evaded by resorting to ploys concerning second order 
belief. In Chapter 3» in fact, I pointed out that there were two kinds 
of understanding failure involved in the incomprehensibility of God's 
goodness. There was the apparent logical impossibility of God resembling 
both the first Jones and the second Jones at a supreme level when, as an 
unsurpassable being, it seemed that he ought to resemble both in this way. 
And, quite distinct from this, there was the difficulty in understanding at 
the second level all those extreme acts of supererogation of which an 
unsurpassable being should in principle be capable. Row the apparent 
logical impossibility of God resembling both the first Jones and the second 
Jones at a supreme level does, at first sight, resemble uncomfortably closely 
the apparent logical impossibility of my being bora before my grandfather; 
the Theist will have to say, of course, that appearances must be deceptive 
in the former case, and God must ultimately be able somehow to have the
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virtues of both Jones in a way that is logically coherent. This could 
not be the whole story, however, in the light of what has just been argued; 
if it is really true that I just do not know what to believe when I am told 
that God somehow has, at a supreme level, the virtues of both the first and 
the second Jones, in the same sort of way as I do not know what to believe 
when I am told that I was bora before my grandfather, then I am wholly 
incapable of believing either. The assertion by the Theist that there is 
a divine state of affairs ultimately to be had, towards which we are 
gesturing with the apparently contradictory assertion that God resembles 
both the first Jones and the second Jones, but that there is no state of 
affairs which would make 'I was bora before my grandfather’ true just does 
not help. In the former case I do not know what to believe any more than 
I would do in the latter case if someone were trying to convince me that 
there really was a truth condition for 'I was bora before my grandfather.
When we look at the matter more carefully, however, matters are not 
quite as bad as this. The seeming impossibility of God resembling both 
the first Jones and the second Jones at a supreme level, which we dignify 
by saying that 'God is transcendently good' has a number of perfectly 
comprehensible entailments. For instance, it entails that God is very 
good indeed - that God is morally better than any other rational being 
ever has been, ever will be, and so on. The Theist could reasonably 
claim some grasp of a condition in which 'God is very good' say, would be 
true. Perhaps there would be more than one such truth condition. Hence, 
whilst it is true that the Theist does not know fully what to believe when 
he is told that God is transcendently good - viz. that, among other things, 
God resembles to a supreme degree both the first Jones and the second Jones, 
he does know in part what to believe. The type of incomprehensibility 
involved here does not wholly preclude belief.
If, on the other hand, we consider 'I was bora before my grandfather', 
whilst there are some 'degenerate' entailments, these are of no help. For
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instance, it is true that 'Iwas bora' is entailed, together with 'I 
exist', and so forth. But these are of no use to me when I am trying 
to see what it is I am supposed to believe when considering the proposi­
tion that I was b o m  before my grandfather. Knowing that 'God is • 
transcendently good' entails 'God is very good indeed' does, in contrast, 
indicate to some extent, however limited that extent may be, what I am to 
believe when supplied with 'God is transcendently good'.
Let us turn briefly now to the other aspect of understanding failure 
involved in God's transcendent goodness. There was, it will be recalled, 
the difficulty, or impossibility, of understanding at the second level all 
those acts of supererogation of which an unsurpassable being must in 
principle be capable. NdW a failure to understand God's acts of this 
kind is perfectly compatible with believing that God has acted in such and 
such a way; I can believe that an agent has done all sorts of things, and 
yet at the same time possess no second level understanding of these actions. 
In the case of Memault in Camus' 'The Outsider', had I been at the trial,
I would have understood Meursault's action at the first level - I would 
understand, that is to say, that he believed that his gun had such and such 
properties, and that he had formed the intention to shoot the Arab, and had 
indeed shot him. But I would not have understood what, if any reasons he 
had for forming that intention; or, failing reasons, I would not perhaps 
have understood what kind of emotion welled up in Meurjault on the beach 
which included or caused a B-want to shoot the Arab. Nevertheless, I could 
perfectly well have had a fully-fledged belief that Meursault performed the 
act in question.
We have focussed in this section on the incomprehensibility of God's 
goodness; but our results may be applied more generally. We can now see 
how in a profound sense God might be beyond the understanding of CEB's - 
namely his actions in general might be beyond the second level understanding 
of CEB's. But this kind of understanding failure does not preclude belief.
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The Theist can feel reasonably optimistic, then, about the 
possibilities of shared discourse and worship of a transcendent God; we 
have seen that his ineffability and incomprehensibility need not impose 
wholly incapacitating restrictions on the beliefs of CRB's.
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It was argued in the second and third chapters that an unsurpassable 
being would be, to a degree, epistemologically and ontologically 
transcendent. We say in Chapter 1 that such transcendence could not be 
confined to one aspect of the divine nature, and that virtually all aspects 
of the divine nature would be to some extent afflicted by transcendence.
We have seen in particular that a central and crucial property of God, 
namely his goodness, a divine property having strong links with many other 
aspects of the divinity such as personhood, agency, intention, etc. carries 
both types of transcendence.
If we now consider any one simple assertion about God, of the form 
'God is p' in which some non-relational property is attributed to God, we 
must immediately note the following point. ' - is p' will consist of 
some predicate drawn from a CRB language learned in connection with 
created items, and developed in the first place to apply to them; we can 
form sentences in which we ascribe the predicate to a created item, or 
ascribe it to a lesser degree to a created item. For instance, we say 
'God is a person*. We can also say 'Jones is a person*• We say God is 
omniscient'. We can also say (though we are scarcely going to be right) 
'Jones is omniscient'. We can say 'God is omnipotent', and we can 
certainly say 'Jones is very powerful' even if we cannot say, appreciating 
the logical impossibility of two omnipotent beings co-existing - 'Jones is 
omnipotent'.
Now it may well be argued that if the predicate ' - is p' has the same 
meaning in the divine context as it has in a context of created items, then, 
either God is having attributed to him the very same property as could be 
in principle attributed to a created item, or, God is having attributed to 
him a property which could be in principle attributed to a lesser degree to 
a created item. The thought behind this would be that if a predicate has
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the same meaning in one context as in another, then the same property is 
concerned on each occasion. (This leaves open the question of whether 
predicates with different meanings can attribute the same property - a 
matter we need not investigate here).
Yet if we accept the claim that God must be ontologically transcendent, 
then, in a large number of cases, a predicate such as 1 - is p' cannot have 
the function of attributing to God a property which could in principle be 
possessed at the same level, or to a lesser degree, by a created item.
In particular, claims about God's goodness, and associated aspects of his 
personhood, intentions, desires, actions, freedom, and so on cannot involve 
the attribution to God of properties which can be possessed in principle by 
created items either at that level or to a lesser degree. Even if in 
principle there dould be assertions of the form 'God is p' which concern 
divine properties which somehow entirely escape the taint of ontological 
transcendence, it seems doubtful whether CRB's could know which these are.
Hence there will be much language about God in which predicates are 
ascribed to him which, in mundane contexts would attribute properties to 
created items which God cannot as such possess. . For instance, *- is a 
person' will be ascribed to God, but whatever property is attributed to 
Jones in 'Jones is a person' cannot be the very same •property as the one 
attributed to God in 'God is a person'. Furthermore, in many cases the 
CRB will be unable to attain to full knowledge and understanding of what 
property it is that is being attributed to God in an assertion of the form 
'God is p'.
In the light of these remarks, we may now outline two problems, (l)
How is it possible for there to be CRB language about God's nature when 
that differs essentially in some respects from the nature of created items, 
and the predicates of CRB language, if retaining their meaning in divine 
contexts apparently serve to attribute to God properties he cannot fully 
possess? (2) How is it possible for CRB's to understand language about
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God when it is first and foremost language for use in the context of 
created items? These problems are closely related. They might be 
given alternative expression thus: (l) How does language about God 
succeed in meaning what it in fact does mean? (2) How can CEB's undei>- 
stand that meaning which it has? Much of the present chapter will be 
devoted to a suggestion for the solution of the first problem. First 
of all, however, I look briefly at a classic attempt to deal with 
transcendence language - which, though it may appear to be an attempt to 
solve the first problem, in fact turns out to be § possible 'solution' to 
the second problem.
Aquinas' Theory of Analogy
Whilst Aquinas does not see the problem of transcendence in the same 
terms that have been developed in the present work, the task he envisaged 
for his theory of analogy is sufficiently similar to make it worthy of 
consideration in the present context. Aquinas is clear that it is the 
knowledge CRB's have of the creation that provides them (a) with knowledge 
of God - viz. as cause of the creation, and (b) enables them to develop 
language which can be used to talk of God, even though.that language cannot 
express fully the nature of God. He thinks that the language of CEB's 
cannot have the same meaning when applied to God as it has when applied to 
created items, and suggests, for instance of predicates, that when they are 
ascribed to God, they are applied 'analogically'.
The analogical for Aquinas is sharply distinguishable from the 
equivocal and from, the metaphorical. For him, an equivocal expression is 
an expression with at least two meanings - e.g. 'bank'. Clearly the 
Theist does not want to use language equivocally about God - he does not 
wish M s  predicates, say, to have a wholly distinct meaning from the meaning 
they have in ordinary contexts. Aquinas rules out the metaphorical as well 
as the literal as an apt characterisation of the central Theistic assertions 
such as 'God is a person', 'God is good', and so on. T M s  is because,
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according to him, at least, the metaphorical carries an implication that 
the item is not really as it is metaphorically said to he. Thus it may 
he apt to characterise God as a rock, in the course of a rather peripheral 
Theistic assertion, hut of course he is not really a rock. When the Theist 
says that God is good, or that God is a person, etc. then, according to 
Aquainas, his agnosticism about the ultimate character of divine personhood 
or goodness does not lead him to say that in the final analysis God is not 
really good, or that God is not really a person. Theists who placed greater 
emphasis on the via negative» might have taken this view, hut Aquinas does not. 
So the analogical for him is not a species of the figurative or metaphorical, 
hut of the literal.
One form of analogy Aquinas regards as being, on its own, unhelpful
to the Theist. In his famous example of 'healthy' he points out that a
diet and a complexion can he described as being healthy, hut only in so far
as they may he, respectively, the cause and the symptom of health in a man.
Neither a diet nor a complexion can literally have that property which is
attributed to a man when we say that he is healthy. Now, if we used this
kind of analogy alone in the case of '-is good', we might say that God is
good in as much as he causes the goodness of CEB's. Yet, as Aquinas points
out, God also causes bodies, hut we would not say that 'God is a body' on
those grounds. He has a doctrine that 'any perfection must he found also
1
in the cause of that effect' . In Aquinas' view, all perfections pre-exist 
in God in a higher or more adequate manner. So as far as Aquinas is 
concerned, this takes care of the problem of predicating perfections of God 
using a CEB language; the relation between God and creation does guarantee 
that those 'perfection' predicates say substantially more about God than 
that he is merely the cause of a created perfection. Unfortunately we 
cannot avail ourselves of this doctrine.
We require the other form of analogy which is suggested by some of 
the things Aquinas says. I refer to what commentators call the analogy
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of proportionality, but I am not interested in questions of interpreting 
Aquinas, and will develop the discussion in an infornai way.
If we understand a sentence such as 'The tree is alive' or 'The lion 
is alive', then we may well understand, 'by analogy' with these, the report 
of a returning astronaut from Mars - viz. 'Martian coral is alive'. We 
may imagine that 'Martian Coral' picks out some strange rock-like formation 
observed at such and such a spot on Mars. Items possess the property of 
being alive in virtue of their possession of other properties, such as 
their having such and such a chemical composition. But the properties in 
virtue of which a virus, for instance, is alive are hardly the very same 
properties in virtue of which a lion is alive, or in virtue of which earth 
coral is alive. Scientists might discover that, as a matter of contingent 
fact, all items that are alive on earth have such and such D.N.A. and R.N.A. 
features. But these features would not be a necessary condition for 
anything anywhere in the world to be alive; science fiction writers have 
speculated about the possibility of silicon based life forms on other 
pianéta. We may be reminded of discussion in Chapter 2 concerning the 
property goodness; this property, if a realist view is taken, may be 
possessed in virtue of all sorts of sets of other properties; there need 
be nothing in common to the properties in virtue of which A is good, and the 
properties in virtue of which B is good.
So far, of course, we have said nothing about what it is to understand 
'Martian coral is alive' by analogy with 'The tree is alive' etc. And as 
our discussion in Chapter 4 of the Sklar-type attempt to evade anti-realist 
arguments, and our subsequent invocation of the Krlpkean interpretation of 
Wittgensteinian rule following considerations showed, if we want to say 
anything about 'understanding by analogy' we must exercise great care.
Now I think it fair to say that on Aquinas' view, when a term is used 
analogically its meaning has shifted, or been 'extended' to ¡Some degree, 
from its 'standard meaning'. I now want to argue that when we understand
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'Martian coral is alive' by analogy with 'The tree is alive', the 'by 
analogy' refers to the process of extending our understanding so that we 
can grasp what it is for the truth condition for 'Martian coral is alive' 
to obtain. The 'by analogy' does not, in any obvious way, refer to the 
kind of meaning which the predicate '- is alive' has in a context in which 
it is ascribed to Martian coral in comparison with the meaning it has in 
contexts in which it is ascribed to earthly coral, a tree, a man, or 
whatever. Generalising the point for which I wish to argue to another 
example; when we understand 'God is a person' by analogy with our under­
standing of 'Jones is a person', the 'by analogy* refers to the process of 
going from our understanding of the truth condition for 'Jones is a person' 
to achieve some understanding at least of the truth condition for 'God is 
a person'• We are not concerned with the kind of meaning the predicate 
'- is a person' has in the divine context. A good deal more needs to be 
said about the latter, but I do not think that Aquinas can be our starting 
point for that. We should rather turn to certain kinds of theories of 
metaphor, and later in the chapter I do this.
Aquinas does speak apparently of meanings, and gives what might be
thought to be an argument for a difference in meaning, though not a total
difference being involved in 'analogical predication'. He says 'God is
more distant from any creature than any two creatures are from each other.
But there are some creatures so different that nothing can be said
univocally of them - for example, when they differ in genus. Much less,
2therefore, could there be anything said univocally of creatures and God .
But this is not a very good argument as it stands. Items belonging to 
widely differing categories can clearly share predicates with the same 
meaning. One well discussed example is '- is interesting'. It would 
be very implausible indeed to claim that is interesting' in 'The book 
is interesting' has even a partially different meaning from that which it 
has in 'The geology of the area is interesting', or 'Her idea is interesting'.
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This is not to deny, of course, that ''-is interesting' is capable of 
various meanings which may or may not overlap with the former cases - e.g.
'Her figure is interesting',or 'The sum of money you mention is interesting'.
But these shades of meaning do not correlate in any obvious way with the 
category or type of item to which the predicate is being applied. Let me 
mention other predicates which appear effortlessly to span categories.
' - is harmonious' might be predicated of societies, sounds, relationships, 
colours, diplomatic talks, etc. There is no obvious difference in the 
meaning of ' - is harmonious' here depending on the context. Other examples:
' - is efficient', ' - is long lasting' might be predicated of fashions, items 
of furniture, persons, etc. without evident ambiguity.
There may be thought to be strong intuitive plausibility to Aquinas' 
contention, however, in a number of important cases, even if not in all cases. 
'Exists' has been argued in the past to be 'systematically ambiguous', 
depending on the category of thing that is said to exist. We can say 
•Mountains exist', 'God exists', 'Numbers exist', 'Evil exists', and so on.
The thought that the existence of numbers is only 'analogous' to the 
existence of, say, mountains, and that 'exists' does not have exactly the 
same meaning when 'predicated' of numbers as it has when predicated of 
mountains, even though it does not have an entirely distinct meaning either, 
may seem to be an appealing one. Yet the conclusion here is controversial.
And how could the issue be settled? Not simply by pointing out that if, for 
instance, numbers exist they exist in very different ways from the ways in which 
mountains.exist. For this is true, but similar remarks can be made in cases 
where it is quite d e a r  that no ambiguity of predicate is involved - indeed, 
not even quite a small shift of meaning. If the bear is dangerous, it is 
dangerous in a very different way from the way in which the Moonies are 
dangerous. But there need be no ambiguity in ’ - is dangerous' here. There 
is a fatal weakness in expressions like 'has the property in a different way' 
which seems to rule out any definitive conclusions about meaning change.
Clearly God has many of his properties 'in a different way* from
created items; there may also he some sense of 'category' in which God
is categorially distinct from everything else. But God's categorial
distinctness, if he did indeed possess such a thing, would not as such entail
a general meaning shift in predicates when applied to him as opposed to being
applied to created items. I thus disagree with Ross's development of a
theory of analogy which he sees as historically continuous with Aquinas, since
he views it as a meaning change theory, as shown, for example, by his remark
'... it (the analogy hypothesis) helps us to notice that when same term
occurrences occur as predicates with categorially distinct subjects the sense
of the predicate term occurrences are appropriately modified; it is no
anomaly, then, that the predicate applied to creatures contract categorial
3contracts when applied to God' .
I see the analogy of proportionality as leaving open the question of 
whether language applied to God 'changes its meaning' in any way from the 
meaning it possesses in mundane contexts. In my view it makes a contri­
bution to our understanding of how CRB's can grasp something of the sense of 
sentences of the form 'God is p' when ' - is p' is a predicate standardly 
occurring in sentences used to attribute a property to mundane items, when 
the truth condition for 'God is p* is one not fully available to the knowledge 
and understanding of CRB's, and when the property attributed to God is 
unlikely to be the same property as that which would be attributed to some 
created item in a 'standard' application of the predicate. The contribution 
is in the form of a reminder that this type of understanding extension goes on 
all the time even within CRB language merely concerned with created items.
In our discussion of anti-realist arguments, we saw that a number of 
interpretations could be put upon 'not fully available to the knowledge and 
understanding of CRB's' and other expressions of the same ilk. The sense in 
which certain truth conditions concerning an unsurpassable being are not 
'fully available' in an epistemological sense to a CRB is a fairly strong one.
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But the CEB has to achieve whatever limited grasp is available to him of 
the divine state of affairs, on the basis of his grasp of mundane states of 
affairs which are truth conditions for sentences involving the ascription 
to an item of the very same predicate as that occurring in the sentence for 
which the divine state of affairs in question is a truth condition. We 
saw in Chapter 4 that the orthodox descriptions of how we achieve a grasp 
of a new sentence S whose truth condition we perhaps are not in a position to 
'recognize directly' on the basis of our grasp of other truth conditions were 
in danger of violating the rule-following considerations. The violation 
would occur if such descriptions invited us to think that the meaning of the 
predicate in S was determined by the rule: apply the predicate when such and 
such a property is present. But we also saw. that if we avoided a clash with 
the rule-following considerations, it did not then follow that we could attach 
no sense whatever to the thought that our grasp of new and possibly unrecogniz­
able truth conditions was based upon our grasp of other truth conditions with 
respect to which we were epistemologically and semantically more favoured.
And indeed, we surely achieve such a grasp of such states of affairs constantly. 
I grasp the truth condition for 'Caesar had an itchy toe' "on the basis" of my 
grasp of what it is for me, and for what it is for Jones across the road (etc.) 
to have an itchy toe. I grasp the truth condition for 'Martian coral is alive' 
on the basis of my grasp of truth conditions for 'Jones is alive', 'The oak is
t ' ■
alive, and so on. I grasp (though this example is admittedly different from 
the others) the truth condition for 'Jane's mood was tempestuous' on the basis 
of my grasp of the truth condition for, for instance, 'The weather was 
tempestuous'•
Of course, it must be conceded that nothing here has been said in 
'explanation' of how I grasp a fresh, and possibly unrecognizable truth 
condition "on the basis" of or "by analogy with" my grasp of other truth 
conditions. It is not entirely clear, actually, what kind of explanation 
there could possibly be. But the 'mystery', if any, is taken out of the
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process of understanding extension as it occurs from mundane to divine 
contexts, when we reflect that similar processes constantly take place from 
one mundane context to another - whether the fresh context involves something 
categorially distinct from the prior context, or something categorially 
similar.
Boss is surely right in so far as he can be understood as claiming that 
we often expect a fresh truth condition, when its sentence involves the ascrip­
tion of a predicate to an item which differs appreciably from those items to 
which the predicate is ascribed in sentences with whose truth conditions we are 
familiar, to involve the manifestation of a ’different’ property also. But 
these expectations are not essentially and universally linked to expectations 
of change in meaning of the predicate in question, as I have already argued.
We can understand a sentence the truth condition for which we have not yet 
encountered, or perhaps which we are unable to encounter, on the basis of, or 
by analogy with, other truth conditions for sentences involving the same 
predicate, even when we have no clear notion of the item to which the 
predicate is being applied in the fresh sentence whose truth condition we 
are attempting to grasp. Thus our returning spaceman might say: 'Tfre thing 
that the captain met near the Martian South Pole was wise'. We could under­
stand the meaning of this sentence perfectly well, whilst having no notion 
of what it was that the captain met, and not possessing in particular any
idea of the category of the thingihe captain met. (Evidently, the fact
that it could be 'met' does rule out certain categories). If we come to
learn in detail what it was that the captain met, our grasp of the truth
condition for the sentence will deepen; but it is not at all obvious that we 
will then conclude that either the meaning of the predicate ' - is wise' is
different in the new context, or that we will conclude that we were previously
4
unsure of the meaning of ' - is wise' in the new context .
To sum up this section: a 'theory of analogy' giving a prime role to 
the so-called analogy of proportionality may be seen as a kind of answer to
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the second question we posed in section 1 - viz. how is it possible for 
CEB's to understand language about God when it is first and foremost language 
for use in the context of created items; the CEB has to rely upon his grasp 
of the truth conditions of sentences concerning created items. It provides 
as much of an answer to this second question as can be given without at the 
same time there being an answer to the first question - how is it possible for 
there to be CEB language about God when properties ascribed to him will in 
many cases differ from those which may in principle be manifested by created 
items; how does divine language succeed in meaning what it does in fact 
mean? It is to this question that I now turn.
2. TEANSCENDENCE LANGUAGE AND METAPHOE THEOEY
There are some divine properties that CEB's cannot know about or tinder- 
stand, and some divine properties which, in principle, no created item could 
possess, even to a lesser degree. But all the Theist has at his disposal 
is a range of predicates in the standard use of which properties are 
attributed to created items. Even those divine properties which the Theist 
would claim to know something about, understand something of - properties 
which apparently in principle created items can share, such as aspects of the 
divine nature in virtue of which God is a person, differ to an extent (and to 
what dxtent it seems that the Theist cannot know) from those properties any 
created item would possess in virtue of being a person. This is because of 
the link between divine personhood properties, and other divine properties in 
virtue of which God is epistemologically and ontologically transcendent. 
Despite this fact, the Theist uses predicates ascribable to objects within 
creation, to attribute properties to God. Of at least some of these, the 
following is true. Either the properties which would be attributed to 
created items in uses of these predicates cannot be possessed by God, and/or 
such properties cannot be known or understood in the fullest way by CEB's 
when manifested in divine states of affairs.
Whilst in ’God is a person', the property attributed to God is not the
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same property as that property which would be attributed to any created 
item with * - is a person1, any suggestion that this is a case of simple 
ambiguity would of course be unacceptable to the Theist. We can find simple 
ambiguity in the standard example of 1 - is a bank'. That predicate has 
(at least) two meanings, and we can put this down to the fact that at least 
two distinct properties may be attributed to things in uses of this predicate - 
the property of being a financial institution, and the property of being the 
side of a river. Needless to say, there is no relation between the two 
meanings or the two properties involved. On the other hand, there must be a 
very close relation in the view of the Theist between the property attributed 
to a created item with ' - is a person*, and the property attributed to God 
with ' - i3  a person*.
The proposal I defend and explain in this chapter is that 'God is a 
person* is related to, say, 'Jones is a person* in the same kind of way as 
'The question is hard' is related to 'The chair is hard'. In the latter 
pair of sentences we do not have a case of simple ambiguity; as in ' — is a 
bank'. It is not entirely clear that there is any difference in meaning 
between the predicate ascribed to the chair, and the predicate ascribed to 
the question. What is_ evident here is that the property attributed to the 
chair is not the same property as the property attributed to the question.
What is involved in the chair's hardness includes being resistant to the touch, 
uncomfortable for sitting on, improved by cushions, etc. A question cannot 
have this property. A question cannot be harder, or less hard, than a chair. 
Yet there .clearly is a close relationship of some kind between the property 
possessed by the question, and the property possessed by the chair. Now it 
seems reasonable to me to describe ' - is hard' when ascribed to a question, 
as a metaphorical extension of ' - is hard' when ascribed to physical objects; 
admittedly the metaphor is old, tired, and scarcely discernible; if this 
bothers us we will have to pretend that we are living at a time when the 
metaphor was fresh - perhaps having been recently introduced by some
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prehistoric orator. Jor we are going to investigate what, for instance, 
would be the satisfactory account of * - is hard' as applied to questions - 
to explain what goes on in such metaphorical extension, and attempt to 
extend our theory for this and other similar cases to the central instances 
of Theistic language such as 'God is a person'.
Aquinas, we may remember, rejected the view that the central cases of 
religious language such as 'God is a person' were metaphorical, on the 
ground that if X is metaphorically P, then it is not really P at all. It 
was for this reason that he insisted that the analogical - his characterisa­
tion of much religious language - was a branch of the literal. I will be 
arguing ultimately that this rejection of metaphor involves a confusion.
Let me first sketch at slightly greater length those lines of thought which I 
claim involve the confusion.
The Theist might be half inclined to accept that 'God is a person' is 
literally false, but that this sentence is the best that CHB's can do in 
trying to capture a central feature of their God, given their limited 
knowledge and understanding of him. On the other hand, the Theist may 
also feel an opposite inclination — to deny that there is any sense in which 
'God is a person' is false. He would feel like asserting that it is after 
all, one of the most important statements that he wishes to make about God; 
his view could be that though God may elude CRB knowledge and understanding 
to a degree - God is ajt least what CRB' s thi nk he is, rather than merely 
different from what CRB's think he is. Hence, on this view, 'God is a 
person' is not so much false as insufficient.
A similar little debate can be held over many non-religious examples 
of metaphor - e.g. those used to describe features of personality. Consider 
'Alice has a sharp tongue'. On the one hand it may be felt that this is 
literally false, since there is nothing sharp about Alice's tongue - it 
would not cut paper, etc. On the other hand it may equally be claimed 
that there is something that is really true, which we express by saying that
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Alice has a sharp tongue.
I would argue that the confusion present in Aquinas and in these 
'debates' may be dispelled once we readh an understanding of what type of 
item is appropriately characterised by the predicate ' - is metaphorical'.
I am going to argue that there is one category of item to which ' is 
metaphorical' is primarily ascribable. In using the expression 'primarily'
I have in mind Aquinas' example ' - is healthy', where we can say that 
' - is healthy' is primarily ascribable to living things, and then, secondarily, 
to their diet, their complexion, etc. Without the primary application of 
' - is healthy' to living things, there could not be secondary applications 
for complexions, diets, ways of life, etc; but there could certainly be 
primary applications of ' - is healthy' without any secondary applications.
In common speech we ascribe the predicate ' - is metaphorical' to a great 
variety of items; - to meanings, words, expressions, sentences, uses of 
sentences, etc. It will be my contention that ' - is metaphorical' is 
primarily ascribable to one of these categories, and hence ascribable to 
others in a secondary fashion.
Let us assume, as in the chapter on Anti-realism, the Dummett-Frege
bipartite notion of the 'meaning' of a sentence (as uttered by a speaker on
a particular occasion) as being made up of 'sense' and 'force'. To grasp
the meaning of a sentence is to know the condition in which it is true. I
want also to assume that kinds of 'force' are kinds of illocutionary force -
5
as discussed, for instance in Searle's 'Speech Acts' . Following Austin 
Searle observes: 'Some of the English verbs denoting illocutionary acts are 
"state", "describe", "assert", "warn", "remark", "comment", "command", "order",
"request", "criticize", "apologize", "censure", "approve", "welcome", "promise",
6"object", "demand" and "argue"' . With these assumptions we may proceed.
Whatever is finally settled upon as the primary vehicle for the ascription 
of the predicate ■' - is metaphorical' must meet the following necessary 
condition; that if something is metaphorical, this entails that it is not
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literal. The reverse entailment need not obtain - if something is not 
literal, it might be ironical, hyperbolic, etc. I think we can see the 
necessity for the entailment if we sample instances of applications of 
M - is metaphorical". We can do this even before we have made up our 
minds about the question of to which category of item " - is metaphorical" 
is primarily ascribed. 'He spoke metaphorically* certainly entails 'He 
did not speak literally'. 'That is a metaphorical expression' entails 
'That is not a literal expression', and so on.
Without additional qualification, expression types and sentence types fail 
to meet the necessary condition as just set out. In Ancient Greece, Socrates 
might have said, albeit in stilted fashion: 'I have enabled you to conceive 
of a new theory'. There would have been metaphor here, drawn from a 
bddogical context. But if a teacher of philosophy said this to his student 
in 1982 there need be no metaphor present at all. It is a common place that 
language is full of dead metaphor - e.g. 'full' in the latter observation*
Dead metaphor is no longer metaphor at all. Suppose we are moved by this point 
to say, not that sentence types are the primary vehicle for the ascription of 
the predicate ' - is metaphorical', or, for that matter, expression types, but 
that tokens of them are at particular times. We suggest, that is that a 
particular utterance - an auditory or inscriptional token of a sentence"or 
expression may be characterised, as such, in primary fashion, as 
metaphorical, literal, etc. I would argue that this move also fails to 
meet the necessary condition set out above. Imagine that a token of 
'Mrs. Thatcher is a strong woman' is produced. The (Pregean) sense of 
this might be that Mrs. Thatcher is possessed of considerable physical 
strength. Or, on the other hand, its sense might be that Mrs. Thatcher is 
a very determined and effective woman. Which sense is expressed depends on 
a number of factors which we lump together and call the 'context'. Now, a 
context is conceivable in which an utterance of this sentence could express 
both senses at the same time; admittedly this is rather unlikely. Poets,
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however, often succeed in expressing a number of senses in one single line 
of verse. The point I want to make is that utterances per se could be both 
metaphorical and literal; they fail to meet the necessary condition, and so 
should not be regarded as the primary candidates for the ascription of * - is 
metaphorical'.
Can we take the sense itself as something to which ' - is metaphorical' 
is primarily ascribed? I think not. If this were right, the following
intolerable implications would arise. Imagine that an utterance U 'The
Prime Minister is a strong woman* were used to express a sense s to the 
effect that she is a woman of great determination. This sense would, 
presumably be aptly characterisable as metaphorical. On the view being 
considered, s could not be expressed in an utterance distinct from U in which 
no metaphor was involved. For if senses per se could be the primary vehicle 
of ascriptions of ' - is metaphorical', they would presumably be incapable 
of losing or gaining the property of being metaphorical, just as they are 
incapable of losing or gaining a particular truth value. If they have such 
and such a truth value, they just have it, timelessly. Similarly, if it 
were tarue that a sense was metaphori cal, that is what it would be, timlessly. 
Hence a view which took senses as the primary vehicles for the ascription of 
' - is metaphorical' would demonstrate at an implausible stroke the dogma 
that no metaphorical 'truth' can be 'translated' into a literal 'truth'.
Perhaps, then, being metaphorical, being literal, and the like, are 
kinds of illocutionary force, on a par with being a warning, being a question, 
being a statement, etc. But this cannot be right either. For a question 
may or may not involve metaphor; a command may be phrased literally or 
metaphorically, etc. Conclusive on this point is the observation made by 
Cohen that illocutionary force 'disappears' in reported speech, whereas 
metaphor is retained. If I say 'There is a bull in the next field', the 
force of my utterance may well be that of a warning. Later, someone may 
report me as follows: 'He warned Jones that there was a bull in the field'.
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The force of my utterance is reported, but it is no longer actually 
functioning; there is no force of warning in the report of my speech.
Cohen invites us to consider the example: 'The boy next door is a ball 
of fire'. If the metaphor here were somehow the illocutionary force of 
the utterance then it ought to disappear when this sentence appears in 
reported speech - i.e. as in 'Tom said that the boy next door is a ball of 
fire'. But whatever metaphorical life there is in 'ball of fire' when 
applied to the boy next door, it is equally present in direct and indirect
speech. Therefore, being metaphorical is not a form of illocutionary
7force .
Finally, should ' - is metaphorical' be regarded as a modifier of 
the main description of the illocutionary force of an utterance. There 
clearly are such modifiers - e.g. 'He commended the speech warmly'. 'She 
questioned him searchingly'. 'He warned her kindly' etc. I do think that 
'metaphorically' may grammatically modify an illocutionary force description 
'He warned me metaphorically', 'She stated it metaphorically', but it rarely 
if ever' logically modifies that description. Let me explain. Consider 
the following. 'Rudy is an attractive ballet dancer'. This can be read 
either as 'Rudy dances attractively' or as 'Rudy dances ballet and is 
attractive in some other way'. In the first reading we take 'attractively' 
as logically modifying Rudy's dancing; in the second reading we do not:
Q
'attractively' is only a grammatical modifier .
So, prima facie there are two ways of construing (w) 'I warn you 
metaphorically'. (l) We take 'metaphorically' as logically modifying 
'warn', so it means 'I am only warning you metaphorically - this is not a 
full blooded literal warning at all'. Or (2) we take 'metaphorically' as
a grammatical modifier only, so we read (w) as 'I am warning you, and I am 
using metaphorical language to do so'. The logical modifier reading does 
not seem to me to make much sense, whereas the grammatical modifier reading 
is perfectly in order. And it brings me to the point where I can put
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forward my own answer to the question 'To what is the predicate ' - is 
metaphorical' primarily ascribed'? - having now explained why I cannot 
accept a number of apparently possible answers.
' - is metaphorical' in my view primarily characterises the way a 
particular utter ance expresses the sense which it in fact expresses on 
the occasion on which it occurs. So an utterance may be described as 
having such and such an illocutionary force, and also its mode of 
expression can be characterised as metaphorical, literal, etc. If the 
utterance expresses its sense metaphorically, this does exclude the 
possibility that it expresses that sense on that occasion literally; thus 
the necessary condition set out earlier is fulfilled. My view permits 
the bare possibility, mentioned earlier, than an utterance might on a 
particular occasion express two or more senses. It might even express 
one sense literally, and another sense metaphorically, on that occasion.
This view does allow for the fact that we characterise in ordinary speech 
all sorts of things as 'metaphorical'. I would claim that such ascriptions 
are 'secondary'. Hence we say that 'planning blight' is a metaphorical 
expression based on disease afflicting certain plants - e.g. potatoes.
What this means is that a sentence such as 'The value of Jones' house was 
adversely affected by planning blight' is 'typically' used to express a 
sense metaphorically. But the metaphor is already a fairly lifeless affair - 
and in time could become entirely moribund; we could imagine a future, in 
particular,- where plants no longer acquired 'blight' yet where the expression 
'planning .blight' retained currency in the language. We would then have 
that same sentence 'The value of Jones house was adversely affected by 
planning blight' as 'typically' expressing a sense literally. What I am 
maintaining is that at present 'planning blight' is said to be metaphorical, 
but that this is only in a secondary fashion, on the basis of the fact that 
sentences containing it are currently used to express senses metaphorically.
We are now ready to return to Aquinas' objection to characterising
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central theistic statements as metaphorical, and to explain the allegation 
of confusion. The sense metaphorically expressed by 'Alice has a sharp 
tongue' is, at least in part, the thought that she is good at saying nasty 
things. And if it is true that she is good at saying nasty things,‘there 
is nothing half-baked about this truth; it is not, because metaphorically 
expressed, a watered down kind of truth. What is metaphorical is not the 
truth but the way it is expressed. We have not yet discussed how this 
happens; we will be investigating this shortly when we move on to consider 
theories of metaphor.
Aquinas need not object to saying of the most important and central 
religious assertions that they are metaphorical, on the ground that this 
means that they are not really true. If it is true that God is a rock, 
then whatever sense an utterance of 'God is a rock' might express 
metaphorically, just is true, not in any sense 'half true'. Part of the 
sense that is expressed metaphorically is that God is such as to be worthy 
of complete and unqualified trust, or something of that kind. And if God 
is being said to be like this, there is nothing half-hearted about the 
assertion, as perhaps is suggested by the idiom 'metaphorically true'. A
consequence of saying that 'God is a rock' expresses its sense metaphorically 
is that we can go on to say - 'But God is not really a rock'. However, when 
we say the latter, we are not retracting the sense that might be expressed 
by the first utterance. We are ruling out a possible sense that the first 
utterance might have expressed, had it been doing its expressing literally 
and not metaphorically - viz. a sense to the effect that God is physically a 
rock - of granite constitution, perhaps.
At first sight, the same kind of analysis of 'God is a person' is less 
convincing, but I hope to show that, in the end, the same kind of thing can 
be said about all such examples. If 'God is a person' can metaphorically 
express a sense, that sense or proposition can have a truth value in as full 
a fashion as any other sense or proposition that is literally expressed.
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Now, a consequence of saying that 'God is a person* expresses its sense 
metaphorically ought to be, following the 'rock* case, that we can go on 
to say 'But God is not really a person*. Unlike the 'rock* case, this 
would seriously worry the Theist. He does want to say that God really is 
a person. On the view that I am putting forward, when we say that God is 
not really a person, we are not retracting the genuine and important sense 
which an utterance of 'God is a person* may metaphorically express. We are, 
rather, denying that possible sense which it might have expressed, had it 
expressed a sense literally.
Suppose for a moment what I am denying - that 'God is a person'
expresses its sense literally when uttered by a Theist in an appropriate
religious context. If this were so, there would seem to be no reason why
we should not treat the ascription of the predicate ' - is a person* in the
divine context as being similar to the ascription of that same predicate in,
usay 'Jones is a person'. Hence the kind of personhood being attributed to 
God would at least involve the same property - that of being a person, as that 
attributed to Jones. Yet, of course, I have argued that whatever it is about 
God in virtue of which 'God is a person' is true differs significantly from 
whatever it is about Jones in virtue of which 'Jones is a person' is true.
This strongly suggests, then, that 'God is a person' cannot express its sense 
literally in the characteristic religious context of utterance. We do not, 
however, have an argument here for the claim that it expresses its sense 
metaphorically instead. At the moment I am trying to show the plausibility 
of suggesting that it is expressing its sense metaphorically, by showing how 
it compares with other examples which clearly do involve metaphorical 
expression.
We certainly feel uneasy about the apparent implication of characterising 
the mode of sense expression as metaphorical - viz. that God is not really a 
person. Our unease should be dispelled once it is pointed out that the same 
resistance to the implication - of the form 'But S is not really P' may be
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experienced in many other cases which are less controversially described
as metaphorical* These are the cases of 'irreducible metaphor' noted by 
9 10Alston and added to by Searle . Alston cites cases of language about 
mental states - 'the stabbing pain', 'she feels depressed', etc* These 
are, as he puts it 'in the position of metaphors that cannot die'^. In 
addition Searle mentions spatial language that is used about time. For 
example, 'Time flies', 'The hours crawled by' - 'I don't want to cut my 
stay short*. An interesting feature of these examples, as well as of'God 
is a person' and the like, is that it is counter-intuitive to follow them 
up with a remark of the form: 'But X is not really P'. For example, we 
should apparently follow a claim that 'I have a stabbing pain' expresses its 
sense metaphorically, with 'But the pain is not really stabbing'. The 
denial is supposed to rule out a possible sense that the sentence might 
have expressed literally, to the effect that a pain could really stab you, 
say in the leg, as could a knife or a dagger. Yet such a denial is 
admittedly difficult to take seriously, since we do wish to maintain, actually, 
that the pain really is a stabbing pain, Again, consider the assertion that 
'The hours crawled by' expresses its sense metaphorically. We are supposed 
to follow this up with something like: 'But they did not really crawl by*.
Our denial is supposed to rule out a possible sense that the first sentence 
might express literally,- to the effect that hours might really crawl, as do 
crocodiles or babies. And again, we feel a reluctance to go ahead with the 
denial, in view of our concern to maintain that the hours really did crawl by.
It seems characteristic of irreducible metaphor of the form 'S is P' that 
the implied denial 'But S is not really P' 'feels' wrong. I would claim that 
this feeling is not symptomatic of the presence of any cogent philosophical 
reasons for failing to make the denial in these sorts of cases.
We now need to explain in a little more detail what irreducible metaphor 
is supposed to be, and to show that if central Theistic statements such as 
'God is a person' express a sense metaphorically at all, then irreducible
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metaphor is the kind of metaphor that is concerned. Suppose 'Jones is
cold' metaphorically expresses a sense s (to the effect that Jones is not
given to displays of emotion, and, indeed, does not seem to feel anything
very strongly). We can also express a sense s' which has a close affinity
to s. An utterance of: 'Jones is unemotional* would literally express
such a sense s'. But s' cannot be identified with s, for what we are
compelled to call the 'coldness* of Jones character has somehow been
omitted; what has been left out is a resemblance of some kind between Jones'
character and the physical quality of coldness. (This way of treating the
matter needs defence; I provide this shortly). When I go on to discuss
theories of metaphor I will have some more to say; and the notion of
12irreducible metaphor itself requires some defence. Black and others who 
deny in general that metaphors can be provided with literal paraphrases would 
not want to make the distinction between irreducible and reducible metaphors 
at all.
Why, if 'God is a person' expresses its sense metaphorically, can there 
be no possible utterance which would express that very same sense literally? 
Imagine that 'God is a person', when uttered on a particular occasion, 
metaphorically expresses a sense s. And suppose also, how, for the sake of 
reductio, that it is also possible to express a literally in an utterance 
of a distinct sentence (s) 'God is Q'. Since the predicate ' - is Q' occurs 
in such a literal context, there would be no reason to think that a different 
property would be attributed to God in an utterance of (s) from the property 
attributed to Jones in 'Jones is Q'. But it has already been argued that
there must be aspects of that about God in virtue of which he is a person
which differ essentially from that about any created item in virtue of which 
it would be a person. Hence it could not be the case that the same property
would be attributed to God in an utterance of (s) as would be attributed to
Jones in an utterance of 'Jones is Q*. From this it seems to follow that 
the possibility that s might be literally expressed by an utterance of (s)
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is rulej out. It looks as though any alternative mode of expressing s will 
involve just as much metaphorical expression as the original 'God is a person', 
if, indeed, the latter involves metaphor at all. It is characteristic of 
irreducible metaphor that any attempt at alternative modes of expressing 
whatever sense is concerned also involves metaphorical expression.
3. COMPARISON METAPHOR
I now want to defend the thesis that the central assertions of religious
discourse about a transcendent God involve comparison metaphors. In order
to do this, I need to explain what comparison metaphors are supposed to be,
and to examine alternative theories of metaphor, together with some of their
objections to comparison theories. I do not claim that all metaphor involves
comparison; I suggest that discussions of metaphor often suffer from the
implicit assumption that there is just one kind of phenomenon called metaphor;
in my view there are quite a variety of semantic phenomena at issue here.
Aristotle is the classical source of comparison theory. He examines
the question of metaphor both in his 'Rhetorica' and in his 'De Poetica'.
Whilst approving strongly of metaphor, he clearly thought of it as something
extra - added to the language to make it more vivid. He remarksi- Clearness
is secured by using the words (nouns and verbs) alike that are normal and 
13ordinary* . Aristotle thought that 'Metaphor consists in giving the thing
14a name that belongs to something else' , and that this essentially involves 
comparison. He observes: 'The simile is a metaphor: the difference is but 
slight. When the poet says of Achilles that he "leapt on the foe as a lion" 
this is simile: when he says of him "The lion leapt", it is a metaphor - here,
»15since both are courageous, he has transferred to Achilles the name of 'lion' .
And he adds a little later: '...those which succeed as metaphors will obviously
do well as similes, and similes, with the explanation omitted, will appear as 
16metaphors' .
Aristotle has been alleged by some to hold a form of 'object comparison' 
theory of metaphor. According to such a theory, metaphor puts the name 'A'
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of one object in the place of 'B', the name of another object, to suggest 
a comparison between A and B. Thus Achilles is referred to as a lion, 
implying that Achilles and the lion resemble each other in one or more respects 
The comparison theory in this form is open to the obvious objection that the 
object selected and suggested for comparison may not exist. For instance, 
one might say of a mean professional colleague at Christmas: 'Scrooge has 
gone into his room'. The objection depends on the thought that it would be 
nonsense to say that a real existent resembled something which did not exist, 
in such and such respects, since objects which do not exist cannot have 
properties. I shall assume that this thought is right . (To anyone who 
wanted to argue that non-existent objects can have properties, I would simply 
say that I would rather avoid the issue, especially as a more plausible 
version of a comparison theory which I support does not involve the 
comparison of 'objects' at all).
Aristotle's account of simple metaphors involving comparisons - those 
which can, on his view, just as easily be expressed in similes, suggest that 
sudh metaphors can be 'paraphrased' by literal alternatives. That is to say, 
in terms of the conceptual framework employed in the last section, the sense 
expressed metaphorically by a certain utterance, can also be expressed 
literally by a distinct utterance.
A more plausible version of the comparison theory, but still in the 
Aristotelian tradition, is that properties rather than objects are compared*
A property of Achilles, for example, is implied by the metaphor to be like a 
property of a lion. By 'property' is meant 'universal', as opposed to actual 
instances of properties — the universal redness, rather than the redness of 
the pillar box near the police station in the centre of Sheffield - the 
universal courage, rather than the courage exhibited by Achilles on a 
particular occasion. Such a theory enables us, say, to speak of the property 
of being a dragon as being more like the property of being a lizard than it 
is like the property of being a horse, and other things of this kind. There
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do, not have to be such things as real dragons for a property comparison 
account of a metaphor such as 'Mrs. Jones is a dragon' to be intelligible.
On such an account, certain universals exemplified by Mrs. Jones are said, 
by means of an utterance of this sentence, to resemble certain universals 
associated with dragons.
The 'property comparison' version of a comparison theory of metaphor
18escapes another objection levelled by Searle against such theories. He 
objects that even if the object with which the comparison is made does 
exist, it may not possess the appropriate property. Consider 'Richard is 
a gorilla'. This, on the comparison view, compares properties of Richard 
with properties of a gorilla; if sufficient resemblances obtain between 
the properties, then an utterance of the sentence in question may express a 
sense or proposition that is true. In most contexts, it is clear that the 
properties of gorillas being put forward for comparison would be such as 
fierceness, nastiness and proneness to violence. 'But suppose ethological 
investigation shows... that gorillas are not at all fierce and nasty .
My response to this is that since it is universals that are being 
compared, and not instances of properties, it would not matter in the least 
if gorillas turned out not to have those properties that most people at 
present believe them to have. The presence of the term 'gorilla' may be 
regarded simply as an aid to the identification of which universal(s) are 
being referred to; it can perform this role even if gorillas turn out not 
to have those characteristics that most people at present believe them to 
have. Of.course, once the gentle nature of gorillas became common knowledge, 
then, over the long term at least, it would become impossible to use a token 
of 'Richard is a gorilla' to express metaphorically the sense it could easily 
express at present.
It.- is argued by Searle and others that it must be incorrect to construe 
all metaphors as comparisons, for in some cases there is no such s im ila r i t y  as 
a comparison should reveal. Now I do not want to say, as, indeed I remarked
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earlier, that every case of what might reasonably be called metaphor 
involves comparison, Nonetheless, since the examples Searle uses to 
refute, as he thinks, comparison theories are those very examples of 
metaphor that I am claiming to be closest to sentences of religious ' 
language such as 'God is a person' I will dwell for a while on his comments, 
Searle would deny, for example, that there is any similarity between 
coldness and being unemotional which would support 'Alice is cold' in a 
metaphorical expression of a sense to the effect that Alice is unemotional.
In 'Time flies' or 'The hours crawled by' there is nothing, according to 
him, that time does and the hours do which is literally like flying or 
crawling. Instead, he thinks that metaphors of this kind are based on mere 
psychological association - contingent facts about our sensibilities, whether 
culturally or naturally determined. The plausibility of his contentions 
here rests upon the fact that some examples rather like the ones he gives 
quite clearly do rest upon 'facts about our sensibilities! There is no 
similarity, for example, between sad music and a sad person, We can 
sometimes say, (perhaps) metaphorically, that the music is sad because, as 
a result of our contingent sensibilities, the music makes us feel sad. As 
this example looks rather like Aquinas' 'healthy' example, some might prefer 
not to call it metaphor at all, but to speak of 'analogy' instead.
Nevertheless, I am inclined to dispute that Searle is correct on 
examples of metaphors about mental states, abstract objects, time, etc.
If he is right about any, he is certainly not right about all. I want to 
assert, for example, that there is a similarity between hardness - the 
property of a chair (for instance), and hardness - the property of a question; 
a similarity between the property of being hot or fiery, and the property of 
being prone to sudden fits of temper ('hot tempered' etc.). Searle's 
dismissal of a comparison account strikes me as specially implausible for 
those cases where terms are transferred from one sensory modality to another - 
'A sharp sound (touch to sound), 'A rough sound' (the same) 'harmonious colours'
(sound to sight) etc.
But again, the issue is confused, and Searle's line made to seem more 
convincing then it should by the presence even in this area of some instances 
which do seem to fit what he says. A 'loud colour', for instance, is not a t. 
colour which possesses a non-relational property which resembles some 
non-relational property that a sound might possess. The situation is rather 
that as a result of our contingent sensibilities, certain colours and certain
isounds cause us to notice them particularly; we notice loud sounds particularly, I 
hence we call certain colours that we notice more than others, 'loud', etc.
(Though this may not be the full story - there is a suggestion of vulgarity in j 
'loud colour').
Searle's argument that in none of these cases can the metaphor be based j
on any kind of similarities is simply that the similarities cannot be stated.
'...the bald assertion of similarity, with no specification of the respect of !
20similarity, is without content' . His remarks seem to me to ignore the 
possibility that there may be genuine similarities which are such that they 
cannot be said to obtain by means of any utterance which expresses its sense 
literally. Searle assumes that a 'literal similarity' must be capable of 
literal expression. This could be a substantial thesis. If so, we are
entitled to ask him how he knows it to be true - he has not shown it. He 
might make it a matter of definition that a literal similarity was capable 
of literal expression. We could then ask him why there should not also be 
similarities not literal in his sense. What, if any grounds could there be 
for the claim that such similarities would not be 'genuine' similarities?
There might be different reasons why different brands of similarities could
i
not be specified literally.
Why we should be unable, for example, to explain in literal terms what 
the similarity is between the hardness of a question and the hardness of a 
chair is difficult to say. But is the onus on us to explain, failing which 
any claimed similarity can be denied? After all, we can provide an
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explanation of the similarity of a kind - that the question makes us feel 
uncomfortable - it resists solution - hard objects also can make us feel 
uncomfortable - they are resistant to the touch» Yet our 'explanation' 
still seems to be couched in metaphorical form. Indeed, I think that the 
'hard question' is an example of irreducible metaphor, and any attempt to ■ 
describe the similarity between the hardness of the question and the hard­
ness of objects will involve metaphorical expression. But does any of this 
suggest that there cannot be a similarity? I cannot see that it does.
In the case of religious language, of course, the Theist will explain 
that God's ontological transcendence prevents many of his aspects from being 
specified literally, for the possibility of literal specification seems to 
entail the possibility that God has the same property that a created item 
could in principle possess. And there are divine properties of which this 
is not true.
Let me summarise now the version of the property comparison theory which
I think is appropriate for, say 'Man is a w o l f , and for many other similar
examples, and state how the theory might work for religious statements. The
comparison theory, as I see it, does not pretend to. provide a comprehensive
explanation of how given sentence types with such and such meanings, are
capable of such and such metaphorical expression of such and such senses.
It claims rather to give a basic sketch of the content of the sense of an
utterance which is expressed metaphorically. 'Man is a wolf' can metaphorically
express a sense with the following' content: certain universals exemplified in
man resemble certain universals thought to be exemplified by wolves. Like 
21Olscamp I want to say that,in cases where the sense takes a truth value, 
the matter is settled by whether enough of the claimed resemblances obtain.
The sense expressed by many of these utterances involving comparison metaphor 
could equally well be expressed literally by an utterance of a-distinct 
sentence; in such an explicit literal formulation, the respective universals 
would be identified, and the respects in which the resemblances were supposed
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to hold would be spelled out*
Also, there are irreducible comparison metaphors. The sense 
expressed by these is still to the effect that similarities obtain between 
certain universals. 'The question is hard' can say that certain universals 
exemplified by this question resemble in some respects universals believed 
to be exemplified by physically hard things. 'Time flies' can say that our 
perception of the passing of time exemplifies certain universals, which 
resemble in certain respects universals believed to be exemplified by flying 
objects, etc. Alternative means of expression of the nature of the 
similarities are available, but these will still be metaphorical. No 
utterances can literally express a sense, the content of which is the nature
of the similarities in question.
22Black, and later Searle himself, objects to comparison theories because
they are too vague. Resemblance or similarity must be in some respect (s)
but anything can be said to resemble anything in some respect. 'Inasmuch as
similarity is a vacuous predicate we need to be told in what respect two
things are similar for the statement that they are similar to have informa- 
23tive content'.
Now I defend a comparison theory to defend the point that the obtaining 
of resemblances is part of the truth condition of the sense of proposition 
that gets metaphorically expressed. This is, in some sense, a rather 
general and 'vague' thesis. If Searle is suggesting that, say, the sentence 
type 'Man is a wolf' - the standard meanings of the words it contains - is 
not alone sufficient for fixing the sense which it may metaphorically express, 
he is right, but would not be right to complain about it. The sentence taken 
by itself fails to indicate in what respects the similarity is supposed to hold. 
Nevertheless, anyone able to use and understand the sentence, having an 
adequate grasp of the semantic rules for the use of 'man', 'wolf', together 
with a background of knowledge and culture essential to the language user, 
will be pointed by the meaning of the sentence type in the right direction.
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In addition - the full detail of the context of utterance - the speaker 
and hearer's shared beliefs about mankind, their previous conversation, 
etc* will finally clinch the respects in which the comparison is being made.
I said that the context 'finally clinches' the respects in which the ’ 
resemblances are being asserted. Yet it is true that in many cases, at 
least, no very exact range of resemblances has to obtain to a precise degree 
for the metaphorical expression to succeed. I agree with Black that 
metaphors, like much other language, are not intended to be absolutely 
precise. But this does not mean that they do not have truth conditions.
If insufficient resemblances obtain then the sense which is metaphorically 
expressed is not true.
'God is a person' can say, metaphorically, that certain universals 
exemplified by God resemble in certain respects universals believed to be 
exemplified by, e.g. humans who are persons. No literal expression of the 
resemblances is possible. That the resemblances obtain is, on the view I 
am defending, part of the content of the sense or proposition which such a 
sentence could metaphorically express.
Again, someone like Searle might be inclined to complain that this 
proposal is vague. The only response to this is that we have to rely upon 
the context of the utterance of a sentence such as 'God is a person' to 
ensure that a reasonably precise sense is expressed. This context is 
likely to consist of a community of religious believers, who worship together. 
Bach of them takes it that their fellow members are directing worship to the 
same unsurpassable being as the being who is the object of their own worship. 
BAch will be aware of at least some of their fellows' beliefs about God.
Some of these beliefs may not be expressible in language, and some of them 
will not be entirely comprehensible (see the previous chapter for discussion 
of this). It may be that the community in question has some kind of shared 
religious experience. All these features of context serve to constrain the 
possible senses that 'God is a person' might express. Were we able to be
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entirely explicit and precise about how this happens we would almost have 
given a specification of the sense itself in so doing. However, it has
been argued that no literal specification is possible. Hence we will have
to rest content with our general reflections here on the influence of 
context.
I now turn to a brief consideration of alternative theories of metaphor, 
explaining why, at the very least, they cannot cover all metaphor, and also 
why they would not help the Theist. First,' I will look briefly at Max 
Black’s well known ’interaction’ view of metaphor. He considers ’Man is 
a wolf’. It has, he claims, two subjects; man or men, the principle 
subject, and Wolf or wolves - which is the subsidiary subject. To Tinder- 
stand the metaphor we need to understand the system of ’associated 
commonplaces' concerning wolves that they are fierce, carnivorous, treacherous, 
etc. This is a system of popular beliefs about wolves, not all of which may 
be true'. The effect, then, of (metaphorically) calling a man a "wolf" is 
to evoke the wolf-system of related commonplaces. If the man is a wolf, he 
preys upon other animals, is fierce, hungry, engaged in constant struggle ... 
each of these implied assertions has now to be made to fit the principle 
subject (the man) either in normal or abnormal senses... Any human trait 
that can without undue strain be talked about in "Wolf language” will be
24rendered prominent, and any that cannot will be pushed into the background'.
For Black, the meaning of the metaphor is somehow a result of the interaction 
of a system of beliefs about man, with a system of beliefs - which need not 
be true, about wolves. Black denies that a literal expression of the metaphor 
is possible - 'the loss in such cases is a loss in cognitive content...it
(the literal, paraphrase) fails to be a translation because it fails to give
25the ihpight that the metaphor did'. Black does allow that there may be 
such things as comparison metaphors, but claims that they are trivial and 
unimportant.
The problem I have with Black's view, is that he is not so much wrong,
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as not talking about the sense which may get itself metaphorically expressed. 
When he says that the meaning of a metaphor is the result of an ’interaction’ 
he is surely talking about the psychological effect of the metaphor on the 
hearer. Now, the affect of the metaphor on the hearer - indeed, the effect 
of any utterance on the hearer cannot be identified with the sense of the 
utterance, although clearly the effect on the hearer will to some extent 
depend on the sense expressed by the utterance. Since the version of 
comparison theory that I am advancing aims to explain what the sense of 
certain metaphorical utterances is, Black's comments about 'interaction' 
are compatible, for the most part, with a comparison account of sense.
Black's observations about the unavailability of literal paraphrases are 
seriously misleading, however. It may be that an utterance which literally 
expresses the same sense as that expressed metaphorically by a distinct 
utterance, will not have the same effect on a hearer - it will not be so 
effective, so vivid, etc. But this does not show that the sense expressed 
by a metaphorical utterance involving Black's process of 'interaction' 
cannot also be expressed by a literal utterance.
Searle criticises both comparison theories and interaction theories
to such an extent that he feels obliged to put forward a theory of his own.
He argues that the idea of comparison may be involved in the process of
comprehension of metaphor but is not, as he puts it, part of the meaning of
metaphor since the existence of similarity is not part of the truth condition
of the sense expressed metaphorically by whatever utterance is in question.
Since I have already rejected in the foregoing discussion much of Searle's
criticism of comparison theory I do not feel obliged, as he does, to
abandon comparison theory. Furthermore, the Theist has particular reason
to reject Searle's view. Searle inquires: 'How is it possible for the
speaker to say metaphorically 'S is P' and mean 'S is R' where P plainly
does not mean R: furthermore, how is it possible for the hearer who hears
26
the utterance 'S is P' to know that the speaker means 'S is R'? Searle's
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broad answer, which he details in a complex and sophisticated way at the 
end of his paper is that the utterance of P calls to mind the meaning, and 
hence, truth condition, associated with R in the special ways that 
metaphorical utterances have of calling other things to mind, and he 
specifies some of these ways. Reverting now to our example of ’God is a 
person', a Searlian view of it would be roughly as follows. The Theist says 
'God is a person', meaning 'God is X', where 'person' plainly does not mean 
the same as 'X', but somehow 'God is a person' calls to mind the meaning, 
and hence truth conditions associated with X. Now the meaning and truth 
conditions associated with ' - is X' are available to the Theist if at all 
via the same sort of metaphorical language of which 'God is a person' is 
(or so I have suggested) in the first place. We saw earlier that language 
about God, if metaphorical because of his ontological transcendence, must be 
irreducibly metaphorical. Otherwise his ontological transcendence is 
ultimately infringed. And now, on the Searle view, the Theist will have 
the same problem in understanding 'God is X' as he had in understanding 'God 
is a person', and a vicious infinite regress threatens to ensue; vicious 
since before the Theist can understand one piece of. irreducibly metaphorical 
language about God he must understand an infinite number of other pieces of 
irreducibly metaphorical language.
27In his paper 'What metaphors mean' Davidson argues that there is no 
special metaphorical dimension of meaning, but that metaphors are sentences 
with an ordinary literal meaning which have certain effects: 'Metaphor makes
us see one -thing as another by making some literal statement that inspires or
28prompts the insight'. '..what we attempt in 'paraphrasing' a metaphor
cannot be to give its meaning, for that lies on the surface: rather, we
29attempt to evoke what the metaphor brings to our attention'. I agree with 
Davidson that expression types and sentence types do not have anything other 
than their ordinary meaning when figuring in an utterance which expresses a 
sense metaphorically. But in my view it is the combination of the words in
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their standard meaning with the context of the utterance that enables the 
sense to get expressed metaphorically. A3 against Davidson, I would want to 
deny that any literal expression of a sense goes on in the course of an 
utterance which expresses a sense metaphorically. Davidson's idea would be, 
presumably, that in say 'Man is a wolf' we have a sense literally expressed to 
the effect that Man is a wolf, and that though this is false, it evokes certain 
effects in the hearer. But surely, no such sense is expressed. Indeed, it 
is difficult to imagine what such a sense would be if it were expressed - it 
would be nearer incoherence than falsity. And other more interesting 
metaphors would provide intractable problems for Davidson's claim that a 
sense is literally expressed:
'But I will wear my heart upon my sleeve
For doves to peck at'
(Othello)
It is arguable that a perfectly clear and coherent sense gets expressed 
metaphorically here. But if we asked Davidson to provide us with a literally 
expressed sense which has such and such effects, I suspect that he would be 
utterly at a loss.
To conclude this discussion of transcendence language, let us take 
stock of what a theory of comparison metaphor can do for the Theist. It 
will be recalled that the first question we posed was: how is it possible 
for the Theist to say something different about God from what he would have 
said about a created object with the same language? The suggestion made 
in this chapter is that the Theist uses comparison metaphor. Ve defended 
the answer by showing that comparison metaphor appears to achieve similar 
feats in other contexts. We attribute a different property to a sound, 
when we say 'It was a sharp sound' from the property we attribute to a 
knife when we say 'It was a sharp knife'. In doing this, it was argued, 
we express a sense to the effect that certain similarities obtain between 
the universal sharpness, exemplified by, say knives, and certain universals 
exemplified by the sound in question. Context of utterance plays an
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important role in determining what these similarities are supposed to he.
If the Theist does indeed use comparison metaphor to speak of a transcendent 
God, then, we saw, this metaphor may well have to be irreducible.
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